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Abstract  
Feyerabend’s later philosophy was a sustained defence of cultural and epistemic 
diversity. After Against Method (1975) Feyerabend argued that his rejection of 
methodological monism challenged the presumed unity and superiority of scientific 
knowledge and practices. His later philosophy was therefore dedicated to a 
reassessment of the merits of a wide range of ‘non-scientific’ traditions present 
throughout non-Western indigenous cultures. Feyerabend drew upon the resources of 
anthropology and environmental and development studies to argue that the cognitive 
and practical merits of a variety of indigenous medical, environmental, and 
classificatory systems had been denied or disregarded. The consequence of these 
reassessments was epistemic pluralism. Western scientific and cultural practices 
represent many but by no means all of these and attempts to assert their cross-cultural 
value have resulted in enormous environmental, social, and intellectual destruction. 
Feyerabend here drew upon John Stuart Mill’s claim that both human wellbeing and the 
growth of knowledge are best served by a diversity of forms of life and modes of 
inquiry. Such diversity is threatened by the cognitive and cultural authority of the 
Western sciences and Feyerabend therefore insisted that moral and political concerns 
are an essential component of the philosophy of science. Throughout the thesis I argue 
that the later Feyerabend anticipated many subsequent themes in the philosophy of 
science, such as pluralism, values in science, and political and postcolonial philosophies 
of science. The irreducibly pluralistic character of the sciences arises from the diverse 
values and concerns of human beings, on the one hand, and the complexity of the 
natural world, on the other, and this claim is developed at length in Feyerabend’s final 
book Conquest of Abundance (1999). Feyerabend’s work served to unify these 
contemporary philosophical and political concerns and also to demonstrate their 
continuity with the older ‘post-positivist’ philosophies of science. I conclude that the 
later Feyerabend presented an optimistic and humane vision of global cultural and 
epistemic diversity and of the role of the Western sciences in the modern world, rather 
than lapsing into the ‘anti-science’ polemics and ‘cultural relativism’ with which his 
work has come to be associated. 
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‘I am neither countenancing nor condemning the things 
Feyerabend describes. I am merely describing aspects of the 
beast “science” that we have been wont to overlook—even 
better, to wish away, to repress. But such things will not go 
away.’ (Mitroff, 1976b: 605) 
 
 
‘Of course the later Feyerabend had some rather odd things to 
say, but it isn’t like buying a car—you don’t have to take the 
whole package.’ (Patricia Churchland, quoted in Bechtel and 
Callabaut, 1993: 367) 
 
 
‘One could ask the question whether science is not just our 
magic. Now, I am not Feyerabend. He might perhaps ask this 
question; I won’t go quite as far.’ (Karin Knorr-Cetina, quoted 
in Bechtel and Callebaut, 1993: 184) 
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Preface 
Feyerabend covers a lot of ground, often quickly and without clear purpose. Rather 
like an over-enthusiastic tour guide, he races from one topic to another—quantum 
theory to art history, Homer to Laozi, and back again. Such energetic eclecticism is 
exhilarating and very entertaining, but it can be easy to get lost in it. Structure and 
coherence often suffers and so reading him can invite frustration, if one is not patient 
and good-natured. This is one of two occupational hazards of Feyerabend scholarship. 
The first is keeping track of what he is saying, and why he is saying it; the second is 
resisting being seduced by his rhetoric, playfulness, and intellectual zeal. Critics often 
complain that Feyerabend alleges too much and argues too little. They are often right, 
and it took me some time—more than a few years, in fact—to become able to read 
Feyerabend whilst keeping his rhetorical excesses and occasional philosophical 
deficiencies in sight. Although Feyerabend valued individuality above all else, it is easy 
to become seduced by him and to become ‘Feyerabended’. Hopefully, this thesis does 
both him and me justice; I should be disappointed on both counts if not. Of course, any 
faults in this work are my own. 
I have always liked F.H. Bradley’s (striking Feyerabendian) remark, in Appearance 
and Reality, that ‘I have really observed no rule of progress, except to get forward in the 
best way that I can’ (Bradley, 1893/2000: 225). For a writer like Feyerabend, whose 
interests varied so much, this advice seems especially suitable, and I confess it also 
appeals to my own ‘philosophical temperament’, to use William James’s term. 
Hopefully the end process of such optimistic scrabbling around is more coherent than 
an awareness of its authors’ ‘methodology’ might suggest. I hope, finally, that reading 
this thesis will be enjoyable as well as educative; that mattered to Feyerabend as much 
as it matters to me. 
During the course of my writing, certain sections of this thesis saw publication 
elsewhere. My treatment of Kierkegaard’s influence on Feyerabend appeared in Studies 
in History and Philosophy of Science (Kidd 2011a), a section of Chapter eight, on 
Feyerabend’s ‘doctrine of ineffability’, is due to appear in a forthcoming volume 
entitled Models of God and Other Ultimate Realities (Kidd forthcoming e), and my 
account of Feyerabend’s discussion of medical pluralism is forthcoming in Studies in 
History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences (Kidd forthcoming f). 
Other sections and chapters—on Bohm, Dadaism, and the history of ancient Greek 
thought and culture, for example—had to be cut for reasons of space and focus. 
Hopefully they will appear in the future; certainly there is more to say about the later 
Feyerabend than any single thesis could express.  
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A Note on Terminology 
 
Throughout this thesis, I will often refer to ‘science’, ‘Western science’, ‘indigenous 
cultures’, ‘modernity’, ‘non-Western cultures’ and the like. I am well aware of the 
complexities and inadequacies of these terms. Certainly Feyerabend played fast and 
loose with them. I use them partly for wont of superior alternatives and partly because 
the qualifications that could justify them would expand this thesis far beyond a 
manageable length. Hopefully my discussion remains sufficiently abstract for these 
terms to remain usable. Appendix II contains literature which critically discusses these 
and other terms. 
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Chapter One 
Ch1 The ‘Early’ and ‘Later’ Feyerabend 
 
1.1. Whatever happened to Paul Feyerabend? 
1.2. Four charges. 
1.2.1. Charge 1: Against Method and the ‘schism’. 
1.2.2. Charge 2: Cultural relativism and anti-science. 
1.2.3. Charge 3: The unity of the later Feyerabend. 
1.2.4. Charge 4: Sincerity and professional identity. 
1.3. A synoptic view. 
1.4. Conclusions. 
1.1. Whatever happened to Paul Feyerabend? 
Paul Feyerabend has a complicated reputation within the philosophy of science. Despite 
his considerable influence on mid-twentieth-century philosophy of science, including 
important tangles with Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos, and despite his influence and 
citation outside of the discipline, his star has assuredly fallen.1 For many philosophers, 
whether ‘of science’ or not, the name ‘Feyerabend’ has come to be associated with a 
whole set of negative epithets: ‘cultural relativism’, ‘anti-science’, ‘polemicist’, ‘the 
Salvador Dali of philosophy’,2 ‘the wild man of twentieth-century philosophy of 
science’3, and, for one expressive commentator, ‘the agent provocateur, the 
Shakespearean Fool and the gifted charlatan all rolled into one’.4 Peculiar legends have 
grown up around him and colleagues often delightedly report stories and anecdotes 
about him (see the Appendix for some of these). Feyerabend also has a reputation for 
being nasty and aggressive, for preferring rhetoric to reason, and for wanton disregard 
for academic and scholarly norms and conventions (see Hoyningen-Huene 2000 and 
Agassi 2002). Some of these charges are, of course, not without basis in fact (see 
Oberheim 2006: Ch1) and Feyerabend often did himself no favours, cheerfully 
declaring his enthusiasm for voodoo and astrology, berating the discipline and 
practitioners of philosophy of science as obsolescent and irrelevant, and regularly 
recording his hostility towards intellectuals of every stripe.  
Such observations may make for an interesting biographical puzzle, but that is not 
my concern here. I open with these remarks because most often, in my experience at the 
                                                           
1
 Nola and Sankey (2001) discuss the influence that Popper, Kuhn, and Feyerabend had 
on the course and content of twentieth century philosophy of science. 
2
 Theocharis and Psimopoulos (1987). 
3
 See Horgan (1993). Godfrey-Smith (2003: 102-103) remarks, ‘I have called 
[Feyerabend] “the” wild man, even though there have been various other wild men—
and wild women—in the field besides Feyerabend’, even if he was ‘uniquely wild’. 
4
 Weinert (1998: 635). 
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least, efforts to assert the significance and merits of Feyerabend’s later philosophy are 
met with objections such as those cited.5 For a man like Feyerabend, who was ‘not the 
kind of philosopher whose personality could easily be divorced from his views’ 
(Preston and Lamb, 2000: xiii)6, such biographical appeals are not wholly out of place; 
however, they can and do function to discourage interest in the later work. As early as 
1977, Frederick Suppe warned that ‘Feyerabend’s philosophy of science has little to 
recommend itself and is losing whatever importance and significance it once had within 
philosophy of science’ (Suppe, 1977: 643). Alas, the decline seems to have been 
terminal. As long as Feyerabend has the sort of ‘bad reputation’ that the aforementioned 
remarks indicate, it will remain difficult to attempt any rehabilitation of his later work.7  
My aim in this chapter is to dismantle some of these familiar criticisms, or 
suspicions, of the ‘later Feyerabend’ and then, once the ‘bad reputation’ is dispelled, to 
indicate fruitful points of contact between Feyerabend’s later writings and 
contemporary debates in philosophy of science. If successful in the first aim, the scene 
should be set for a re-engagement with Feyerabend’s later work, and, if similarly 
successful in the second, some contacts will already have been put in place. Indeed, my 
efforts to rehabilitate the later Feyerabend will rely, in part, upon some important recent 
scholarship, including Eric Oberheim’s Feyerabend’s Philosophy (2006), Robert 
Farrell’s Feyerabend and Scientific Values (2004), and John Preston’s Feyerabend: 
Philosophy, Science, and Society (1996). My guiding claim is that Feyerabend 
consistently articulated a radical epistemic pluralism which, into his later career, 
developed into a sustained reflection on the cognitive and cultural authority of the 
sciences in the modern world. In so doing, he anticipated contemporary debates over 
values in science, disunity and pluralism, and the concerns of ‘political’ and 
‘postcolonial’ philosophers of science. A sense of justice requires that Feyerabend’s 
prescience is affirmed, and hopefully this will allow his work to fruitfully contribute to 
these debates. 
 
1.2. Four charges. 
Feyerabend’s views were consistently challenged across the course of his career. The 
four charges I am concerned with here, however, reflect a set of broader scholarly 
concerns, rather than, say, the particular details of any of his historical and 
                                                           
5
 See Reavon (2000) for an engaging discussion of how Feyerabend’s personality 
influenced, and often compromised, his philosophy. It is illuminating to consider the 
criticisms of Feyerabend’s attitudes by reading interviews with him; see for instance 
Broad (1979) and Feyerabend (2000a). There is a list of Feyerabend’s interviews in 
Oberheim (1999). 
6
 Nola (2001: 816) concurs: ‘Feyerabend is one of the few contemporary philosophers 
in which both the person and his ideas are intimately related and difficult to separate’. 
See further von Brentano (1991). 
7
 Munévar entitled his (2000b) paper, ‘A Réhabilitation of Paul Feyerabend’, and this 
thesis is intended to continue in that spirit. 
Kidd                             Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 
 
15 
 
philosophical arguments and theses. Indeed, if Eric Oberheim (2006: III) is correct, then 
Feyerabend’s ‘philosophy’ consisted less in the articulation of specific theses than in 
the advocacy of a thoroughgoing ‘philosophical pluralism’. Feyerabend’s 
‘philosophical pluralism’ is, as Oberheim persuasively argues, largely responsible for 
many of the confusions surrounding the interpretation of his work—including alleged 
inconsistencies in his work—and it also, I think, relate to the four charges detailed in a 
moment: in rough, the apparent ‘schism’ in Feyerabend’s work marked by Against 
Method (1975a) dissolve, and new continuities appear, once Feyerabend’s pluralistic 
concerns are appreciated. Indeed, my interpretation goes further than Oberheim, since it 
connects Feyerabend’s ‘philosophical pluralism’ with concerns for human wellbeing, 
indigenous cultures, and the ‘scientific worldview’. 
The four specific claims that I intend to rebut can be described as follows: 
(1) Feyerabend’s most significant and respectable work took place during his 
‘early’ period, up to and including Against Method (1975). His work on 
philosophy of quantum theory, incommensurability, theory change, and 
scientific methodology are all important and influential, both intrinsically and in 
relation to contemporaneous figures such as Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos. 
(2) The ‘later’ Feyerabend, roughly, from Against Method through to his death in 
1994, is much less deserving of serious interest, since it lapses into cultural 
relativism, ‘anti-science’ polemics, and politically-motivated criticisms of 
‘Western culture’ and academic philosophy. This ‘later’ period also included 
ventures into political philosophy, in the form of ‘democratic relativism’, which 
were largely unsuccessful. 
(3) Even if there is philosophically-interesting work in the ‘later Feyerabend’, there 
is no wider ‘structure’ or ‘programme’ which might enable it to be considered as 
anything more than occasional or incidental works on disparate topics. 
Certainly, by the time of his later period, Feyerabend had moved far beyond the 
philosophy of science, into new moral and political territory, such that even if 
his work remained intellectually credible, it still lies beyond the scope of 
philosophy of science. 
(4) Feyerabend was often insincere and one cannot take seriously his views on 
science, relativism, indigenous cultures, and the like. Too often these views, 
especially the stronger ones, are simply provocation, rhetoric, or insincere 
statements which do not reflect any views he actually holds. 
 
These four charges are, I think, well-established in most of the literature on Feyerabend, 
even if they are not always made explicit. Point two, for instance, seems most often to 
be present by implication, even though some commentators have argued forcefully for 
it. Moreover, these three claims, taken individually, or, better, collectively, can be used 
to respond to a curious feature of Feyerabend’s reputation within the philosophy of 
science: namely, his status as a leading philosopher of science at an exciting and 
dynamic period of its history, yet his subsequent fall from grace, beginning, perhaps, 
with the charged critical reception of Against Method and ending with his nomination, 
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by two writers for Nature, as the ‘worst enemy of science’ (Theocharis and 
Psimopoulos 1987).8  
There is an interesting story to be told here, but my interests are not just to offer a 
rehabilitation of Feyerabend, nor to indulge in hagiography or apologetics. Instead, I 
want to relocate him relative to contemporary debates within the philosophy of science, 
to argue that he anticipated them and can, moreover, fruitfully contribute to them today. 
As early as the late 1960s, and certainly from then onwards, Feyerabend was 
emphasising the ‘disunified’ and pluralistic character of scientific inquiry, the role of 
non-epistemic values in structuring research, and venturing into debates that are now 
familiar to us in the guise of ‘political’ and ‘postcolonial’ philosophies of science. At 
the time, these concerns often tended to push Feyerabend out of mainstream philosophy 
of science, or they were accounted for as ‘rhetorics’, intellectual dramatism, or 
provocative excesses. Today, however, they are central debates within philosophy of 
science. Curiously, too, Feyerabend’s prescience in anticipating and engaging with 
them is rarely if ever noted, doubtless because of the persistence of the four charges 
cited earlier.9  
The first task, then, is to articulate and substantiate these four charges, so that they 
can then each be rejected in turn. Once this is done, I will offer a new synoptic account 
of Feyerabend’s later philosophy, including its continuity with the earlier work, and its 
relationship to contemporary philosophy of science. I conclude that the time is well 
overdue for a rehabilitation of Feyerabend’s work and a sustained engagement with his 
neglected later writings. 
1.2.1. Charge 1: Against Method and the ‘schism’. 
Feyerabend’s early work is certainly his best-known and most influential. Three of the 
four volumes of his philosophical papers are devoted entirely to the ‘early’ work, 
focusing, as their subtitles suggest, on realism, rationality, empiricism, scientific 
method, and philosophy of physics (Feyerabend 1981a, 1981b, 1999a, forthcoming a). 
The three studies by Preston, Farrell, and Oberheim all focus predominantly on the 
earlier work, and their brief ventures into the ‘later’ period writings are invariably 
accompanied by comments upon the regrettable absence of detailed studies of them. 
Indeed, the only papers devoted to the later work is Preston’s ‘Science as Supermarket: 
‘Post-Modern’ Themes in Paul Feyerabend’s Later Philosophy of Science’ (Preston 
1998) and Gonzalo Munévar’s ‘Conquering Feyerabend’s Conquest of Abundance’ 
                                                           
8
 Amusingly, this epithet was later taken as the title for Preston, Munévar, and Lamb’s 
(2000) edited volume of papers on Feyerabend’s philosophy. 
9
 Consider, for instance, John Searle’s remark, in a recent survey of contemporary 
philosophy of science, that ‘few philosophers [of science] are looking for the one single 
method that pervades every enterprise called ‘science’ (Searle, 2003: 11). Michael 
Williams similarly notes that although ‘[a]t their time of their publication, Feyerabend’s 
writings … enjoyed a considerable succès de scandale they have subsequently ‘come to 
seem less outrageous’. Indeed, ‘their general spirit has some claim to be seen as today’s 
conventional wisdom’ (Williams, 1998: n.p.). 
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(Munévar 2002).10 Most citations of Feyerabend’s work concentrate on his writings up 
to, roughly, the late 1970s. This is odd in itself. Of Feyerabend’s five English-language 
books, only one, Against Method, is from the ‘early’ period; Science in a Free Society 
(1978) is ‘borderline’, but Farewell to Reason (1987), Three Dialogues on Knowledge 
(1991a), and Conquest of Abundance (1999) are all ‘later’ writings, yet receive only 
sparse mention and discussion. The quality of these works notwithstanding, their lack of 
impact within philosophy of science is surely worth accounting for.  
A charitable argument could be that there is more than enough material to be getting 
on with from the later period, so that it is not that the later work is neglected per se, 
only that it has not yet been explored. This argument falls down, of course, because the 
later writings have remained largely untouched—by philosophers of science, at least—
for some thirty years now. A more plausible argument is that philosophers of science, 
perhaps understandably, do not know what to ‘make of’ or ‘do with’ the later work. 
Whereas Feyerabend’s early work remained roughly within the bounds of history and 
philosophy of science, into his later period he extended his disciplinary and intellectual 
scope quite radically. One could choose any number of writings from the later period 
and find Feyerabend’s discussions ranging from history and philosophy of science, to 
classical scholarship, art history, anthropology, and environmental studies, and 
similarly find Aristotle, Bohr and Popper rubbing shoulders with Brecht, Laozi, and 
Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. Philosophers like Søren Kierkegaard are 
enigmatically cited as major influences, yet there are barely mentions of any 
philosophers of science.11 Stimulating and entertaining as such eclecticism may be, it 
does pose obvious interpretative difficulties for philosophers of science unfamiliar with 
such a diverse range of disciplines and traditions; and, indeed, Feyerabend himself has 
been criticised for his at-times incautious interdisciplinary explorations, which, if 
Stephen R.L. Clark is right, too often ‘relied too much on his own reading, too little on 
conversation with contemporary scholars’ (Clark, 2002: 250). These interpretative 
difficulties are further compounded by Feyerabend’s own indolence concerning 
scholarly conventions.12  
Considering the interpretative problems that the later work poses, it may come as no 
surprise that philosophers of science have preferred to remain within the early work. 
Not only is the work from this period more obviously pertinent to ongoing debates 
within philosophy of science, but the general style and presentation of it is more 
familiar, and, hence, easier to work with. The conclusion that Feyerabend’s most 
significant and respectable work took place during his ‘early’ period, up to and 
including Against Method is thus wholly intelligible. Moreover, it is easier to connect 
this work with ‘foundational’ figures in the history of philosophy of science, such as 
Kuhn, Popper, and Lakatos; even if the merits of these figures today is open to dispute. 
Intelligible as the focus on the earlier work may be, however, it does not establish that 
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 Some of the essays in Munévar (1991) also refer to Farewell to Reason, such as the 
papers by Hannay and Hooker.  
11
 On Kierkegaard’s influence on Feyerabend, see Kidd (forthcoming a). 
12
 See Oberheim (2006: 30-42). 
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one ought not to consult the later work. Understanding that neglect leads us to the 
second charge. 
1.2.2. Charge 2: Cultural relativism and ‘anti-science’. 
Feyerabend is notorious today for being a cultural relativist. That term means many 
things, but most of them have derogatory connotations, and Feyerabend doubtlessly fell 
foul of many of them throughout his later career. Indeed, a regular feature of his later 
writings is the long discussions of cultural relativism and his responses to the charge 
that he is, was, or could be a cultural relativist of one form or another.13 The easy 
association of Feyerabend and relativism persists—for instance, in Paul Boghossian’s 
(2006: 2) recent attempt to claim Feyerabend for the relativist camp. As Oberbeim puts 
it, ‘[i]n many circles, the name ‘Feyerabend’ has come to be associated with 
irrationality, with anarchism, or with a form of toothless relativism’ (Oberheim, 2006: 
17).  
Allied to the ‘relativism’ charge is what one might call the ‘anti-science’ charge, the 
claim that Feyerabend was either opposed to science, sceptical about its cognitive 
authority, or critical of its privileged place within Western societies. Depending on how 
those charges are articulated, they have elements of truth in them: however, the blanket 
claim that Feyerabend was the ‘worst enemy of science’ is false. As Gonzalo Munévar 
remarked, ‘Feyerabend ... was no enemy of science’, and, on the contrary, his work was 
an attempt to affirm—in the face of the abstract accounts favoured by logical 
positivists—how ‘complex and exciting science is, and how it may become at once 
more fruitful and more humane’ (Munévar, 2000a: v-vi).14 
The ‘worst enemy’ reputation likely arose because Feyerabend openly questioned the 
methodological credentials of the sciences, and not because he was ‘anti-science’. Of 
course, he insisted upon a critical perspective upon the sciences, and he often appended 
polemics to his philosophical criticisms. The ‘relativism’ and ‘anti-science’ charges 
converge in the inherited idea that Feyerabend was an enthusiast for voodoo, astrology, 
magic, and other ‘non-scientific’ beliefs and practices. That perception is encouraged 
by such typical Feyerabendian gestures as including his horoscope on the cover of 
Science in a Free Society, or by his favourite pedagogical strategy of maintaining that 
medieval witchcraft was, for a time at least, more intelligible and empirical than 
physics, or his claim—cited by the then-Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict XVI, 
no less—that creation science should be taught in schools. Whether one sees this as 
sincere statements or not, they all too-easily encourage the perception that Feyerabend 
is either ‘anti-science’ at worst, or intellectually irresponsible to proffer such 
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 See, for instance, Feyerabend (1987: 19-89) and (1993: 268-272). 
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 As the theoretical physicist Lee Smolin recalls, Feyerabend ‘was not anti-science, as 
some of my professors at Harvard had intimated he would be. It was clear that he loved 
physics, and that he was more conversant with the technicalities than most philosophers 
I met. His reputation as hostile to science had undoubtedly arisen because he considered 
the question of why science worked as unanswered’ (Smolin, 2007: 292). 
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contestable and controversial opinions, at best. Feyerabend’s sincerity is discussed in 
section six. 
My aim here is to offer a corrective account of the ‘relativism’ and ‘anti-science’ 
charges; this could be viewed as a prolegomenon for a more detailed account, although 
I am persuaded that it can successfully dismiss the two charges. I suggest that: 
Feyerabend did advocate a radical cultural relativism for a period in the late-1970s, 
perhaps stretching into the early-1980s. The most sustained expression of this ‘radical 
relativism’ was Science in a Free Society, where Feyerabend did indeed affirm a 
‘hands-off’ attitude towards other cultures, and where he also denied the special 
cognitive and practical efficacy of the sciences, and issued his notorious call for the 
‘separation of science and the state’. In a sense, it is this book which represents the 
Feyerabend described by the ‘bad reputation’, and, as long as one’s focus remains on 
that book, that reputation is justified.  
Into his later work, however, Feyerabend systematically dismantled these attitudes. 
Throughout the 1980s and into the early 1990s, he maintained that cultures were fluid 
and amorphous, affirmed the potential for inter-cultural moral interventions, conceded 
that scientific knowledge and practices were superior to ‘non-scientific’ alternatives in 
certain areas (especially medicine), and agreed that the sciences were a central and 
important feature of modern Western cultures. Bearing these changes in mind, one can 
uncontroversially say that Feyerabend systematically dismantled the ‘relativism’ and 
‘anti-science’ attitudes that he expressed Science in a Free Society. The shift in his 
attitude towards cultural relativism can be illustrated by charting his changing models 
of culture. In his earlier works, Feyerabend maintained that cultures were discrete and 
autonomous and that any intervention by one culture into another was therefore 
necessarily disruptive. Throughout the 1980s, this view was modified as Feyerabend 
increasingly conceded that cultures constantly interact, exchanging ideas, values, and 
practices, without this violating their integrity. This is one reason why Farewell to 
Reason opens with thirteen alternative forms of ‘relativistic’ intercultural contact 
(Feyerabend, 1987: Ch1). By the 1990s, Feyerabend had come full circle. He now 
affirmed that cultures are fluid and amorphous, that they interact and change; his new 
motto, and the title of a later essay, was ‘potentially every culture is all cultures’. An 
important consequence of this is that ‘cultural differences lose their ineffability’—one 
need not respect certain values or practices simply on the grounds that they belong to a 
certain culture:  
 
‘Objective judgements are out; so is an abstract and ideology-driven 
protection of cultures. Drastic interventions are not excluded but should be 
made only after an extended contact, not just with a few “leaders”, but with 
the populations directly involved.’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 35fn25) 
 
Feyerabend therefore repudiated the relativism he had earlier defended. The essentialist 
model of cultures—as discrete and autonomous—was abandoned, and, with it, the idea 
that intercultural exchanges were necessarily destructive. With one eye on earlier views, 
Feyerabend remarked that ‘traditional relativism assumes that cultures are ‘closed’ and 
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well defined’, but objected that ‘this is not how ‘real’ cultures react. Facing sizable 
problems (or long-lasting successes) they change’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 215-216). With 
this remark, Feyerabend moved away from the cultural relativism that he defended in 
Science in a Free Society, and which many philosophers still associate with him.15 
One can therefore reject the second charge, namely, that the ‘later’ Feyerabend is 
much less deserving of serious interest. It is not tainted by cultural relativism, ‘anti-
science’ polemics, nor into politically-motivated criticisms of Western culture. This is 
not to say, of course, that Feyerabend did not maintain views on inter-cultural 
interactions, on the authority of the sciences, nor that he abandoned his critical 
perspective on Western culture. Indeed, in all three cases, he did, and as I argue in the 
next section, the relationships between science, cultures, and Western modernity 
became the major axes of his later philosophy. However, none of these axes reflected 
anything like the ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘anti-science’ that is so often attributed him, 
nor should they be assessed by their conformity with these attitudes, which formed only 
a temporary and aberrant feature of Feyerabend’s philosophy. (Feyerabend’s dismissive 
attitudes towards academic philosophy are less easy to account for. These remained 
constant up until his death; in an interview given a few months before his death, one 
finds Feyerabend (2000a) reaffirming his distaste for academic philosophy.) 
1.2.3. Charge 3: The unity of the later Feyerabend. 
Hopefully the discussion in the preceding sections has helped to clear the way for an 
assessment of the merits of the later Feyerabend. A problem arises, of course, in that 
whereas the ‘early’ work is familiar enough, the ‘later’ work, in general, is not; in my 
experience, many philosophers of science are pleasantly surprised to find that there is a 
‘later Feyerabend’ at all. Certainly their surprise may be due to the lack of supporting 
literature; as Preston has noted, ‘[c]ritical study of this later work is still in its infancy’ 
(Preston, 1996: 7). My account of the later work in this section, then, will rely mainly 
upon the reviews of one key later text: Conquest of Abundance (1999b), ‘a tale of 
abstraction versus the richness of Being’, Feyerabend’s final book, which was 
uncompleted at the time of his death, but was ably edited by Bert Terpstra (see Terpstra 
2001). I focus on this text for three reasons. First, as Feyerabend’s final work, it 
represents the fruits of his thinking, his ‘intellectual testament’, and so is the best place 
to turn for an account of his mature philosophy. Second, it has been well-served by 
reviewers and commentators, both critical and laudatory, especially, of course, by 
leading Feyerabend scholars such as Preston (2000), Oberheim (2001), and Munévar 
(2002). Third, it is arguably the most accessible and engaging of his later books, and so 
would provide an obvious ‘point of entry’ for those wishing to explore the later 
Feyerabend; especially since it was uncompleted at the time of his death in 1994, and so 
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 Indeed, the fact that Feyerabend recorded his dissatisfaction with that book, and his 
desire that it not be reprinted, attests to the fact that he no longer wished to be 
associated with the views expressed in it. See Horgan (1993) and Borrini-Feyerabend 
(2000). However, as I argue in Chapter two, Science in a Free Society is not completely 
a lost cause. 
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enjoys an ‘ambiguity … and openness … that Paul was far from despising’ (Borrini-
Feyerabend, 2001: ix).  
Before offering any perspective on the later philosophy, however, the ‘third charge’ 
must be defused. So far, I have argued that Feyerabend’s important philosophical work 
did not end in 1975 with Against Method, and that the later work is not guilty of the 
cultural relativism and anti-science polemics that it is supposed to be. Even if my 
rebuttals are correct, however, that does not establish the further claim that there is a 
coherent or unified set of concerns, such that one can speak properly of there being a 
‘later Feyerabend’. The third charge to respond to, then, may be stated as follows: even 
if there is philosophically-interesting work in the ‘later Feyerabend’, there is no wider 
‘structure’ or ‘programme’ which might enable it to be considered as anything more 
than occasional or incidental works on disparate topics.  On these terms, the later work 
consists of a series of essays and comments on a variety of topics—historical, 
philosophical, artistic, and political—which, whilst engaging in themselves, did not 
feature as part of any broader philosophical program. One reviewer of Conquest of 
Abundance writes that Feyerabend ‘picks fights with scholars of the classics, gives 
advice on human flourishing, and tries to wrestle with how we should approach and 
understand all human cultures’, with the consequence that the book is ‘uneven; at times 
it is absorbing and at times simply frustrating’ (Downes, 2002: 160) (though this is 
surely a little unfair, since Feyerabend died before the book was finished). To be sure, 
Feyerabend covers a lot of ground in that book, stating his ‘procedure will be historical 
and episodic’, encompassing ‘selected events and developments’ from the histories of 
philosophy, science, and the arts (Feyerabend, 2001: 17). The cast of characters 
includes Achilles, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Aristotle, the Christian mystic Pseudo-
Dionysius the Areopagite, as well as Brunelleschi, Galileo, Planck, Bohr, and the 
Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi, whilst topics range from scientific realism, the role of 
argumentation, perception and language, international development, historical 
interpretation, and cultural change. The book is, as Preston puts it, ‘rich in its own 
abundance’ (Preston, 2001: 597).16 
Bearing such ‘richness’ in mind, one may be forgiven for supposing that the ‘later 
Feyerabend’ lacks cohesion or unity, such that he may be considered a kind of 
intellectual journalist: a series of scattered, loosely-interconnected essays and remarks 
on topics that interested him, but which, collectively, had little real unity. Certainly it 
can be difficult to see how Christian Neoplatonism and contemporary global cultural 
diversity relate to one another—at least, within the usual conventions of philosophy of 
science. Less so, arguably, in Feyerabend’s case; his own work was always innovative, 
‘highly original, contain[ing] sharp arguments, provocative theses, and deep critiques’, 
including a deliberate strategy of ‘introducing texts from outside the field ... that had 
previously played no role, but which through Feyerabend became fruitful within the 
philosophy of science’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 2000: 8). Such eclecticism was, moreover, 
related to two of Feyerabend’s guiding values.  First, the ‘philosophical pluralism’ 
articulated by Oberheim, with its associated imperative to make use of the resources 
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offered by diverse disciplines and traditions. Feyerabend himself affirmed that ‘there is 
no idea, however ancient or absurd, that is not capable of improving our knowledge’, 
and concluded that the ‘whole history of thought’ should be ‘absorbed’ into our 
inquiries (Feyerabend, 1993: 33). Second, Feyerabend’s pluralism committed him not 
only to defending but also to demonstrating the value of theories and traditions outside 
of the norm, whether these be other academic disciplines (like classics or art history), or 
other cultural and epistemic traditions (like those of contemporary indigenous cultures). 
Elisabeth Lloyd (1997) attributes this to Feyerabend’s adoption of a Millian role, 
defending minority views against ‘tyrannous’ majorities. Of course, these eclectic—or, 
better, pluralistic—methodologies must be intended to serve some end, some guiding 
purpose, otherwise the effort invested in them would be wasted.  
The guiding purpose of Feyerabend’s later philosophy, that which confers unity upon 
it, was arguably this: it was a defence of a thoroughgoing epistemic and cultural 
pluralism. This claim will be articulated and defended throughout this thesis, but for 
now it provides a framework within which to consider the four charges raised at the 
start of the paper, and which can reconcile the diverse disciplinary scope and 
intellectual concerns of the later work. To recap, the three charges discussed so far 
were: that Feyerabend’s philosophically-important work was confined to his ‘early’ 
period, that the later work suffers from ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘anti-science’ excesses, 
and finally that there isn’t any coherent, unifying theme to the later writings. These 
three charges have been rebutted, and now it is time to assert the ‘unity’ of the later 
Feyerabend, and, in so doing, show how Conquest of Abundance is at once continuous 
with the earlier works, and, finally, how it attempts to unify the diverse concerns which 
motivated Feyerabend. 
Fortunately, Feyerabend offers us a thumbnail sketch of his philosophical 
development in the preface to the second edition of Farewell to Reason, which is worth 
quoting at length: ‘In Against Method I argued that the customary accounts of scientific 
knowledge and scientific method are faulty and that scientists do not proceed 
‘rationally’ in the sense of rationalist philosophers. In Science in a Free Society I 
argued that the sciences are particular ways of gaining information and of interfering 
with the world, that there are other ways and that these ‘other’ ways are satisfactory in 
the sense that they meet the material and spiritual needs of those who use them [and in] 
Farewell to Reason, finally, I argued that cultural diversity “is beneficial, while 
uniformity reduces our joys and our (intellectual, material, emotional) resources”’ 
(Feyerabend, 1987: v).  
This is Feyerabend’s own account of the path of his philosophical development, and 
it makes clear that the reassessment of the special cognitive authority of the sciences 
that Against Method initiated laid the foundations for the later extensions into cultural 
diversity; for if the sciences are not privileged means of engaging with the world, then 
one should, as a good epistemic pluralist, consult other allegedly ‘non-scientific’ modes 
of inquiry. However, this concern with epistemic pluralism soon led Feyerabend to 
realise the extent to which the survival of non-scientific beliefs and practices was under 
threat, thanks to the ‘homogenising’ tendencies of Western modernity. This prompted 
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Farewell to Reason, which opens with the statement, quoted in the passage above, 
about the multiple benefits of cultural diversity.  
Feyerabend here connected epistemic and cultural pluralism: maximising our 
epistemic engagement with the world requires a diversity of epistemic activities, and 
associated institutions and communities, and this, in turn, is premised upon cultural 
diversity. However, cultural diversity is being eroded, and so the preservation of global 
epistemic diversity is premised upon the protection of cultural diversity; otherwise, the 
result may be a radically bounded pluralism, as one may have scientific pluralism, but 
not the much broader epistemic pluralism that Feyerabend has in mind (the distinction 
between scientific and epistemic pluralism is the topic of Chapter four). This point 
relates to the ‘cultural relativism’ and ‘anti-science’ charges: the point that Farewell to 
Reason and Conquest of Abundance make is that there are many ways of epistemically 
engaging with the world, many ‘modes of inquiry’ and ‘forms of knowledge’, of which 
the Western sciences represent many, but by no means all. This is not ‘anti-science’, 
although it is ‘anti-scientism’, or, in John Dupré’s term, anti-‘imperialist scientism’ 
(Dupré, 2003: 113f). The ‘conquest of abundance’ itself refers to the progressive 
dissolution of global epistemic and cultural pluralism, at the hands of philosophical and, 
later, scientific ‘abstractions’ which assert their own ‘reality’ to the exclusion of 
rivals—whether mythic and religious traditions, ethnosciences, or whatever. 
There is a further moral and political dimension to Feyerabend’s defence of cultural 
pluralism. As early as 1968, in his neglected paper ‘Science, Freedom, and the Good 
Life’, Feyerabend was arguing that the ‘fragmentariness’ of the arts and sciences should 
be resolved by asserting a new ‘unifying ideal’, namely, ‘the preservation of human 
happiness’, including ‘an increase in the powers of human beings to become what they 
are capable of becoming’. This was explicitly connected to the ‘tremendous 
proliferation of points of view’, and the epistemic virtues of tenacity and anti-
dogmatism (Feyerabend, 1968: 134). Even earlier, Feyerabend had declared to Kuhn 
that the significance of scientific problems depended upon ‘the influence a specific 
solution of it may have upon the well-being of mankind’, again meaning ‘the full 
development of human faculties’ (quoted in Hoyningen-Huene, 2006: 613-614). The 
influence of John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty (1859) is unmistakable here, and Feyerabend 
repeatedly affirmed his respect for Mill and that ‘immortal essay’.17 Of course, the main 
thesis of On Liberty is that both human wellbeing and the pursuit of knowledge are 
bettered by social diversity, and this is the point that Feyerabend seems to have drawn 
from his reading of Mill (see, for instance, Feyerabend, 1968: 134; 1988: 34, fn2; 
1981b: 143;  2001: 202, 269). The ‘abundance’ which Feyerabend praised was 
epistemic and cultural diversity, but this is, however, a point which has been missed by 
commentators engaged in a long-running debate about Feyerabend’s debts to Mill: 
some, like (Staley, 1999), have supposed that what Feyerabend took from Mill were 
arguments for theoretical pluralism, and critics have replied that, if so, then Feyerabend 
misunderstood Mill (Jacobs, 2003).  
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This debate rests on the presupposition that it was theoretical pluralism alone that 
Feyerabend admired in Mill, but this seems unlikely, for two reasons: first, Feyerabend 
already had a range of perfectly good historical and philosophical arguments for 
theoretical pluralism, and, second, the content and context of his citations of Mill makes 
it abundantly clear that the pluralism he was drawing from him was social and ethical as 
well, insofar as it pertained to human wellbeing.18 Moreover, many of Feyerabend’s 
discussions of the value of cultural diversity emphasise, not its instrumental value as a 
means of sustaining epistemic pluralism, but, rather, its intrinsic value as a precondition 
of human wellbeing. The dissolution of global epistemic and cultural pluralism is, 
therefore, an urgent matter of ethical as well as epistemological concern, and Conquest 
of Abundance is the mature manifestation of this concern. Feyerabend’s concerns with 
epistemic and cultural pluralism, human wellbeing, and the cognitive and cultural 
authority of the ‘scientific worldview’ all reflect his unifying pluralistic sentiment that 
human life is best served, in every respect, by the sustenance of a diversity of ways of 
living within and making sense of the world, answering to multiple values, serving 
many explanatory interests, and so on.  
The interlinking of cultural and epistemic pluralism is an important and distinctive 
feature of Feyerabend’s pluralism. Certain ‘modes of inquiry’ and ‘forms of 
knowledge’ can only be operated and employed within a receptive culture or 
community; on these terms, preserving epistemic pluralism goes hand-in-hand with 
preserving cultural pluralism. For instance, if one aim of epistemic pluralism is to fulfil 
diverse human explanatory needs, then where would those needs come from, if not 
from the wider society within which those epistemic activities are embedded?19 The 
interpretation of Feyerabend that I offer in this thesis is close, and sympathetic, to 
Oberheim’s reading of Feyerabend as a philosophical pluralist. However my account 
differs from his in two respects. First, I include the wider moral and political 
dimensions of Feyerabend’s later thought and consider them to be significant features 
of the later philosophy. These do not significantly feature in Oberheim’s study of 
Feyerabend. Second, Oberheim is pessimistic about the prospects of identifying a 
coherent and substantive project in Feyerabend’s later work. Where Oberheim tends to 
emphasise the critical and often performative argument for pluralism within 
Feyerabend’s work, I see such pluralism as forming part of a more significant and 
unified project (see, for instance, Oberheim, 2006: Ch9). Oberheim argues that 
Feyerabend defended a philosophical pluralism as a means to ‘improve our 
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 The most explicit statement is Feyerabend’s remark, in a letter to Lakatos, that, when 
speaking of Mill he was ‘always talking of On Liberty’ (Feyerabend and Lakatos, 1999: 
239). Later in that letter Feyerabend praises Mill’s theory of science for being ‘more 
liberal ... and less hampered by technicalities’ than Popper’s, and, importantly, for 
Mill’s efforts to ground ‘his theory of science [in] a theory of man that aims to find 
conditions for the full and free development of individuality’ (Feyerabend and Lakatos, 
1999: 240).  
19
 One could draw useful parallels with Hasok Chang’s ‘pluralistic traditionalism’ 
(Chang, 2004: 231-234f), although Feyerabend has in mind something far more radical. 
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understanding … counter conceptual conservatism … and thereby to help promote the 
critical development of new points of view’ (Oberheim, 2006: 287). I agree with this, 
but wish to add the further claim that these calls for proliferation and pluralism were 
motivated by substantive moral and political concerns: namely, to identify and sustain 
the conditions within which human beings maximally flourish. Feyerabend employs a 
pluralistic philosophical method and defends cultural and epistemic diversity because 
he identifies them as essential to ensuring human wellbeing. 
1.2.4. Charge 4: Sincerity. 
The final charge against Feyerabend relates to the significance of his later work to the 
philosophy of science. One could concede that the three previous charges are in fact 
baseless, and agree that the ‘later’ Feyerabend is not ‘anti-science’ nor a ‘cultural 
relativist’, and that it does enjoy a strong degree of ‘unity’ of themes and concerns. 
However, these concessions would not establish the point, important to my purposes 
here, that the later Feyerabend is relevant to the philosophy of science. After all, if his 
later writings seem to treat issues which traditionally fall into ethical, cultural, and 
environmental philosophy, then why continue to connect them to the philosophy of 
science? And surely the fact that the later Feyerabend also extends into anthropology, 
classics, and other ‘non-philosophy’ disciplines cements this objection? Even if the later 
Feyerabend is engaged in valuable philosophy, its pertinence to the philosophy of 
science needs to be better demonstrated.20 
There are two ways to affirm the relevance of the later Feyerabend to the philosophy 
of science. First, his later discussions of ethical, cultural, and environmental issues all 
issue from his history and philosophy of science. The later chapters will illustrate this 
claim, so it is enough for now to say that Feyerabend’s later philosophy is an 
exploration of the epistemological conclusions he drew from his ‘earlier’ work. 
Roughly put, the later work is an attempt to identify and examine the implications of the 
reassessment of the cognitive and cultural authority of the sciences prompted by the 
history and philosophy of science. 
Second, the apparent disparity between the later Feyerabend’s wider concerns and 
the philosophy of science relies upon an older conception of the philosophy of science. 
As Bernard Rollin once remarked, Feyerabend represents an ‘inspiring and pioneering’ 
attempt to create a ‘realistic philosophy of science’, one which ‘engages the welter of 
ethical, social and epistemological problems of science that had been declared non-
problems by fiat in a great deal of traditional philosophy of science’ (1986: 165).21 
Rollin’s point is that Feyerabend took issue with the narrower remit of mid-twentieth-
century philosophy of science, which had largely confined itself to logical, 
methodological, and epistemological issues. Important as these issues are, they do not 
exhaust the range of philosophically important issues generated by scientific knowledge 
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 At least one writer has said explicitly that he ‘refuse[s] to read everything that 
Feyerabend has written since Against Method’ (Schnädelbach, 1991: 433). 
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 The use of ‘realistic’ is perhaps unfortunate, since it risks being conflated with 
‘realism’. 
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and practices.22 Feyerabend’s desire to expand the scope of the philosophy of science 
reflected his sensitivity to the moral and political implications which arise from the 
cognitive and cultural authority in modern cultures.23 The later Feyerabend can 
therefore be interpreted as making an attempt to diversify the philosophy of science, 
both by expanding the range of issues it addresses and by increasing the range of 
disciplines it interacts with. 
The later Feyerabend is therefore relevant to the philosophy of science, just as long 
as one embraces a richer conception of the issues and concerns of that discipline. 
Gratifyingly, the enrichment of the philosophy of science that Rollin anticipated has 
been substantiated by subsequent developments. There is now a growing literature on 
ethics and science, political and ‘postcolonial’ philosophies of science, values in 
science, and of course a well-developed literature in feminist philosophy of science. 
Specific sciences like archaeology have also begun to receive philosophical attention 
(see Scarre and Scarre 2006). Although the aims and interests of these areas vary 
greatly, they all serve as a testament to the diversification of the philosophy of science 
that Feyerabend tried to initiate. How much credit he can take for this is, of course, 
another matter, and not one that I will touch upon here. 
1.3. A synoptic view. 
My aim in this chapter has been to argue that Feyerabend’s later work is not guilty of 
‘cultural relativism’ or ‘anti-science’ polemics, and that, contrary to the diversity of its 
appeals and concerns, it in fact enjoys a strong unity. In fact, this unity grows when one 
interprets it as continuous with the pluralistic themes of the earlier work which 
Oberheim emphasises. The later Feyerabend offers a sustained and multi-pronged 
defence of epistemic and cultural pluralism—using historical, epistemological, moral, 
and political arguments, and appeals to the intellectual and empirical resources of 
philosophy, history, anthropology, and other disciplines. Indeed, there is a pleasing 
neatness to the fact that Feyerabend defends epistemic and cultural ‘abundance’ by 
invoking disciplinary and intellectual abundance of his own. After all, one excellent 
way to defend pluralism is to demonstrate it, to put it to work.  
During his earlier work, Feyerabend defended scientific pluralism; however, with his 
rejection of methodological monism in the early 1970s, he saw no prima facie reason to 
confine his epistemic pluralism to the sciences, and so radically extended it to 
encompass non-scientific beliefs and practices. This ‘turn’ was marked by ‘On the 
Critique of Scientific Reason’ (1976b), which opened with the question, ‘What’s so 
great about science?’, meaning, upon what values and standards is the efficacy and 
success of the sciences to be established? Feyerabend realised that different cultures 
have different explanatory concerns and interests, and adjusted his assessment of 
                                                           
22
 On the still-neglected area of ethical issues in the philosophy of science, see Resnik 
(1998) and Rollin (2006, especially chapter 2). 
23
 Feyerabend would therefore disagree with, for instance, Suppe’s suggestion that, ‘If 
any problem in the philosophy of science justifiably can be claimed the most central or 
important, it is that of the nature and structure of scientific theories’ (Suppe, 1977: 3). 
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scientific knowledge and practices accordingly. The turn to cultural pluralism which 
followed was intended to trace the implications of this. 
The continuity of Feyerabend’s philosophical development can be more clearly 
charted using this interpretation. Prior to Against Method, Feyerabend was occupied 
with various central issues in the philosophy of science, with a guiding remit to assert 
philosophical pluralism against the monistic, dogmatic, and conceptually-conservative 
tendencies—for instance, those he discerned in Kuhn’s model of science (see 
Hoyningen-Huene, 2006). However, this included a commitment to social pluralism, to 
the value of a diversity of ‘experiments in living’, as Mill called them, as well as to 
methodological or theoretical pluralism. This reflects Feyerabend’s liberal, pluralist 
conviction that human beings flourish best within a diversity of social and cultural 
forms; however, this theme remained fairly low-key. With Against Method, however, 
this changed: the rejection of the ‘myth of method’ prompted Feyerabend to radically 
reassess not only the practical and cognitive authority of the sciences, but also their 
social and political authority. Science in a Free Society was an early and ineffectual 
attempt at this radical reassessment, but, as Feyerabend later acknowledged, was very 
unsuccessful—and, indeed, did his reputation lasting damage.24  
Into the early 1980s, fortunately, Feyerabend did encounter the literature necessary 
to substantiate his reassessment, including acquaintance with medical anthropology and 
development studies, but, by that time, he had withdrawn from mainstream philosophy 
of science. As a result, later works, such as Farewell to Reason, went largely unnoticed, 
and, where they were, tended to be overshadowed by a preoccupation with 
Feyerabend’s ‘relativist’ credentials and his apparent efforts to avoid them; indeed, that 
book begins with a long, almost ninety-page, chapter, called ‘Notes on Relativism’. 
Conquest of Abundance is thankfully relatively free from Feyerabend’s anxieties about 
his reputation as a ‘relativist’, and instead embraces a ‘quieter, more wondering’ tone, 
and a less charged attitude towards epistemic and cultural pluralism and the 
depredations of Western modernity. 
1.4. Conclusions. 
My aim in this opening chapter was to affirm the unity and value of the later philosophy 
of Paul Feyerabend. I did this in two ways. First, by articulating and rebutting four 
familiar charges against the later work, namely, that it lapsed into cultural relativism, 
anti-science polemics, and a fatuous defence of voodoo, astrology, and other ‘eccentric’ 
beliefs and practices, or that, even if it is meritorious, its relevance to the philosophy of 
science is minimal. Each of these four charges was assessed and rejected. Second, I 
argued there is a clear and strong unity to the later work, namely, a vigorous defence of 
epistemic and cultural pluralism. This pluralist stance is also continuous with the earlier 
work and coheres well with Oberheim’s interpretation of Feyerabend as espousing a 
strong ‘philosophical pluralism’. Although Feyerabend’s arguments and claims are not, 
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 Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend reports that ‘[i]n the last decade of his life … Paul was 
not at all pleased with Science in a Free Society, which he did not want to see reprinted’ 
(Borrini-Feyerabend, 2001: xi). See further Horgan (1993). 
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of course, beyond critique, and although they need greater articulation and defence at 
certain points, he does succeed in affirming the value of, and need for, a vigorous 
epistemic and cultural pluralism. Developing and defending this pluralism will make for 
a rich and promising area for future research, especially in conjunction with 
contemporary debates over values in science, political and postcolonial science studies, 
and, beyond that, in anthropological, development, and environmental studies. On these 
terms, Feyerabend can also be credited with continuing to diversify and ‘pluralise’ the 
philosophy of science. In the next Chapter, I explain why Feyerabend thought such 
pluralisation was needed. 
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Chapter Two 
Ch2 Methodological Monism 
 
2.1 The myth of method. 
2.2 Against Method. 
2.3 Feyerabend’s normative philosophy of science. 
2.4 Science in a Free Society. 
2.5 ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’. 
2.6 Conclusions. 
 
2.1 The myth of method. 
Feyerabend is perhaps best known for his studies of scientific methodology. The title of 
his most famous book, Against Method, makes both his interest and his critical stance 
clear. However, what is perhaps less well appreciated are the aims of his views on 
scientific methodology. Feyerabend is sometimes described as being opposed to method 
per se, or as denying the value of scientific methods, or as defending the radical claim 
that, where scientific methodology is concerned, ‘anything goes’.25 Of course, 
Feyerabend often varied the presentation and rhetoric of his remarks on scientific 
methodology, in accordance with his shifting interests and critical targets (see 
Oberheim 2006: Ch7). However, there are clear and continuous claims regarding 
scientific methodology and the aim of this Chapter is to outline them, beginning, in this 
section, with Feyerabend’s criticisms of what I will call the ‘myth of method’.  
The ‘myth of method’ refers to methodological monism. It is ‘myth’ in Feyerabend’s 
sense because it is a distorting ideal which lends false prestige to the sciences. This 
latter point is important, because one should bear in mind that Feyerabend’s criticisms 
of methodological monism are not criticisms of the importance of methodologies in 
science, but only of what he sees as the false and distorting idea of ‘the scientific 
method’. The myth of method, then, refers to the idea that there is a singular, formalised 
scientific method which is both historically invariant and context insensitive. Against 
Method is a sustained assault upon the myth of method, but does not entail any rejection 
of the need for methodology in science. Instead, Feyerabend is trying to restore an 
account of scientific methodology which is both historically accurate and 
philosophically persuasive. The purpose of the critique is, therefore, to contribute to 
scientific practice by liberating it from the false methodological demands of the logical 
positivists and other advocates of methodological monism. This has other beneficial 
consequences because the myth of method supports, and is supported by other ‘myths’ 
regarding the sciences, such as its unique claims to rationality and objectivity, its value-
neutrality and its autonomy from social and political factors. Feyerabend’s critical 
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 See Tsou (2003) for a discussion of these various interpretations. 
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strategy is to dismantle various myths about the sciences—starting with the myth of 
method—and to contribute to a reconceptualisation of the sciences. 
Feyerabend makes the positive functions of his critique of methodological monism 
clear. The Preface to Against Method includes the remark that ‘[s]cience must be 
protected from ideologies’—by which Feyerabend means ‘myths’, like that of method. 
Feyerabend is not advocating a ‘hands off’ attitude and, indeed, he affirms that 
scientists can ‘profit from a philosophical education’ just as long as philosophical ideas 
and models are ‘examined and freely accepted’, rather than being ‘imposed’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: viii).26 Indeed, Feyerabend often explained, with no false modesty, 
that the ‘interpretation of scientific knowledge’ he defends was not original, and that it 
was ‘a triviality for physicists like Mach, Boltzmann, Einstein and Bohr’. These 
physicists developed methodological norms from their reflections on scientific practice 
and so provided the sort of practice-based normative methodology that Feyerabend 
insisted upon; however, their insights were ‘distorted beyond recognition’ by positivist 
and logical positivist philosophers of science (Feyerabend, 1993: viii). There is 
therefore a need for ‘a far more complex account of scientific knowledge than that 
which had emerged from positivism and similar philosophies’ (Feyerabend, 1993: x). 
Repairing these distortions was one of Feyerabend’s main aims. He hoped that by 
challenging the myth of method he could contribute to the construction of a perspective 
on the sciences which could benefit from ‘interesting results in the history of science’ 
and in turn provide ‘new insights into the limits of reason’ (Feyerabend, 1993: viii). The 
critique of methodological monism may be cast in negative terms but there should be no 
doubt that it was conceived as a positive project.  
Against Method is less dogmatic and more exploratory than is often supposed. In the 
Introduction to the Chinese Edition, Feyerabend explained that Against Method 
‘proposes a thesis and draws consequences from it’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 1). Although 
there are many historical and philosophical arguments in the book, its main aim is to 
offer a certain image of the sciences—as pluralistic and disunified—and to drew out 
some of its implications. This strategy is significant, for it explains many otherwise 
unusual features of the book. Feyerabend often remarked that Against Method was a 
‘collage’ of earlier papers, and cited this as a reason for his puzzlement at the hostile 
response that the book received (Feyerabend, 1995: 139). However, although the 
arguments and case studies in Against Method may not have been new, the implications 
that Feyerabend began to draw from them were. Arguing that the sciences are 
methodologically pluralistic is one thing; but suggesting that this undermines the typical 
demarcation between science and non-science (especially when the latter is illustrated 
by voodoo) is another! Therefore, what one sees in Against Method is Feyerabend 
beginning to articulate the radical implications of his emphasis upon the pluralistic 
nature of the sciences. Many of these implications are listed in the Analytical Table of 
Contents, often in the form of pithy, aphoristic statements. Amongst many possible 
examples, Feyerabend argues that his arguments may entail the conclusions that 
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have had in mind the promotion of such ‘myths’ in courses of scientific education. 
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applying familiar models of science would have ‘disastrous consequences’ for scientific 
practice; that proposed demarcation criteria ‘break down’ when one compares science 
and non-science; that neither science nor rationality are ‘universal measures of 
excellence’ and, finally, that science is ‘neither a single tradition, nor the best tradition 
there is’, except for those ignorant of alternatives (Feyerabend, 1993: 7-8). 
Many critics interpreted these implications as the necessary consequences of the 
arguments. As such, they convicted Feyerabend of promoting irrationalism, ‘anti-
science’ sentiments and of lapsing into culturally relativistic polemics about the 
equality of science with voodoo and the like. Chapter one detailed these charges, and 
their enduring and distorting effect upon scholarly assessments of Feyerabend’s later 
work. Many of these implications, of course, were radical: some of the claims, like the 
disunity of science, have become widely accepted within the philosophy of science (see 
Dupré 1993 and Galison and Stump 1996). Others, such as the demarcation of scientific 
and non-scientific practices and systems, remain controversial. However, critics 
arguably too often failed to distinguish between conclusions which Feyerabend thinks 
are plausible, and those which are offered as either provocation or stimuli for further 
speculations. Feyerabend’s writing may not always be transparent but, as Oberheim 
warns, ‘[a] little  more attention to detail and a better appreciation of Feyerabend’s 
rhetoric could have prevented at least three decades of a perpetuating 
misunderstanding’ (Oberheim, 2006: 34). I suggest that many of the radical proposals 
contained in Against Method are just that—proposals—and are not intended as 
substantive views that Feyerabend is committed to. Feyerabend used his critique of 
methodological monism as a way to open up new critical perspectives on the value and 
structure of the sciences. In doing so, he employed historical case studies, philosophical 
arguments, and provocative rhetoric and proposals; however, the aim of all of these 
critical strategies was to enable critical engagement with the sciences, rather than to 
undermine them.  
In the remainder of this Chapter I develop this interpretation of Feyerabend by 
focusing on Against Method and Science in a Free Society respectively. I argue that 
Against Method represented Feyerabend’s initial attempt to encourage critical reflection 
on the sciences. That book had two aims: the first was to critique methodological 
monism, and the second was to identify and explore various implications that critique 
had for our understanding of the sciences. However, most critics failed to distinguish 
between these two aims. As a result, they accused Feyerabend of illegitimately drawing 
radical conclusions that his arguments could not sustain, and of substituting rhetoric for 
argumentation. Unfortunately, Feyerabend responded to these charges by amplifying 
his rhetoric and making increasing extreme claims.  
I conclude the Chapter by arguing that Against Method and Science in a Free Society 
set the scene for the later philosophy. Against Method established Feyerabend’s critical 
project, but the ambiguity of its rhetoric—and the ‘illiteracy’ of its critics—obscured 
the combination of critique and speculation. In Science in a Free Society, Feyerabend 
radicalised his claims about the sciences by identifying the most extreme consequences 
of his criticisms of the sciences. His subsequent work can therefore be understood as an 
attempt to assess which, if any of those radical claims were tenable.  
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2.2 Against Method. 
Against Method had a complex history. In much the same way that Samuel Beckett was 
once apparently described as having written three different plays with the same name, 
Feyerabend wrote three different books with the same title. There are three works 
entitled ‘Against Method’, one long essay and three books.27 
In 1970, Feyerabend published a long article entitled ‘Against Method: Outline of an 
Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge’ (Feyerabend, 1970a). A few years later, Imré 
Lakatos proposed to Feyerabend that they write a book together, and work began 
immediately.28 The book was provisionally called For and Against Method, and the 
writing of it is documented in the surviving Feyerabend-Lakatos correspondence.29 
Sadly, Lakatos’ untimely death put an end to the joint project, so Feyerabend pressed on 
and published his own contribution. In typically candid prose, he later explained that 
Against Method ‘is not a book, it is a collage. It contains descriptions, analyses, 
arguments that I had published, in almost the same words, ten, fifteen, even twenty 
years earlier.’ Feyerabend ‘arranged them in a suitable order, added transitions, 
replaced moderate passages with more outrageous ones, and called the result 
“anarchism”’, freely admitting that he ‘loved to shock people’ (1995: 139, 142). Indeed, 
much of Feyerabend’s published writing was a ‘collage’ of this sort; certain passages 
are recycled, certain favoured quotations regularly reappear, and so on.30  
When Against Method was first published it met with a hostile reception—of which 
more in a moment. Feyerabend was initially puzzled by this. One reason was that his 
main historical and philosophical claims had already been made elsewhere, in person or 
on paper. Of course, presenting them in a sustained work may have amplified their 
force, and perhaps it was only in Against Method that the full range of Feyerabend’s 
critical claims became clear: science is not unified, whether methodologically or 
theoretically; science is radically pluralistic and ‘disunified’; scientific theories are not 
value-free; scientific research is affected by social and political factors, rhetoric, 
propaganda, and historical conditions. Feyerabend offers a ‘catalytic’ treatment of the 
philosophy of science, as he challenged ‘virtually every major assumption underlying 
the empiricist (and critical rationalist) accounts of scientific progress’: 
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 In fact, there are four editions of Against Method (1975a; 1988; 1993; 2010). 
However, the fourth edition was not prepared by Feyerabend and the editorial changes 
are arguably unhelpful; they obscure certain features of Feyerabend’s later philosophy. 
See Kidd (forthcoming b) for an account of these criticisms. Throughout this thesis, I 
refer to the third edition (Feyerabend 1993) unless otherwise stated. 
28
 Feyerabend (1993: vii) offers this account: ‘In 1970 Imré Lakatos, one of the best 
friends I ever had, cornered me at a party. “Paul”, he said, “you have such strange ideas. 
Why don’t you write them down? I shall write a reply, we publish the whole thing and I 
promise you—we shall have lots of fun”’. He also adds that the manuscript was once 
lost in London and was retrieved by Interpol! 
29
 See Feyerabend and Lakatos (1999). 
30
 See the comments in Hacking’s introduction to Feyerabend (2010). 
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‘The demand for theoretical consistency, the reliance on empirical fact, the 
need for increased confirmations, the reduction of ad hoc theorizing, all of 
which were believed to play a critical role in advancing knowledge, were found 
problematic’ (Gergen, 1986: 119) 
 
Many of these claims had been made before, of course, and the 1970s were of course a 
time of radical change for the philosophy of science, following in the wake of the 
‘historical turn’ and the emergence of ‘post-positivist’ challenges to science.  
Against Method also challenged many of the established norms of the philosophy of 
science. Its style, use of humour, and the liberal appeals to figures such as Brecht and 
Lenin puzzled and frustrated many readers. Feyerabend’s style was, as one sympathetic 
reviewer put it, ‘[o]ne of the most remarkable and least understood aspects’ of his 
books (Steedman, 1982: 726). Yet, for all its excesses, wrote one reviewer, Against 
Method ‘fulfil[s] the task set to all good philosophy of crystallising complacently held 
opinions into an absorbing and profitable conclusion’ (Lieberson, 1977: 492). It also 
issued its challenges in a charged and polemical manner. Feyerabend, as one 
commentator put it, ‘does not merely “write a book” in the conventional sense’, but 
instead ‘assaults his readers in his attempt to reach them and to engage them’ (Mitroff, 
1976a: 346). For many readers, what this ‘unconventional’ literary style resulted in was 
an aggressive polemic. Ernest Gellner, for instance, wrote that Against Method was ‘a 
melange of truisms and extravagances ... presented as a recipe for our [epistemological 
and social] liberation’, written in a ‘rasping, boastful, derisive’ tone, and filled with a 
‘Californian-Viennese Schmalz [which] leaves ... a disagreeable taste in the mouth’ 
(1975: 341-242)—and this, from the review for the British Journal for the Philosophy 
of Science! Another writes that, ‘One might be inclined to dismiss Feyerabend as a 
clown ... were it not for the fact that he is not amusing enough to fit the role’ 
(Schnädelbach, 1991: 433)—and this remark appeared in a contribution to 
Feyerabend’s festschrift! Other reviews were less hostile, but no less critical. A 
consensus emerged that Against Method was guilty of wilful historical distortion, 
philosophical extremism and unprofessional rhetorical excesses. 
Feyerabend was shocked and angered by the criticisms.31 Two things most struck 
him about the reviews (see Feyerabend, 1978: 125). First, many of the reviewers were, 
to his mind, guilty not only of the ‘nastiness’ they accused him of but also of a general 
philosophical ‘illiteracy’. A common complaint was that reviewers could not 
distinguish between jokes and serious points, and could not tolerate jocular remarks and 
asides. Second, and this is more speculative, Feyerabend perceived the criticisms of 
Against Method as slights against Lakatos’ memory; the book had been a joint project, 
and only Lakatos’ death—which had greatly depressed him (Feyerabend, 1995: 130f)—
put an end to it. It is therefore quite possible that Feyerabend interpreted the hostile 
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reception of Against Method as a slight against Lakatos.32 (Whether this is fair or not is 
another matter). 
The critical reception of Against Method marked a turning point in Feyerabend’s 
philosophy, in two senses. First, it precipitated his movement away from mainstream 
philosophy of science. Prior to 1975, the majority of Feyerabend’s work reflected 
contemporary debates in the philosophy of science—theory choice, empiricism, and so 
on—and it appeared in familiar journals of the discipline. To take just one example: 
prior to 1975, Feyerabend published ten articles in the British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, but after 1975, he published just three—two reviews, and a 
response to Gellner’s review of Against Method.33 Indeed, after 1975, most of 
Feyerabend’s papers appear in non-philosophy journals, conference proceedings, and 
edited volumes. Against Method therefore prompted Feyerabend to move away from 
mainstream philosophy of science; and many philosophers of science were, of course, 
quite pleased to let Feyerabend go.  
Second, Against Method also marked the beginning of Feyerabend’s turn to a wider 
set of philosophical and, increasingly, political concerns. Prior to Against Method most 
of his work reflected various epistemological and methodological issues in the sciences; 
afterwards, these concerns are augmented by new moral, social, political, 
environmental, and cultural interests. Although historical and philosophical studies of 
the sciences remained the ‘core’ of Feyerabend’s work, it was increasingly applied to a 
whole host of ‘applied’ issues. Most obvious amongst these was a growing interest in 
cultural diversity and the practical and cognitive efficacy of non-Western, ‘non-
scientific’ cultures (the topic of the next two Chapters). 
2.3 Feyerabend’s normative philosophy of science. 
The preceding remarks suggest that Against Method was the real turning point of 
Feyerabend’s philosophical development. This claim should now be clarified. As 
mentioned earlier, much of what Feyerabend actually defended had appeared elsewhere, 
and the book was of course not universally derided. Even those reviewers who did not 
agree affirmed the great value of the book. For one reviewer, 
 
‘Against Method ... is full of contradictions, over- and under-statements, and 
enough ad hominem statements to give even the most liberal student of 
rhetoric apoplexy. This is not to condemn Feyerabend. Indeed, I applaud 
him all the more for breaking through the hypocrisy, dullness, and triviality 
of so much of contemporary academic philosophy’ (Mitroff, 1976a: 347) 
 
Feyerabend would doubtless applaud. In his correspondence with Lakatos, he makes 
clear his dissatisfaction with the discipline of philosophy of science. These discontents 
were also made provocatively clear in the titles of two papers which appeared in the 
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 There is a complete bibliography of Feyerabend’s works, including interviews and 
published lectures, in Oberheim (1999). 
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years preceding Against Method, ‘Philosophy of Science—A Subject with a Great Past’ 
(Feyerabend, 1970b), and ‘Die Wissenschaftstheorie—eine bisher unbekannte Form des 
Irrsins’ (Feyerabend, 1973)—‘The Philosophy of Science—A Previously Unknown 
Form of Mental Disease?’ The claim of these two papers was that the philosophy of 
science had lost its connections to the history and practice of science. The results were 
increasingly abstract models (of scientific methodology, say) which were not only 
historically vacuous but which would also be disastrous if they were actually applied in 
scientific research. Feyerabend urged his peers to return to what he perceived as a 
‘golden age’ when the philosophy of science was practised with a close and continuous 
connection to scientific practice, rather than being led by ‘armchair methodologists’.  
The heroes of Feyerabend’s normative proposals for the philosophy of science were 
figures like Aristotle, Ernst Mach, and Niels Bohr. Two things are worth noting about 
Feyerabend’s heroes. First, they were all both philosophers of science and practising 
scientists—or, perhaps better, they were inquirers for whom the distinction between the 
practice and the philosophy of science was minimal, if not absent. As Dean Rickles 
(2008: 6) recently put it, for scientists like Einstein, Heisenberg, and Bohr, ‘physics and 
philosophy of physics are not really so different’.34 Their philosophies of science are 
therefore ‘activist’, in the sense that ‘philosophy of science interacts more directly with 
scientific results’ (Searle, 2003: 11).35 Second, Feyerabend’s ‘heroes’ also saw 
important connections between science and other dimensions of human life. Mach, for 
instance, is praised for ‘want[ing] to change science not just to increase its efficiency, 
but also to preserve freedom of thought’ (Feyerabend, 1970c/1999: 196).36 Aristotle is 
celebrated for his development of ‘a humane science’, one ‘adapted to the requirements 
of a balanced and rewarding life’, and for his argument that the ‘task of thought’ is ‘to 
comprehend and perhaps to improve what we perceive and do when engaged in our 
                                                           
34
 The philosophical interests of late nineteenth and early twentieth century physicists 
are well-documented, although discussions often emphasise their philosophical 
reflections on the sciences. Whilst this is understandable, it does tend to obscure the 
important point that Bohr, Heisenberg, Planck and others also had much to say about 
language, religion, and ethics. For an excellent discussion and assessment of 
Heisenberg’s claim that Bohr was ‘primarily a philosopher, not a physicist’, see Pais 
(1991: Ch19). On Heisenberg and Planck on language and religion, see Heisenberg 
(2007). 
35
 Such ‘activism’ continues today, for instance with the establishment of the Society 
for Philosophy of Science in Practice. It has also become a major theme of 
contemporary history and philosophy of science—another instance of Feyerabend’s 
prescience. 
36
 In a letter to Harald Hoffding of 6th September 1905, Mach writes, ‘I was very 
pleased that you count me among ‘philosopher-scientists’ [philosophierende 
Naturwissenschaftler] and not among ‘philosophers’. My aim and my profession is not 
to solve philosophical problems, but only to purify the methodology of the natural 
sciences from old disturbing pseudoproblems’ (quoted in Hentschel, 1985, 391). The 
resonances with Feyerabend’s own philosophy is obvious. 
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ordinary everyday affairs; it is not to wander off into a no-man’s-land of abstract and 
empirically inaccessible concepts’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 217-218).37  
Feyerabend’s interpretation of Mach and Aristotle has been challenged.38 Too often, 
as Stephen R.L. Clark points out, Feyerabend’s interpretations of his heroes reflects his 
own predilections rather than strict scholarly accuracy; Aristotle, for instance, is ‘less of 
a pluralist and pragmatist than Feyerabend allows’ (Clark, 2002: 257). However, the 
accuracy of Feyerabend’s interpretations is less important here than what they can tell 
us about his own concerns. The interpretations of Mach, Aristotle and others illustrate 
the normative model of a ‘good scientist’ that Feyerabend has in mind: they are 
‘philosopher-scientists’, engaged in both scientific practice and philosophical reflection 
upon it, and they also have wider interest in social and political affairs, informed by a 
generous and eclectic historical perspective. They are, if you like, activist, civic, and 
historical. Feyerabend’s normative ‘philosopher-scientist’ has a clear command of 
history, philosophy, science, and politics, and uses the resources of each, individually 
and in concert, for both the growth of knowledge and the improvement of humankind. 
It is this model which informed Feyerabend’s criticism of the philosophy of science. 
what Mitroff described as the ‘hypocrisy, dullness, and triviality of so much of 
contemporary academic philosophy’ arose—it is alleged—because philosophers of 
science ceased to be ‘activist’, ‘civic’, and ‘historical’. Under the influence of logical 
positivism, the philosophy of science detached itself from actual scientific practice, it 
lost its appreciation of the historical dimension of science, and, more worryingly for 
Feyerabend, it lost its interest in the wider moral, social, and political aspects of human 
life. This complaint has been supported by recent historians of the philosophy of 
science. Heather E. Douglas (2009, esp. Chs2-3) argues that the philosophy of science 
deliberately cultivated its ‘value-free’ image of science and philosophy of science in an 
attempt to insulate itself from political scrutiny during the Cold War. David Stump 
(2002: 155) similarly suggests that such attempts have shaped contemporary philosophy 
of science. The philosophy of science, he complains, ‘today suffers from a ... general 
lack of political engagement’, despite the fact that,  
 
‘[B]y taking science as the object of philosophical reflection, philosophers 
of science are engaging an institution that plays a major role in 
contemporary life and are therefore dealing with issues that are often 
directly related to issues of public concern. Philosophers of science therefore 
retain their potential to affect public discourse by performing their role as 
interpreters of science and judges of scientific practice.’ (Stump, 2002: 157) 
 
The last few decades have, happily, seen a revival of social and political concerns in the 
philosophy of science. Much of this has taken the form of rejecting the ‘value-freedom’ 
of scientific research and, by extension, the neutrality of the philosophy of science. 
hence Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie argue that there are ‘defensible 
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 See also Feyerabend (1995: 119). 
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 By Hentschel (1985) and Clark (2002) respectively. 
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positions other than the dichotomous views that good science must always be value free 
and that all science is politics’ (2007: vii). Similar claims have also been made by 
feminist and postcolonial historians and philosophers of science, such as Evelyn Fox 
Keller (1985), Helen Longino (1990), and Sandra Harding (1986, 1991), the latter of 
whom I return to in later chapters.39 
Other philosophers have used more specific strategies. Philip Kitcher (2001) 
develops an account of ‘well-ordered science’ whose explicit aim is to reinvest 
scientific research—and the philosophy of science—with ‘non-epistemic values’ 
reflecting broad moral, social, and political concerns. John Dupré (1993, 2003) has 
similarly stressed the social and political issues inherent in the philosophy of science, 
especially in the cases of evolutionary psychology and human classification. 
Interestingly, Dupré, who has perhaps done most to reintroduce social and political 
concerns in the philosophy of science, once remarked that,  
 
‘the philosopher with whose general perspective on science I find myself 
most closely in agreement [is] Paul Feyerabend ... an oasis of serious critical 
analysis on a topic that, astonishingly enough, has been almost entirely 
ignored by philosophers of science [viz., the social and political position of 
science in contemporary society]. Feyerabend’s notorious epistemological 
anarchism is intended above all as a therapy against the antidemocratic and 
oppressive consequences of the monopoly of epistemic authority sustained 
by science.’ (Dupré, 1993: 262-263) 
 
The claim unifying these philosophers is that the philosophy of science was mistaken to 
dissociate itself from the wider humanitarian concerns of its earlier incarnations. Even 
without subscribing to Feyerabend’s perhaps tendentious interpretations of Aristotle, 
Mach and other ‘heroes’, there is a clear consensus amongst both contemporary 
historians of philosophy of science and contemporary philosophers that moral, social, 
and political issues must be reintroduced into the philosophy of science. In this, they 
follow Feyerabend’s complaints, first raised in the early 1970s, about the ‘irrelevance’ 
of philosophy of science and the need to recapture its ‘great past’.  
If I am correct, then Against Method was one of the first works in recent philosophy 
of science to both draw attention to this problem, and to attempt to respond to it; in so 
doing, it was ahead of its time, but, alas, too much so. The claims that Feyerabend made 
in the mid-1970s alienated him from the mainstream of the philosophy of science, and 
subsequent histories of philosophy of science have tended to overlook his prescience. 
The silver lining of this scholarly occlusion is, of course, that the time is now ripe for 
Feyerabend’s significance to these contemporary developments to be made clear. 
However, before doing so, the rest of the story of the reception of Against Method 
should be told. 
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 Keller and Longino (1996) is an excellent introduction to feminist philosophy of 
science. 
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2.4 Science in a Free Society. 
The foregoing remarks have been generally sympathetic to Feyerabend. Against Method 
offered not only revisionary accounts of scientific methodology but also issued a stern 
challenge to the discipline of the philosophy of science. The aim of both was to 
encourage constructive critical reflection on the sciences. Subsequent developments in 
the philosophy of science have, moreover, vindicated many of Feyerabend’s claims. 
Contemporary philosophers of science generally concede that science is pluralistic, 
value-laden, shaped by historical and social factors, and connected to social and 
political concerns. These are all key features of Feyerabend’s account of the sciences, 
and they have all gone on to become generally accepted commitments of subsequent 
philosophy of science.40 The fact that Feyerabend is not therefore celebrated as a 
prescient philosopher of science therefore poses a puzzle, and one which grows when 
one considers the reputation that Feyerabend does have—a polemical, ‘anti-scientific’ 
cultural relativist.  
In Chapter One, I argued that this ‘bad reputation’ is unwarranted, insofar as the later 
Feyerabend is neither anti-science, nor a cultural relativist, and that, on the contrary, he 
offers a positive account of the role of the sciences in the modern world. My account 
there did not explain, however, quite how the ‘bad reputation’ arose, and it is now time 
to repair this omission. To recap, after the hostile reception of Against Method, 
Feyerabend wrote a book-length reply entitled Science in a Free Society (1978a). The 
first two parts of the book are entitled ‘Against Method Revisited’ and ‘Science in a 
Free Society’ and they reiterate—and exaggerate—the main claims of Against Method. 
This ‘sequel’ was intended both to clarify the claims made in Against Method which 
Feyerabend thought his critics had misunderstood and also included a series of replies 
to the more aggressive of his critics (see Feyerabend 1976a, 1977, 1978b, 1978c). 
These formed part three of the book, ‘Conversations with Illiterates’, a title which 
makes their tone and content clear, and which ‘constitute lessons in intellectual 
annihilation’ (Gergen, 1986: 122).  
It is Science in a Free Society which is responsible for the ‘bad reputation’ that 
Feyerabend came to enjoy (or suffer). It is in this book that Feyerabend argues that 
cultures are separate and isolable and that legitimate inter-cultural criticism is therefore 
impossible (Feyerabend, 1978a: 79-86). It is in this book that Feyerabend denies the 
special cognitive and practical authority of the sciences (Feyerabend, 1978a: 98-105). It 
is in this book that he makes enthusiastic appeal to astrology, parapsychology, and 
alternative medicine (Feyerabend, 1978a: 91-96), and it is in this book that his prose is, 
even by his own standards, at its most aggressive and polemical. Finally, it is in this 
book that Feyerabend deserves the ‘bad reputation’ that came to jeopardise the 
appreciation of his later philosophy. 
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 Denise Russell (1983) was one of the earliest writers to remark upon how 
Feyerabend’s work anticipated developments in the sociology of science and to note his 
interest in the question of the value of science and its implications for social control of 
science. 
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These remarks make it clear that Science in a Free Society was, by all accounts, not a 
success. Feyerabend himself later expressed his disappointment with it, and stated his 
wish not to see it reprinted.41 That said, he did not repudiate it publicly in print, a 
gesture which would have done both him and his work a great deal of good, and 
perhaps prevented the lapse of the later philosophy into what Bertrand Russell once 
neatly called ‘intellectual oblivion’. Of course, Feyerabend’s response to this would no 
doubt have been that he was not concerned about the opinions of philosophers of 
science—‘dull’ and preoccupied with technicalities and trivialities as he alleged they 
were. This is surely disingenuous, and also lacking in professional scholarly virtues. In 
any case, it is not yet clear why Feyerabend did not want to see Science in a Free 
Society reproduced; after all, this is the book in which he first states his concerns about 
the hegemony of science, the value of cultural diversity, and the efficacy of non-
scientific practices and systems. Indeed, Science in a Free Society is the first place in 
which Feyerabend discusses at length the mutually enriching relationship between 
cultural and epistemic pluralism—which, as I argue in later Chapters, became a central 
theme of Feyerabend’s later philosophy. 
I suggest that one should interpret Science in a Free Society as representing various 
extreme positions which Feyerabend hastily embraced (and perhaps earnestly) but from 
which he spent much of his later career gradually retreating. The fact that Feyerabend 
did retreat from its extreme positions is important, because many philosophers have 
taken that book to represent something like Feyerabend’s ‘mature’ philosophical 
positions. This is unfortunate, of course, since the views on science, culture, and 
philosophy of science that it defends are untenable and often unsophisticated. As a 
result many philosophers, especially those ‘of science’, simply stopped reading 
Feyerabend at that point. Science in a Free Society was a step too far, even if it did win 
Feyerabend great acclaim from the many radical ‘relativist’ movements of the late 
1970s, and with later ‘anti-science’ groups, to each of whom he became a ‘hero of the 
anti-technological counter-culture’ (Preston, 2009: §2.17). Unfortunately, it placed 
Feyerabend firmly outside the philosophy of science—a wilful, self-imposed eviction 
which he never attempted to repair.  
 
2.5 ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’. 
Science in a Free Society aligned Feyerabend with various radical political and 
philosophical positions, such as anarchism, irrationalism, and ‘counter-cultural’ trends. 
However, I suggest that Feyerabend was not in fact adopting these positions; instead, he 
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 It is perhaps telling that, in the years immediately following its publication, 
Feyerabend authorised the translation of Science in a Free Society into German (1979), 
Italian (1981), Japanese (1982) and Spanish (1982), but only twice thereafter—into 
Persian in 1987 and Chinese in 1990. This is unlike Against Method, Farewell to 
Reason, and Three Dialogues on Knowledge, each of which was regularly translated 
and reprinted long after their publication. For bibliographical details, see Feyerabend 
(1999: 228-230).  
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was inviting us to consider them because, to his mind, they were too often simply 
dismissed without discussion. This becomes obvious in the first chapter of part two of 
the book, entitled ‘Two Questions’ which Feyerabend claim ‘arise in the course of any 
discussion of science’ (Feyerabend, 1978a: 73). These two questions are: ‘What is 
science’ and ‘What’s so great about science’, and Feyerabend complained that there 
‘hardly exists anyone’ who asks the second question because ‘[t]he excellence of 
science is assumed, it is not argued for’. Therefore one aim of Science in a Free Society 
is to ask this question and to provide motivation for others to do so. As Feyerabend 
writes: 
 
‘This phenomenon, though remarkable and somewhat depressing, would 
hardly bother a sensible person if it were restricted to a small number of the 
faithful: in a free society there is room for many strange beliefs, doctrines, 
institutions. But the assumption of the inherent superiority of science has 
moved beyond science and has become an article of faith for almost 
everyone.’ (Feyerabend, 1978a: 74) 
 
There is hyperbole here, but the point that Feyerabend is making seems to run as 
follows: the presumption of the ‘excellence of science’ has become increasingly 
influential in the life of developed world societies (such as medicine and education). 
This presumption has therefore moved from the ‘small number’ of scientists and 
philosophers of science and come to affect many of the major institutions and policies 
of public life; it is therefore now a political issue. Feyerabend urges us to take seriously 
questions about the social and political authority of the sciences, partly because of his 
perception that this is a neglected question, and partly because of his concerns that 
certain false images of science—like the ‘myth of method’—are interfering with our 
capacity to appreciate and address this question. This interpretation makes clear the 
connection between Feyerabend’s earlier work in scientific methodology and his later 
social and political concerns. There is nothing ‘inherently liberating’ in the sciences, 
and their emancipatory power will depend upon our having an accurate understanding 
of their nature and limitations; however, science, ‘being a product of human effort has 
its faults’, and identifying and repairing these faults is—or should be—a key aim of the 
history and philosophy of science (Feyerabend, 1978a: 75).  
Science in a Free Society is Feyerabend’s proposal for a ‘critique’ of science. This is 
evident in the contemporaneous paper ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’ 
(Feyerabend, 1976b), much of which was reproduced as chapter one, part two of 
Science in a Free Society. The title ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’ is, of course, 
a nod to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and I suggest that Feyerabend intended his 
critique of scientific reason to be a ‘critique’ in Kant’s sense. In the Critique, Kant 
‘rejects extravagant claims made on behalf of reason’ and therefore also rejects 
systems, like Leibniz’s, which indicate ‘reason pressed beyond its proper limits’ 
(Cooper, 2003: 296). Feyerabend’s critique has the same aim: he criticises ‘extravagant 
claims’ made on behalf of science, such as that it is methodologically unified, and so 
seeks to identify the ‘proper limits’ of scientific inquiry. Feyerabend clearly intended 
Kidd                             Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 
 
41 
 
his ‘critique of scientific reason’ to be comprehensive: ‘a true Critique of Scientific 
Reason cannot anything for granted. It must examine the most obvious assumptions’ 
(Feyerabend, 1976b: 112). This is why Science in a Free Society makes such radical 
claims, like the ‘proposal’ that science should be separated from the state; these are not 
serious proposals, but rhetorical means of identifying the possible, extreme limits of a 
critique of the structure and value of the sciences. When Feyerabend writes that a 
critique of scientific reason may see the sciences ‘abolished [or] play[ing] a relatively 
small role’ in future societies, he is not engaging in malicious, anti-science polemics; 
instead, he is offering certain provocative, yet possible answers to the question ‘what’s 
so great about science’. Feyerabend wants us to engage in a ‘critique of scientific 
reason’ and exploring ‘radical’ conclusions and possibilities is an essential feature of 
this.42 
The aspect of ‘critique’ was noted by some reviewers of Science in a Free Society. I 
will focus on three reviews, those from the British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science, Philosophical Quarterly, and the Review of Metaphysics. ‘R.H.S’ (1981), 
writing for the Review, makes the ‘critique’ explicit, explaining that Feyerabend 
‘challenges some of the basic presuppositions of the enlightenment; namely, that 
intellectual and social progress can be achieved only under the control of reason with 
the aid of science’ (‘R.H.S.’, 1981: 384). The same reviewer goes on to remark, ‘I can 
think of no philosopher since Hume who has been able to expose, and willing to 
challenge, so many of the presuppositions underlying our tacit confidence in rationality 
and science’ (‘R.H.S.’, 1981: 385). Stephen R.L. Clark (1980) notes that Feyerabend’s 
critique is intended to help us ‘insist on liberty’ in the face of those ‘who can offer no 
argument for their tyranny’ (Clark, 1980: 174). Noretta Koertge (1980) similarly 
recognised that Feyerabend’s ‘epistemological anarchism’ was ‘a specific remedy for 
today’s philosophy of science’, not ‘an elixir for all seasons’ (Koertge, 1980: 385). 
However, she complained that she ‘find[s] Feyerabend’s critique too wide-sweeping to 
be of much use… and his specific proposals for counteracting scientism and the cult of 
the expert rather naïve’ (Koertge, 1980: 389). This objection relies on the presumption 
that Feyerabend was trying to provide specific proposals: however, I argued that his aim 
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 Of course, there is still much rudeness and, at times, nastiness in Science in a Free 
Society. The suggestion that the philosophy of science should ‘not be reformed, but … 
allowed to die a natural death’ is one example (Feyerabend, 1978a: 122). Moreover, 
Feyerabend’s was often easily provoked to anger by his perception of the ‘conceit’ and 
‘pretension’ of intellectuals, especially where such (perceived) conceit and pretension 
was accompanied by political power. Feyerabend explained that his early ‘political’ 
papers, such as ‘Experts in a Free Society’ (Feyerabend, 1970c), were written ‘in a fit of 
anger and self-righteousness caused by what I thought were certain disastrous 
developments in the sciences’ (Feyerabend, 1999a: 112). Feyerabend often derided the 
‘conceit’ of intellectuals (himself included); see Feyerabend (1978a: 118, 121) and 
(1993: 264, 267). Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend (per. comm.) tells me that Feyerabend was 
always especially critical of ‘pontifications and self-aggrandizements’. 
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was simply to inspire and enable philosophers of science to take seriously the question 
of the excellence of science. 
2.6 Conclusions. 
This Chapter offers a scholarly reinterpretation of the ‘turn’ in Feyerabend’s philosophy 
marked by the publication of Against Method and Science in a Free Society (c.1975-
1978). This period is important because it marks what is generally perceived as the shift 
from the ‘early’ to ‘later’ philosophy. It is also marred by controversy. Against Method 
was controversial enough, but Feyerabend exacerbated the charges against him by 
ostensibly embracing various radical political and philosophical views. This 
compounded his ‘bad reputation’ within the philosophy of science and began the slow 
decline in the quality and significance of his work—or so it is thought. I challenged this 
interpretation of these two books. Against Method introduced Feyerabend’s challenge to 
methodological monism and introduced his suggestion that radical philosophical 
reassessments of the sciences could have political implications (for instance, of 
judgements about the value and authority of the sciences). Science in a Free Society 
was intended to develop these ideas; however, Feyerabend, stung by the criticisms of 
Against Method, let his rhetoric and anger get the better of him and this unfortunately 
obscured the ‘critique of scientific reason’ he was trying to initiate. Into his later period, 
this critique was developed in more moderated terms but. But by then, Feyerabend was 
not read by, nor addressed himself to, philosophers of science. 
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Chapter Three 
Ch3 Defending Epistemic Pluralism 
 
3.1 Feyerabend’s epistemic pluralism. 
3.2 Chang’ epistemic pluralism. 
3.3 Harding’s epistemic pluralism. 
3.4 History, pluralism, and humane concerns. 
3.5 Conclusions. 
 
Chapter two detailed Feyerabend’s rejection of methodological monism, and his 
defence of scientific pluralism. However, one consequence of scientific pluralism is that 
the very idea of ‘science’, as enjoying a distinctive ‘essence’, or whatever, dissolve; and 
this prompted Feyerabend to consider the value of practices and epistemic systems 
which were previously classified as ‘unscientific. Science in a Free Society did this, 
badly, but Feyerabend’s account did improve—that’s the topic of chapter four. This 
chapter ‘formalises’ the account of epistemic pluralism that Feyerabend developed, 
both to secure the claims in Chapter Two and to prepare the way for Chapter Four. 
 
3.1 Feyerabend’s epistemic pluralism. 
Although best known, perhaps, as an ‘anarchist’, it would be fairer to describe 
Feyerabend as a pluralist. Indeed, one could quite plausibly argue that Feyerabend’s 
philosophical career consisted in a sustained defence of a epistemic pluralism, against 
all forms of ‘dogmatism’ or ‘monism’. This is evident in his advocacy, in the 1960s, of 
theoretical pluralism and the principles of proliferation and tenacity, in his criticisms of 
Kuhn’s model of science in ‘Consolations for the Specialist’, in the ‘epistemological 
anarchism’ of Against Method, and in his later remarks, throughout the 1980s and early 
1990s, about cultural and epistemic diversity and the ‘abundance’ of reality. Oberheim 
(2006) notes that Feyerabend’s arguments and strategies changed as his interests and 
concerns evolved over time and therefore credits him with adopting a flexible 
‘philosophical pluralism’. Feyerabend was also a pluralist on many fronts: about 
theories, methods, cultures, moral systems, and so on. Although his arguments and 
attitudes towards the various forms of pluralism are, as one might expect, different, the 
underlying sentiment is clearly that having resource to a plurality of alternatives—
whether these be scientific theories, ‘forms of life’, or whatever—invariably promises 
greatest practical and cognitive benefits. Pluralism not only maximises criticism, 
empirical content and other epistemic values, but also promotes various ‘humanitarian’ 
concerns, such as promoting progressive intellectual, moral, and political virtues, like 
tolerance and open-mindedness. In Chapter five I say more about the humanitarian 
dimensions of pluralism and suggest that Feyerabend was greatly indebted to John 
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Stuart Mill’s claims that having resource to a ‘diversity of modes of thought and action’ 
is a precondition for a flourishing human life.43 
The pluralist reading of Feyerabend is not controversial, even if his ‘pluralist’ 
credentials are not widely acknowledged. Certainly many contemporary scientific 
pluralists generally do not identify him as an important precursor to current enthusiasm 
for pluralism.44 In Chapter one, I identified four common charges against Feyerabend 
which may help to explain his absence from contemporary pluralist debates and another 
could be added from the work of Eric Oberheim. In a recent book, Oberheim argues 
that Feyerabend’s ‘pluralism’ does not consist in ‘a cohesive, stable set of doctrines or 
set of principles’, but, rather, in ‘a pluralistic philosophical method that calls for 
pluralism in science and philosophy in the pursuit of progress’ (Oberheim, 2006: 287). 
Feyerabend’s ‘pluralism’ was premised upon the value of epistemic diversity, both as a 
means to maximising inter-theoretic criticism, empirical content of our theories, our 
epistemic engagement with reality, and as a means of reflecting the diverse aims and 
values motivating human inquiries into the world. Moreover, pluralism is, as 
Feyerabend argued, the most appropriate attitude to take towards the history of science, 
as evinced by his proposal that the ‘whole history of thought’ should be ‘absorbed into 
science’ for its improvement—and our edification (Feyerabend, 1993: Ch4). 
In the following section, I use Hasok Chang’s recent defence of epistemic pluralism 
as a model for understanding Feyerabend’s own epistemic pluralism. In the following 
section, I augment this by drawing upon the work of Sandra Harding. 
 
3.2 Chang’s epistemic pluralism. 
Feyerabend argues that reality can sustain a radical epistemic pluralism. This means 
that the objective structure and properties of reality are such that they can be explored 
and represented using a plurality of mutually-incompatible epistemic activities. 
However this positive claim raises some important questions which must be answered 
and which relate to the basic question of just how much epistemic pluralism reality can 
sustain and the related issue of how pluralistic we need to be. The metaphysical claim 
that reality can sustain a radical epistemic pluralism of course not does entail that such 
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 In the very late stages of this thesis, it occurred to me that there is a further dimension 
to Feyerabend’s commitment to pluralism, which I will briefly sketch but not go into: I 
suggest that Feyerabend thought that human nature was inevitably diverse, pluralistic, 
and conflicted. This theory of human nature is much like that defended by Isaiah Berlin. 
My idea here is that, for Feyerabend, human nature is pluralistic and diverse, such that 
human activities—like science, or art, or culture—should, under normal circumstances, 
manifest such pluralism and diversity. I do not intend to elaborate this nascent idea 
here, but mention it here simply as an idea. 
44
 See, for instance, Feyerabend’s absence from Kellert, Longino, and Waters’ recent 
and important edited volume, Scientific Pluralism (2006). Doubtless a large part of this 
absence arises from a worry that mere mention of Feyerabend will set off ‘relativist’ 
alarm bells, and that recruiting him as a pluralist would do more harm than good. 
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pluralism should be cultivated, especially when one considers familiar pragmatic 
objections to pluralism (such as the greater demands it poses upon finite human and 
material resources).  I argued in the last section that Feyerabend thinks that although 
there are metaphysical limits to epistemic pluralism, these are far less restrictive than 
philosophers have tended to suppose.  Indeed, one could argue that Feyerabend’s 
position is that we are likely to encounter other limitations to epistemic pluralism long 
before we hit these metaphysical limits.  In Chapters two, three, and four, for instance, I 
discussed Feyerabend’s claim that epistemic pluralism has been hampered by false 
ideas about the methodological unity of the sciences and the status of ‘non-scientific’ 
epistemic activities.  What are these other limitations to epistemic pluralism? 
There are many conceivable factors which might impose restrictions on epistemic 
pluralism. Many of these are cited by critics of scientific pluralism. Typical examples 
include the risk of jeopardising the distinction between science and pseudoscience 
(Reisch 1998), the financial and other costs of sustaining a diversity of research 
programmes, and historical and sociological arguments in favour of scientific monism 
(Kuhn 1962). These are many issues here, and I cannot address all of them here. 
Instead, my strategy will be to consider a recent defence of a strong form of epistemic 
pluralism by Hasok Chang (2010; forthcoming). My hope is that establishing a strong 
normative case for pluralism should make it clear that the further practical problems 
facing pluralism are worth the cost of establishing and sustaining pluralism. I appeal to 
Chang for two reasons.  First, Chang’s ‘active normative epistemic pluralism’ does not 
rely on strong metaphysical claims and so is compatible with Feyerabend’s own 
pluralism and the metaphysics that grounds it.  Second, many of Feyerabend’s own 
arguments for pluralism can be best understood within the account given by Chang (and 
so, in this sense, Chang succeeds in his ambition to take inspiration from Feyerabend 
but to proceed in a ‘more systematic fashion’ than him (Chang, 2010: n4).  Chang’s 
active normative epistemic pluralism can therefore be fruitfully used to provide a 
systematic case for pluralism that can help us to better understand Feyerabend’s own.  
The outcome of this comparison should be to secure a strong normative case for 
epistemic pluralism. 
Chang dubs his position ‘active normative epistemic pluralism’.  His pluralism is 
active because it does not simply indicate the benefits of having multiple systems of 
knowledge, but also actively cultivates them.  It is normative because it maintains that 
having multiple systems of knowledge is of great benefit to scientific research; 
pluralism is not an ‘optional extra’ which can be cultivated or not, as one chooses.  The 
aim of science should not be to converge on a single account of the world, and the 
standard aims of science can be well better served if one has recourse to multiple 
systems of knowledge.   
Chang offers both philosophical arguments and historical case studies to support his 
pluralism.  My interest here is with the philosophical arguments.  Chang identifies two 
sets of benefits of pluralism, namely ‘benefits of toleration’ and ‘benefits of 
interaction’: 
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Benefits of toleration Benefits of interaction 
Insurance against unpredictability Integration 
Covering different aspects of nature Co-optation 
Multiple satisfaction of an aim Competition 
Satisfaction of multiple aims  
 
The benefits of toleration refer to the benefits arising from the coexistence of multiple 
systems of knowledge.  Since the future development of science is uncertain, it is wise 
to cultivate multiple systems of knowledge so that we keep our epistemic options open.  
The sudden collapse of one system of knowledge would then not be so catastrophic, 
since alternatives are available which one could appeal to.  Epistemic pluralism also 
allows us to cover different aspects of the world, since each epistemic activity focuses 
upon only certain aspects of the world and then only at a certain degree of accuracy.  
Cultivating multiple systems of knowledge maximises the number of aspects of the 
world that we have epistemic access to, and it also allows for the possibility that our 
explanatory aims could be satisfied by more than one system of knowledge.  Epistemic 
pluralism also allows for the possibility that multiple explanatory aims can be satisfied.  
Since human explanatory interests are diverse, it is unlikely that any one system could 
adequately fulfil all of them; however, a plurality of such systems of knowledge could. 
Feyerabend also urged us to tolerate and preserve a diversity of epistemic systems on 
the grounds that they ‘insure’ us against unexpected developments. One should 
‘preserve’ older, ‘obsolete’ theories ‘for possible future use’, both because the process 
of scientific research ‘can change direction in surprising ways’ and also to insure us 
against the vicissitudes of ‘recurrent fashions’ (Feyerabend, 1987, 33). Feyerabend 
sometimes lapsed into hyperbole: 
 
‘There is no idea, however ancient and absurd, that is not capable of 
improving our knowledge. The whole history of thought is absorbed into 
science and is used for improving every single theory. Nor is political 
interference rejected. It may be needed to overcome the chauvinism of 
science that resists alternatives to the status quo.’ Feyerabend, 1993: 33) 
 
This remark should not be taken literally, for two reasons. The first is that it is too 
assertive. Feyerabend himself repeatedly emphasised the need for case-by-case 
examinations of the value of epistemic practices and systems; therefore to claim that 
there is ‘no idea … that is not capable of improving or knowledge’ is untenable, even if 
one can appreciate the epistemological motivations behind it. The second is that one 
cannot foresee the value of epistemic practices and systems because these are 
contingent upon future theoretical and practical developments. These cannot be 
identified in advance. Feyerabend’s exaggeration here is understandable, but his point is 
that one should preserve epistemic pluralism because of the ‘benefits of tolerance’ that 
Chang identifies. These possible benefits depend upon ongoing theoretical 
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developments, changes in explanatory interests, and so on, and cannot be foreseen. (I 
return to this point in Chapter four). One cannot therefore make ex cathedra judgements 
about the value of certain epistemic practices and systems; one can of course entertain 
doubts about the future utility of certain of these, but that cannot be determined in 
advance.  
The benefits of interaction refer to the advantages that result when multiple systems 
of knowledge interact with one another.  Epistemic pluralism allows for the ad hoc 
integration between multiple systems in situations where neither can achieve a certain 
aim to an acceptable degree.  Even without full integration, different systems of 
knowledge may co-opt features from one another, such as theories, techniques, or 
instrumentation.  Such co-optation may be one-way or two-way, and it will likely 
involve the interpretation and adaptation of those features, rather than straight 
borrowing.  And even where integration and co-optation do not occur, competition may 
arise between different systems of knowledge which is similarly beneficial.  This may 
take the form of psychological and professional pressure to perform better in the face of 
superior rivals, or other forms of motivation. 
Chang presents a variety of arguments in favour of normative epistemic pluralism.  
These arguments all pertain to the pragmatic value to scientists of cultivating multiple 
systems of knowledge.  Even for scientists convinced of the efficacy of their own 
research programmes, Chang’s account can indicate the benefits they might enjoy from 
tolerating and interacting with alternative research programmes.  There is much to say 
about active normative epistemic pluralism as Chang presents it, but for my purposes it 
should suffice to demonstrate the normative case for epistemic pluralism.  Certainly it 
supports Feyerabend’s remarks about proliferation and pluralism: since there are no 
immediate metaphysical limitations to epistemic pluralism, one needs only a persuasive 
normative argument in its favour. Chang provides that with his active normative 
epistemic pluralism. 
 
3.3 Harding’s epistemic pluralism. 
There are further arguments which Feyerabend can add to Chang’s case for pluralism.  
Chang’s normative case for pluralism focuses upon epistemological arguments for 
cultivating multiple systems of knowledge.  Other writers have added practical, 
empirical, and even neurophysiological arguments for the value of epistemic pluralism; 
interesting as these are, they are not my interest here.  Although Feyerabend would 
consent to the epistemological arguments that Chang offers, he would also introduce a 
further set of moral and political arguments for epistemic pluralism.  The provision of 
moral and political arguments for epistemic pluralism is not confined to Feyerabend 
since this same argumentative strategy has recently been used by Sandra Harding 
(Harding 1998; 2006; 2008).  
Harding emphasises the positive and productive relationship between cultural and 
epistemic diversity.  Like Feyerabend’s, her work reflects a concern with political and 
philosophical issues relating to the cognitive and cultural authority of the Western 
sciences in the modern world.  Common to both Feyerabend and Harding is also a 
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concern to prompt a reassessment of the epistemic merits of other cultures’ epistemic 
traditions, and they use moral and political as well as practical and epistemological 
arguments to pursue this concern.  Harding defends epistemic pluralism using the 
resources of ‘postcolonial science and technology studies’.  In her recent work, she 
focuses upon cross-cultural epistemic diversity and its status in relation to the Western 
sciences.  Central to Harding’s work is the claim that cultures and sciences ‘co-
constitute’ one another.  Cultures provide the social and material conditions and 
explanatory motivations for scientific projects, which in turn inform and enable new 
conditions and motivations, thus sustaining an interactive cultural and epistemic 
diversity.  
This is very close to Feyerabend’s account of the ‘abundance’ of reality as arising 
from the interaction of diverse human cultures with the ‘richness of Being’.  Harding’s 
account of the co-constitution of cultures and sciences arguably complements Chang’s 
epistemological arguments: whereas Chang provides a normative case for epistemic 
pluralism, Harding is concerned with the conditions which generate such pluralism in 
the first place.  These are, of course, the social and intellectual resources of human 
cultures and the wide array of explanatory goals and practical and cognitive values they 
generate.  
As Harding puts it: 
 
‘Cultures generate scientific and technological projects to serve distinctively 
local interests and needs in the first place. Moreover, the diversity of the 
cultural resources that they bring to such projects enables humanity to see 
yet more aspects of nature’s order. Cultures’ distinctive ways of organising 
the production of knowledge produce distinctive repositories of knowledge 
and method.’ (Harding, 1998: 20) 
 
Scientific projects are informed by the cultures which generate and sustain them.  The 
contributions that cultures make to scientific projects are numerous: conceptual 
schemes, social and political structures, physical infrastructures, practical and economic 
imperatives, and so on.  Since these vary across and within cultures, they enable 
different forms of scientific inquiries: the ‘[sciences and] technologies a culture can and 
is willing to use is a matter of social and cultural history’, as are the ‘skills and 
techniques … material environments … and ways of organising the labour of scientific 
research and [attaching] new meanings to such processes’ (Harding, 2008: 185).  
Harding emphasises that scientific traditions draw upon the material, social and 
intellectual resources of the cultures and communities which generate them. This point 
may seem trivial, but she emphasises that most of the world’s contemporary scientific 
and technological traditions tend to be located within developed world cultures. 
Feyerabend similarly maintained that cultural values ‘affect not only the application of 
knowledge but are essential ingredients of knowledge itself’ and that scientific 
knowledge ‘arises from interactions that are shaped by social customs and individual 
preferences’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 28). He goes on to remark that: 
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‘Knowledge is a local commodity designed to satisfy local needs and to 
solve local problems; it can be changed from the outside, but only after 
extended consultations that include the opinions of all concerned parties. 
Orthodox ‘science’, in this view, is one institution among many, not the one 
and only repository of sound information. People may consult it; they may 
accept and use scientific suggestions—but not without having considered 
local alternatives and certainly not as a matter of course.’ (Feyerabend, 
1987: 28) 
 
Both Harding and Feyerabend maintain that cultures and sciences co-constitute, and 
argue that many of the world’s cultures are disenfranchised, for complex economic, 
political, and historical reasons.  This means that the sciences have tended to be shaped 
and informed by the cultural values and interests of the European and, later, ‘Western’ 
cultures, leaving the potential scientific projects of non-Western cultures largely 
unexploited.  
They find this objectionable for two reasons. First it is practically and epistemically 
disadvantageous for Western cultures because it deprives them of valuable scientific 
projects, including modes of inquiry and forms of knowledge.  Even if only a few of 
these prove to be valuable, our Western sciences can benefit—in the ways outlined by 
Chang—by tolerating and integrating with other cultures’ sciences.  And indeed, 
postcolonial science and technology studies scholars have documented the immense 
debt of the Western sciences, both historical and contemporary, to the knowledge 
systems of non-Western cultures—a point also emphasised, although with less scholarly 
rigour, by Feyerabend.  Second, the scientific projects pursued within a culture reflect 
its distinctive values and needs, such as its economic and industrial interests.  The 
scientific projects of one culture may therefore fail to adequately fulfil the needs of 
another culture, whose values and needs may be quite different.  Of course, there may 
often be overlap between these needs but the diversity of values and concerns animating 
distinct cultures ensures that this is likely to be the exception rather than the rule.  
Therefore the pluralisation of the sciences has moral and political as well as practical 
and epistemic value.  Harding argues that the Western sciences have tended to serve 
distinctly Eurocentric concerns, to the exclusion of those of non-Western peoples.  The 
implicit exclusion of other cultures’ values and interests creates a situation in which the 
dominant sciences fail to reflect their concerns; unless those concerns are built into the 
sciences at their foundations they are unlikely to subsequently appear within the theories 
and practices they generate.  Harding and Feyerabend both concur that the sciences can 
and should be pluralised by incorporating the values and concerns of non-Western 
cultures.  Such co-constitutive cultural and epistemic diversity is of practical and 
epistemic as well as moral and political value. 
Harding’s ‘postcolonial science and technology studies’ offers an argument for 
cultural and epistemic diversity that Feyerabend would approve of (and indeed which he 
arguably anticipated).  The sciences can be pluralised in many ways, but an obvious 
strategy—and a neglected one—is to re-enfranchise the values and concerns of non-
Western cultures.  Their epistemic disenfranchisement discussed in Chapter four, where 
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I explore Feyerabend’s claim that the rich epistemic resources offered by non-Western 
cultures have been excluded, both deliberately and not, from serious consideration.45 A 
main culprit in these exclusions has been the false idea that ‘Science’, as both a 
descriptive and an honorific term, is confined to Western scientific and technological 
traditions; this of course includes the claim that those traditions are themselves 
independent of the traditions of other world cultures, itself a dubious claim. Feyerabend 
approved of such a project: 
 
‘[T]here is nothing in the nature of science that excludes cultural variety. 
Cultural variety does not conflict with science viewed as a free and 
unrestricted inquiry, it  conflicts with philosophies such as ‘rationalism’ or 
‘scientific humanism’ and an agency, sometimes called Reason, that use a 
frozen and distorted image of science to get acceptance.’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 
12-13, original emphasis) 
 
Neither Harding nor Feyerabend think that engaging in reassessments of non-Western 
epistemic practices will see them automatically incorporated into the body of scientific 
knowledge.  That is too much to hope for; rather, their point is that global cultural 
diversity offers an unexploited resource—‘repositories’, as Harding puts it—which can 
help us to pluralise the sciences and create a more socially and politically inclusive 
scientific enterprise.46   
A great advantage of recognition of the epistemic value of cultural diversity is that it 
offers a potentially inexhaustible resource for pluralising the sciences.47  Harding argues 
that ‘[t]he limits of such resources can never be reached as long as cultures continue to 
change over time and new ones emerge in the diasporas and interstices of older cultures’ 
(Harding, 1998: 20).  The ongoing evolution of human cultures generates new values 
and imperatives, social and cultural interests, and economic and industrial concerns.  
This in turn affects the range and prioritisation of scientific projects which those cultures 
                                                           
45
 Harding urges us to ‘reevaluate indigenous knowledge … not from the perspective of 
conventional Northern exceptionalist and triumphalist standards, but rather as projects 
which responded well, or not, to concerns of non-European societies and their peoples’ 
(Harding, 2008: 134). 
46
 Harding notes the possibility that future, culturally-diverse, pluralistic sciences may 
be quite different from the sciences we currently recognise, once one takes seriously the 
idea that ‘[t]he North is no longer regarded as having the right to hold as uniquely 
legitimate its designs for possible future global science and technology scenarios’. This 
possibility holds even if, as Harding rightly remarks, ‘it is extremely difficult to 
imagine how scientific and technological work could be different than it is now’ 
(Harding, 2008: 145, 146). See also Harding (2006: Ch3). 
47
 This is one reason why Feyerabend was so alarmed by the dissolution of global 
cultural diversity and the ‘brave new monotony’ that it threatened to produce. See 
Feyerabend (1987: Ch11). 
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generate and so ensures that the sciences can fulfil an array of practical, cognitive, and 
social values.48  
Chang and Harding offer two forms of normative argument for active epistemic 
pluralism.  Both of these are necessary to make the case for the pluralisation of the 
sciences and they also help us to systematise Feyerabend’s own scattered remarks on the 
value of pluralism.  Chang’s active normative epistemic pluralism offers a systematic 
argument for cultivating multiple systems of knowledge.  The benefits of tolerance and 
benefits of interaction provide the best possible conditions for the development of 
particular theories and for the growth of knowledge about the world. Harding augments 
these epistemological arguments by identifying cultural diversity as a resource for 
generating and sustaining epistemic pluralism.  Diverse human cultures offer 
repositories of knowledge and methods as well as a diversity of values and concerns 
which motivate different forms of scientific project.  
The common theme between Feyerabend, Chang, and Harding is the diversity of 
arguments in favour of normative epistemic pluralism.  Using these three thinkers in 
concert, one can argue that the pluralisation of the sciences is both practically and 
epistemologically advantageous and morally and politically praiseworthy.  Chang would 
surely concur with Harding’s statement that ‘there were in the past, are now, and always 
will be and should be multiple scientific traditions which partially overlap and partially 
conflict with each other’ (Harding, 2008: 145). Feyerabend agreed and he can, I think, 
be identified as an advocate of something like Chang’s active normative epistemic 
pluralism. Consensus and uniformity could arise spontaneously, perhaps as the result of 
a convergence of theories or pragmatic considerations; however, pluralism and diversity 
are generally the normal state for any area of human activity. This is, I think, what 
Feyerabend had in mind when he emphasised the ‘humanitarian’ aspects of pluralism; 
for instance, when, he complains that Kuhn’s (monistic) normal science is ‘incompatible 
with a humanitarian outlook’, and suggests that pluralism may ‘raise [us] to a higher 
level of consciousness’ and aid in ‘preventing our species from stagnation’ (Feyerabend, 
1981b: 144). Like Mill, Feyerabend considers that ‘stagnation’ and a loss of diversity is 
indicative of a failure on the part of human beings to explore their diverse 
potentialities—whether in science, philosophy, or in any other area of human life. 
 
3.4 History, pluralism, and humane concerns. 
Feyerabend defended pluralism on a number of fronts. Into his later period, he even 
began to develop a historical narrative—the ‘conquest of abundance’—whose core 
                                                           
48
 Kitcher’s ‘well-ordered science’ is one attempt to reconcile epistemic and non-
epistemic values in the Western sciences, but by connecting it with Harding’s work one 
can make a case for a well-ordered science that applies to non-Western cultures as well. 
Feyerabend arguably led the way here by insisting that scientific projects should 
contribute to human wellbeing by incorporating the values and concerns of both 
Western and non-Western cultures. This pluralises the sciences and reconnects them 
with the practical and social concerns of a greater majority of the world’s population. 
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claim was that Western intellectual culture has been broadly hostile to pluralism. This 
historical narrative is not meant to be interpreted as a systematic treatment of the 
histories of Western intellectual culture, and Feyerabend himself remarks that his 
historical remarks will be confined to ‘selected events and developments’ from the 
histories of ‘common sense, philosophy, science and the arts’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 17). 
The ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative should not even be interpreted as an accurate 
history; instead it is, like Foucault’s ‘histories’, an attempt to provide a critical 
perspective upon contemporary values and institutions. Stephen R.L. Clark remarks 
that: 
 
‘Much the same can be said of Feyerabend’s essays in creative history. 
Inaccurate in detail as they may be, and ambiguous in their implications, 
they still constitute a deeply serious vehicle for exploring the dilemmas and 
ambiguities of living  … Whatever the proper conclusion to his work (which 
we do not have), it remains a salutory challenge to philosophers disposed to 
believe that ‘science’ or ‘philosophy’ is certainly a public good, and 
‘philosophers’ particularly well equipped to clarify and reform the human 
heart.’ (Clark, 2002: 263) 
 
Clark interprets Feyerabend’s ‘history’ as a critical device. The ‘conquest of 
abundance’ narrative is yet another of the provocative strategies that Feyerabend 
employed in an effort to rethink ideas that we take for granted. In this case, the aim is to 
make us critically reassess the idea that our aim should be the provision of some one 
theory, whether philosophical or social, under which one can explain all phenomena. 
The ‘critical’ functions of this history become obvious once one considers how poorly 
Feyerabend’s talk of the ‘conquest of abundance’ would be if it were interpreted as 
documentary history. Most obviously, the history of philosophy, whether ‘Western’ or 
‘Asian’ or whatever, is startlingly and wonderfully diverse and pluralistic, as are the 
histories of science, medicine, technology, and the arts. The increasing enthusiasm of 
historians of science for ‘micro-histories’ and their hostilities towards grand, ‘Plato to 
Nato’ histories are two signs of this. 
Feyerabend offers a quasi-historical story to invite us to critically assess monism, 
and to delight in the plurality offered by our history. One could perhaps interpret 
Feyerabend’s pro-pluralistic ‘history’ as a late response to those earlier generations of 
historians of science who concurred with Kuhn’s (1962) model of the history of 
science. Kuhn argued that, within the history of the physical sciences, periods of 
pluralism are rare, transitory, and indicative of a ‘crisis’ state which necessitates 
‘extraordinary’ measures. Happily, ‘post-Kuhnian’ historians of science are far more 
sympathetic to pluralism, and their philosophical colleagues have, in recent years, come 
to explicitly embrace pluralism (see Kellert, Longino, and Waters 2006).49 The 
prospects for pluralism are, therefore, very good, and not just within the history and 
philosophy of science—indeed, for some optimistic commentators, ‘pluralism now 
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 See also Rescher (1995) for a sophisticated defence of pluralism. 
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reigns’ (Stump, 2002: 154).50 Of course, if Feyerabend is correct, then pluralism 
invariably reigns; one only needs to worry when certain groups or schools begin to 
militate against it. 
It is interesting to note that many contemporary pluralists emphasise the ‘humane’ 
dimension of pluralism. Dupré (2002; 2003) defends pluralism because of a worry that 
monism threatens to distort our understanding of complex phenomena, like human 
behaviour. Although monism has a powerful appeal, Dupré (2003) stresses the point 
that the irreducible complexity of phenomena militates against the ‘lure of the 
simplistic’. In the case of human behaviour, for instance, any ‘grand unifying theory of 
human nature’ can be ‘confidently predicted to distort many or most of these 
complexities’. Feyerabend was equally critical of the tendency to allow ‘social or 
psychological theories’ to assume exclusive explanatory authority, even to the point of 
neglecting the views of ‘asking the people involved’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 263).51 Since 
any one theory or model is partial and selective, one must employ a variety of them in 
order to maximise one’s empirical and cognitive engagement with the phenomenon in 
question—which, in this case, is human beings. No one theory or set of theories can be 
allowed to assume exclusivity and priority here, and this is why Dupré (2003; 2006) 
criticises evolutionary psychology. Dupré explains that, concerning human nature, 
‘It seems to me that here we should not even aspire to approach the topic 
with a unified tool-kit. Indeed, the more diverse and varied the contents of 
our tool-kit, the better chance we have of coming to grips with the really 
interesting problems about human behaviour ... [C]omplexity cries out for 
plurality. The only route to a deeper understanding of ourselves is through 
radical epistemological pluralism’ (Dupré, 2002: S292-293) 
 
On Dupré’s account, epistemic pluralism enjoys both epistemological and moral 
advantages. It maximises the resources available to us for understanding the complex 
phenomena of human behaviour and in so doing protects us against distorting, reductive 
accounts which may, in a worst case scenario, be abused to support dubious social and 
political policies. And this latter point is not an incidental, ‘humanitarian’ feature but, 
rather, an essential guiding concern of the philosophy of science: ‘science is a human 
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 Some historians and philosophers have connected the rise of pluralism with various 
cultural and intellectual trends, such as ‘postmodernist’ enthusiasm for ‘eclecticism’, 
multicultural rhetoric in praise of ‘diversity’, greater appreciation of philosophical and 
scientific traditions outside the ‘Euro-American core’, and so on. Reflecting on these 
trends, John Kekes (2000) recently urged us to steer a path between ‘absolutist 
certainties’ and ‘relativistic arbitrariness’, and argued that  the ‘alternative to absolutism 
and relativism is pluralism’. It is worth noting, too, that his book, Pluralism in 
Philosophy is subtitled ‘Changing the Subject’. 
51
 This was the phenomenon that Feyerabend saw at work in many contemporary 
international development projects which, he complained, generally tend to ignore local 
wishes and values. See, for instance, Feyerabend (1993: 263-267 passim). 
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product [and] like other human products, the only way it can ultimately be evaluated is 
in terms of whether it contributes to the thriving of the sentient beings in this universe’ 
(Dupré, 1993, 264). Dupré, like Feyerabend, considers that the complexity of 
phenomena—from human behaviour to biological classification—generates epistemic 
pluralism. Complexity, as Dupré neatly puts it, ‘cries out for pluralism’. As with 
Feyerabend, Dupré thinks that this call for pluralism has both epistemological and 
ethical or political dimensions. Epistemologically, there are good reasons for us to 
employ a plurality of theories and systems, and these were neatly systematised by 
Chang. Ethically (or politically), such pluralism enables us to include a diversity of 
explanatory interests, modes of inquiry, and so on, especially where these are culturally 
and geographically variable. This is the point made by Harding in the context of her 
overt moral and political concerns with the disenfranchisement of non-Western 
scientific and technological traditions, a theme she develops at length in Science and 
Social Inequality (Harding 2006).  
As an aside, the appeal to Harding’s pluralism may also provide a response to one 
very important criticism of Feyerabend’s pluralism. This is the objection that his 
pluralism is flawed because it allows for the endless proliferation of theories and 
methods, but without any mechanism for the removal or rejection of theories. Peter 
Godfrey-Smith puts this criticism very well: 
 
‘What is missing in Feyerabend’s picture is some rule or mechanism for the 
rejection and elimination of ideas. Feyerabend gives a recipe that, if it was 
followed, would lead to the accumulation of an ever-increasing range of 
scientific ideas being discussed in every field. Some ideas would probably 
become boring and might be dropped for that reason. But aside from that, 
there is no way for an idea to be taken off the table.’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2001: 
116) 
 
This criticism has practical as well as epistemological aspects. Feyerabend may urge us 
to happily engage in theoretical proliferation and to generate an over-growing ocean of 
alternative theories. However, such ever-growing pluralism is not only costly, but may 
result in an embarrassment of riches, as one is faced with an unmanageable diversity of 
theories and methods. Godfrey-Smith continues that if a part of science consists in the 
resolution of practical problems, then Feyerabend’s pluralism ‘seems completely 
misguided’ because it lacks ‘a mechanism of selection in science’, especially for the 
‘rejection of ideas’ (Godfrey-Smith, 2001: 116). I would like to propose two responses 
to this. The first is that Feyerabend was responding to his perception of the general 
dominance of monistic models of science; so his stress upon the need for pluralism 
reflects a worry that, at the time of his writing, this was absent. His aim was to secure 
the need for pluralism, not (yet) to provide mechanisms for managing pluralism. The 
second is that Feyerabend does point to criteria which might inform such selection 
mechanisms, namely, values. Harding, for instance, emphasises that scientific and 
technological projects reflect the diverse social, economic, and intellectual interests of 
the cultures which participate in them. One could—and this is only a proposal—invoke 
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something like Kitcher’s (2001) idea of ‘well-ordered science’ to provide a mechanism 
whereby one can make decisions about the retention and proliferation of scientific 
projects according to a host of epistemic and non-epistemic values. As I will discuss in 
Chapter seven, this is one reason why I think Feyerabend began to consider political 
issues in the philosophy of science into his later period. 
 
3.5 Conclusions. 
Feyerabend’s epistemic pluralism cannot be confined to the sciences alone. His earlier 
defences of theoretical and methodological pluralism in the sciences later expanded into 
a broader commitment to epistemic pluralism, across the range of human epistemic 
activities (including philosophy and the arts). Preston and Oberheim chart these aspects 
of Feyerabend’s pluralism, even if their accounts diverge in important respects (which 
is discussed in Kidd 2008). Feyerabend’s pluralism is not simply a reflection of his 
epistemological views, however, because it reflects his deeper commitment to the 
‘humanitarian’ character of such pluralism. In Chapters five and six I say more about 
what this is, but it consists in the conviction that human beings are naturally diverse, in 
their aims and interests, such that epistemic pluralism is not only epistemologically 
sensible, but also ethically and politically important. For the later Feyerabend, epistemic 
pluralism is both an epistemological and ethical position and so should be safeguarded 
for both of those sorts of reasons. 
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Chapter Four  
Ch4 Exceptionalism, Triumphalism, and the Contingency of Science 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
4.2 The presumption of the omnicompetence of science. 
4.3 The contingency of science. 
4.4 Exceptionalism and triumphalism. 
4.5 Conclusions. 
 
Feyerabend wants to preserve and increase the plurality of science by encouraging us to 
engage with the practices and systems of knowledge of non-Western cultures. Since 
arguments already exist for pluralism within the sciences, Feyerabend needs to make a 
good case for encouraging contact between scientific and ‘non-scientific’ practices and 
systems of knowledge. Feyerabend shows that the cognitive and practical efficacy of 
the sciences does not preclude the possible success of alternative practices and systems. 
Feyerabend does this by challenging what I call the ‘presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science’, which is understood as a form of scientism consisting of 
the related tendencies of ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘triumphalism’. In this Chapter, 
therefore, I detail how Feyerabend used arguments based upon the contingency of the 
sciences to challenge the presumption of the omnicompetence of science. The gist of 
this argument is that the contingencies accompanying the emergence of the modern 
sciences prevented the development of alternative theories and practices whose 
practical and cognitive efficacy may have been equivalent or superior to that of our 
own. This is substantiated this using recent literature on contingency from the history 
and philosophy of science. I conclude that the aim of Feyerabend’s criticisms of the 
presumption of the omnicompetence of science is to provoke us to reassess the 
distribution of practical and cognitive efficacy across the range of human epistemic 
practices and systems. 
 
4.1 Introduction. 
Feyerabend wanted to encourage epistemic pluralism by encouraging fruitful 
interaction between the Western sciences and the diverse range of epistemic practices 
and systems of knowledge found in non-Western cultures. It is clear that Feyerabend 
considered the sciences to be inherently pluralistic; however, he felt that the sciences 
could be more diverse—in their theories, methods, and investigative aims—through 
greater interaction with the scientific traditions of non-Western cultures. There are two 
sense of ‘science’ at work here: firstly, there is the descriptive use of ‘science’ to refer 
to, for instance, the disciplines of physics, chemistry, and biology that emerged across 
the history of Western science. This sense is what Alexander Rosenberg has in mind 
when he argues that ‘Science as a distinctive enterprise is arguably the unique 
contribution of western thought to all the world’s other cultures’ (Rosenberg, 2000: 1-
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2). The second sense is of ‘science’ as a normative term to refer to responsible and 
useful epistemic practice, or what Dupré, later in this Chapter, refers to as 
‘epistemically excellent’ practices and projects of inquiry. Sandra Harding has this 
second sense in mind when she writes that ‘modern sciences and technologies … are 
local knowledge systems’, a point which is quite compatible with the claim that 
‘modern science is far more accurate at predicting many more of the regularities of 
nature’s order than are many of the claims of other cultures’ knowledge systems’ 
(Harding, 1998: 55). Feyerabend often vacillates between these two senses of science: 
although he thinks that science, in the second sense, is not confined to early to late 
modern Euro-American cultures, he often writes and speaks as if it is. However, in the 
third edition of Against Method, Feyerabend makes clear his allegiance to the second 
sense of science as an honorific term for good epistemic practice: ‘There can be many 
different kinds of science … People starting from different social backgrounds will 
approach the world in different ways and learn different things about it’ (Feyerabend, 
1993: 2-3). In this Chapter I argue that Feyerabend thought that there are many 
scientific traditions and that some of these, primarily those that lie outside of developed 
world societies, have been unfairly disenfranchised owing to mistaken belief in the 
uniqueness and superiority of ‘Western science’. 
Chapter three presented the normative arguments for epistemic pluralism that one 
can find in Feyerabend’s philosophy and connected these with contemporary literature 
on scientific pluralism. However there is further work to be done to secure 
Feyerabend’s insistence that the normative arguments for epistemic pluralism can be 
applied to non-scientific practices and systems; pluralism within the sciences is one 
thing, but a radical pluralism encompassing both scientific and non-scientific practices 
is far more controversial. Indeed, few contemporary scientific pluralists mention any 
productive role for non-scientific practices and theories; even philosophers such as 
Harding (2008) who openly affirm the efficacy of non-Western scientific and 
technological traditions confine their attention to the empirical practices and systems of 
those cultures (see Maffie 2008). The result is that certain possible practices and 
systems—such as those invested in theological or magical schemes—remain neglected. 
The later Feyerabend did propose that one should investigate such ‘non-empirical’ 
practices and systems, if only at a strategy for identifying the limits of epistemic 
pluralism. 
Feyerabend therefore occupies a radical position amongst contemporary pluralists 
because he urges us to take seriously non-Western practices and systems which fall 
outside of even a capacious definition of ‘science’. This claim has also tended to be 
conflated with Feyerabend’s complex and changing commitment to cultural relativism 
and this has prevented serious engagement with his remarks on the efficacy of 
indigenous cultures. Indeed, there is a consensus within the scholarship that 
Feyerabend’s appeals to the efficacy of indigenous cultures is rhetorical, polemical, or 
otherwise not to be taken seriously.52  
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In this Chapter, I challenge this consensus and argue that Feyerabend’s appeals to the 
efficacy of indigenous cultures should be taken seriously. The purpose of these appeals 
is to encourage us to reassess the distribution of cognitive and practical efficacy across 
the range of human epistemic practices and systems of knowledge. I outline the 
challenge that Feyerabend posed to what I will call the ‘presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science’. This refers to an exaggerated conception of the practical 
and cognitive efficacy of the sciences which depends upon historically and 
philosophically untenable models of science. It is this presumption which marginalises 
the epistemic practices and systems of non-Western cultures and which plays a large 
role in preventing serious assessments of their efficacy taking place. Feyerabend offers 
examples of the efficacy of selected indigenous practices and systems of knowledge. 
These examples substantiate his claim that practical and cognitive efficacy is not 
confined to the Western sciences and technologies and gives us good practical and 
moral reasons to take undertake a reassessment of global epistemic diversity. They also 
demonstrate that, into his later period, Feyerabend abandoned cultural relativism 
because he accepted that certain practices and systems of knowledge were less 
efficacious than others. This rebuts any implication that he entertained an ‘anything 
goes’ attitude towards the diversity of practices and systems across the range of human 
cultures. I conclude the chapter by introducing the political dimension to Feyerabend’s 
appeals to the efficacy of indigenous cultures which assumes an increasingly important 
role in later Chapters. 
 
4.2 The presumption of the omnicompetence of science. 
In this section I provide an account of what I call the ‘presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science’. This refers to a cluster of false accounts of the nature and 
structure of the sciences and the exaggerated estimations of the practical and cognitive 
efficacy of the sciences which they generate. The presumption of the omnicompetence 
of science is a form of scientism and much of Feyerabend’s philosophy, both early and 
later, can be understood as a series of challenges to it—or, perhaps better, as his 
changing ideas about how such scientism is sustained and manifested within the modern 
world. Scientism has not been a common theme in the philosophy of science, but has 
received some excellent treatments in recent years.53 Feyerabend is one exception to 
this. Throughout his early career Feyerabend consistently criticised models of science 
which mistakenly affirmed its unique claims to enjoy rationality, objectivity, and 
theoretical and methodological unity. The reason was, of course, that these models of 
science are both historically inaccurate and philosophically deleterious; they find no 
basis in the history of scientific thought and practice and if applied would impair, rather 
than aid, scientific research. Against Method was a sustained critique of such 
misleading images of science using the example of methodological monism. 
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Feyerabend criticised many prevailing philosophical accounts of science. 
Unfortunately, this meant that he defended a view of science which was, at the time, 
very radical—namely, that science is disunified and pluralistic, charged with values, 
and powerfully affected by contingent social and historical conditions. Of course, this 
conception of science has since become widely accepted within the history and 
philosophy of science even if the particularities of it are still subject to vigorous debate. 
Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is therefore critical (not that anyone ever doubted 
that) and its purpose is not to undermine scientific knowledge and practices, but instead 
to provide us with an accurate understanding of their nature and efficacy. 
Feyerabend argued that into the early twentieth century certain philosophies of 
science with scientistic tendencies began to become predominant. The logical positivist 
and logical empiricist models of science that assumed increasing influence into the 
1920s and 1930s were unapologetically scientistic. The logical positivists emphasised 
that science was unified and rational and that is represented the most advanced form of 
human intellectual activity. Some of them argued that ‘science’ should be adopted as a 
model or exemplar for other human endeavours, for instance in philosophy, ethics, and 
politics, often by referring to a ‘scientific world conception’, or Weltanschauung.54 
Feyerabend agreed that the sciences were a marvellous cognitive and cultural 
achievement but disagreed about logical positivist emphases upon their superlative 
value and efficacy. This is a historical and philosophical complaint about the accuracy 
and tenability of the logical positivists’ model of science and much of Feyerabend’s 
most influential work was devoted to challenging it; for instance, by rejecting the 
distinction between observation and theoretical languages and the contexts of discovery 
and justification. Feyerabend often referred to such misleading models of science as 
‘myths’ or ‘ideologies’ and insisted that science proper needed to be protected from the 
‘ideology of science’. 
The presumption of the omnicompetence of science is one such ‘ideology’. This 
presumption can take a variety of forms and it may be more accurate to speak in the 
plural of presumptions of the omnicompetence of science. A general form of the 
presumption could be the claim that science per se is practically and cognitively 
superior to any and all alternative traditions, such as magical and mythological 
cosmologies. A more specific form would be the claim that certain areas of science, 
such as the physical sciences, are fundamental and that other areas of inquiry are 
ultimately reducible to them. The presumption can be either general or specific and can 
range from praising all of the sciences, or only certain select disciplines or theories. 
There are also political and cultural dimensions to the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science; it may encourage the view that the sciences are the most 
valuable parts of human intellectual activities such that the arts and humanities, say, 
should be less valued and perhaps even abandoned.55 Nor are such attitudes confined to 
the older logical positivist period in the history of philosophy. Ladyman and Ross 
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(2006) defend just such a scientistic account in their recent book Every Thing Must Go, 
where they describe the Western sciences as ‘the great epistemic enterprise of modern 
civilization’ and argue that any discipline or practices which do not conform to it ‘fails 
to qualify as part of the enlightened pursuit of truth, and should be discontinued’ 
(Ladyman and Ross, 2006: 310, vi).56 
Feyerabend was interested in multiple manifestations of the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science. These included debates about the value of the arts and 
humanities in relation to the sciences, the legitimacy of religious belief, and the place of 
science within modern developing world cultures. In this Chapter, however, my focus is 
on just one aspect of the presumption: namely, the claim that the Western sciences 
enjoy unique or superlative practical and cognitive efficacy. This can be understood in 
two ways. The first is that the Western sciences are uniquely successful at enabling us 
to understand and manipulate the natural world. The second is that they are 
superlatively successful at doing so, in the sense that other ‘pre-scientific’ practices and 
systems of knowledge can claim lesser degrees of practical and cognitive success; for 
instance, certain cultural and cognitive anthropologists have argued that ‘folkbiological 
concepts’ can be understood as containing ‘rudimentary or inchoate’ forms of concepts 
which receive their most sophisticated manifestation in scientific practices (Atran and 
Medin, 1999: 11). Claims about the practical and cognitive efficacy of the sciences 
should be understood as lying on a broad spectrum; there is abundant empirical 
evidence to demonstrate the efficacy of certain practices and systems, such that one 
could not dismiss them tout court (see Appendix II for a scholarly survey of such 
literature).  
Feyerabend agrees that practical and cognitive efficacy is shared across the range of 
human epistemic practices and traditions. What he disagrees about is the distribution of 
efficacy and the scope of the practices and traditions being considered. Feyerabend 
insists that the ‘non-scientific status of certain practices and systems of knowledge does 
not automatically debar them from enjoying practical and cognitive efficacy. In an 
autobiographical essay, he reports a realisation prompted by the increasing inclusion of 
black, Spanish, Native American and Indian students into his classes into the 1970s: 
 
‘Their ancestors had developed cultures of their own, colourful languages, 
harmonious views of the relation between people, and between people and 
nature whose remnants are a living criticism of the tendencies of separation, 
analysis, self-centredness inherent in Western thought. These cultures have 
important achievements in what is today called sociology, psychology, 
medicine, they express ideals of life and possibilities of human existence. 
Yet they were never examined with the respect they deserved except by a 
small group of outsiders; they were ridiculed and replaced as a matter of 
course first by the religion of brotherly love and then by the religion of 
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science or else they were defused by a variety of ‘interpretations’’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: 264) 
 
The reason is that there is no singular term ‘science’ to which one can appeal in order to 
sustain a demarcation between scientific and non-scientific practices. Although this 
does not, of course, deny the fact that practical and cognitive efficacy varies across the 
range of human epistemic practices it does mean that one must seek alternative 
standards for judging it then an appeal to an alleged demarcation between science and 
non-science. Feyerabend argues that, too often, the merits of indigenous practices and 
systems are ignored or overlooked simply because they are classified as unscientific. 
These classifications are sustained by false images of the sciences and should therefore 
be abandoned or radically reassessed once those images are dissolved. 
One particularly influential false image of science that Feyerabend challenged was 
the doctrine of the ‘unity of science’. During the 1960s and 1970s the guiding message 
of Feyerabend’s work was that the sciences are not and should not be theoretically and 
methodologically unified. The sciences are pluralistic or ‘anarchistic’ and include a 
complex range of theories and methods which are often mutually inconsistent. This is 
the image of science presented in Against Method and it is one of the first sustained 
defences of what later became known as the ‘disunity of science’. That term was of 
course made famous some twenty years later by Dupré in The Disorder of Things 
(Dupré, 1993). Dupré defends a pluralistic and disunified account of the sciences based 
upon a study of classificatory pluralism in the biological sciences. Furthermore, like 
most of the ‘Stanford school’ philosophers of science, Dupré is alert to the social and 
political implications of both scientific knowledge and our philosophical understanding 
of the sciences. He argues that an appreciation of the disunified and pluralistic nature of 
the sciences should prompt us to rethink our ideas about ‘epistemic excellence’ and the 
legitimacy of our talk of ‘science’ in the singular. An awareness of the pluralistic nature 
of the sciences should prompt us to consider alternative accounts of the epistemic 
excellence of the sciences: one can no longer attribute the excellence of science to its 
application of a uniform scientific method because no such method exists. Dupré 
instead proposes that we appeal to ‘epistemic virtues’. These are features of projects of 
inquiry according to certain virtues such as empirical adequacy, fecundity, and so on. I 
am not interested here in the nature and taxonomy of these epistemic virtues but rather 
in their implications for our assessment of the efficacy of the sciences.  
In an important and neglected passage, Dupré writes that: 
 
‘In general, I can imagine no reason why a ranking of projects of inquiry in 
terms of a plausible set of epistemic virtues (let alone epistemic and social 
virtues) would end up with most of the traditional sciences gathered at the 
top. No sharp distinction between science and lesser forms of knowledge 
production can survive this reconception of epistemic merit. It might fairly 
be set, if paradoxically, that with the disunity of science comes a kind of 
unity of knowledge.’ (Dupré, 1993: 243) 
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The reconceptualisation of epistemic merit which Dupré proposes is obviously radical. 
Certain projects of inquiry could be newly classified as epistemically excellent whilst 
others may be demoted and find themselves languishing in epistemic mediocrity. Other 
projects of inquiry may not see their classification change at all; however, any such 
changes will be made on a case-by-case basis because the salience of the epistemic 
virtues will vary from one project of inquiry to another. Dupré also remarks that his 
account of the epistemic and political implications of an appreciation of the pluralistic 
nature of the sciences was inspired by Feyerabend’s own remarks in Against Method 
and Science in a Free Society: 
 
‘The philosopher with whose general perspective on science I find myself 
most closely in agreement [is] Paul Feyerabend ... an oasis of serious critical 
analysis on a topic that, astonishingly enough, has been almost entirely 
ignored by philosophers of science [viz., the social and political authority of 
science in contemporary society]. Feyerabend’s notorious epistemological 
anarchism is intended above all as a therapy against the antidemocratic and 
oppressive consequences of the monopoly of epistemic authority sustained 
by science.’ (Dupré, 1993: 262-263) 
 
Feyerabend and Dupré share the view that an appreciation of the disunified and 
pluralistic nature of the sciences has important and perhaps radical implications for our 
ideas about the distribution of epistemic excellence across the range of human 
epistemic practices and systems. Both are also critical of sciences’ monopolisation of 
epistemic authority and its ‘antidemocratic and oppressive consequences’ (see 
Feyerabend 1975c). Dupré (per. comm.) is more of a naturalist than Feyerabend and is 
less sympathetic to certain of the more exotic epistemic practices and systems of 
knowledge that exist within global indigenous cultures; however he concurs that one 
should engage in a thorough programme of reassessment of the epistemic excellence of 
diverse human epistemic practices and systems. Determining which ‘exotic’ practices 
and systems Dupré would reject is difficult because his work focuses upon biological 
classification; however he and Feyerabend are united in opposing presumptive 
assertions of the privileged status of scientific practices and systems of knowledge. 
Dupré writes that: 
 
‘It is not the reality I want to oppose so much as the exclusivity or elitism of 
the kinds that are allegedly provided by science. It is the idea that there is 
only one legitimate way of classifying things in the world, the ‘scientific’ 
way, that presumably underlies the assumption that whales must be either 
fish or mammals, but cannot be both.’ (Dupré, 2006: 3-4; see also Dupré 
1999) 
 
The diverse range of scientific practices and systems instantiate certain epistemic 
virtues to different degrees. The many projects of inquiry human beings engage in are 
conditioned by complex material, social and intellectual factors as well as diverse 
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explanatory goals. These affect the salience of the epistemic virtues and therefore 
demand that projects of inquiry must be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Feyerabend 
emphasises this point in the first pages of Against Method: since the ‘events, procedures 
and results that constitute the sciences have no common structure … there are no 
elements that occur in every scientific investigation but are missing elsewhere’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: 1-2). This has two implications. The first is that one can no longer 
interpret ‘scientific’ as referring to any singular set of epistemic virtues. The honorific 
term ‘scientific’ should be pluralised to reflect the complex range of actual and possible 
epistemic virtues it actually covers. The second is that there is no longer any good 
reason to suppose that these epistemic virtues would be confined to projects of inquiry 
that might typically be classed as ‘scientific’. The epistemic virtues may be manifested 
in any number of epistemic practices including many which may be commonly judged 
to be unscientific, such as the folk taxonomies that Dupré discusses.   
Feyerabend wants to employ this pluralistic conception of epistemic excellence as 
part of his programme of reassessing the cognitive and practical efficacy of indigenous 
practices and systems. There are two related claims here. The first is that the 
distribution of epistemic excellence within the sciences may not be as uniform as 
philosophers have often supposed. It may be the case that certain areas of science—
particular theories or disciplines, say—are in fact grossly lacking in epistemic 
excellence. The second is that epistemic excellence need not be confined to those 
projects of inquiry that have been typically classed as scientific. The epistemic virtues 
which constitute different forms of epistemic excellence may be instantiated in 
practices and systems of knowledge which are currently regarded as unscientific. 
Therefore the sciences may not be as uniformly excellent as one supposes and other 
practices and systems may be more epistemically excellent than we tend to imagine. It 
is important to note here that Feyerabend is not rejecting the possibility of critical 
assessment of epistemic practices and systems—his position here is not ‘anything goes’. 
On the contrary, the program of reassessing the distribution of epistemic excellence 
depends upon the claim that certain practices and systems are more practically and 
cognitively efficacious than others. 
Feyerabend’s conclusion is that the actual distribution of practical and cognitive 
efficacy across the range of human epistemic practices and systems has not yet been 
uncontroversially established. A widespread commitment to the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science has tended to distort the assessment of non-Western 
epistemic practices and systems of knowledge. Feyerabend challenged this presumption 
by criticising many of its core claims; for instance, that science enjoys a unity conferred 
by its possession of a unique and distinctive ‘method’. The sciences are far more 
disunified and pluralistic than prevailing philosophies of science acknowledged and this 
introduced a need for more case-by-case assessments of the epistemic excellence of the 
many projects of inquiry grouped under the broad umbrella term ‘science’.57 It is also 
implied that the epistemic virtues which constitute epistemic excellence may also be 
present within indigenous epistemic practices and systems which are not commonly 
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classified as ‘scientific’. The many appeals to the efficacy of indigenous cultures 
throughout the later writings reflect Feyerabend’s attempts to explore the implications 
of the pluralistic conception of epistemic excellence.  
In the next two sections I present Feyerabend’s arguments against the presumption of 
the omnicompetence of science. The aim of these two sections is not to undermine the 
efficacy of the sciences, but only to make the case that the success of the modern 
Western sciences does not undermine the actual or possible efficacy of other ‘non-
scientific’ practices and systems. I hope to preserve the efficacy of the Western sciences 
but open a space for the consideration and perhaps inclusion of the whole range of other 
practices and systems that exist in non-Western indigenous cultures.  
 
4.3 The contingency of science. 
The historical contingency of the sciences is a current topic of debate for contemporary 
historians and philosophers of science. The discussions so far have focused on the 
question of whether our modern sciences were ‘inevitable’ or ‘contingent’.58 Howard 
Sankey (2008) outlines the two positions: ‘[t]he inevitabilist holds that science, properly 
conducted, will tend to converge on a single unified theory of the world’, whilst the 
contingentist ‘holds that science, properly conducted, might well have led to a 
completely different theory of the world from that of contemporary science’ (Sankey: 
2008: 259).59 Feyerabend takes a more radical position on the inevitabilism-
contingentism debate because he takes seriously the possibility that the sciences may 
not have emerged and may not persist as features of human cultures.60 He therefore 
takes seriously the idea that epistemic practices and systems that are not recognisably 
‘scientific’—in the descriptive sense outlined earlier—should be examined for their 
epistemic excellence. Feyerabend does this as part of his commitment to pluralism and 
proliferation and it reflects what, in his later work, he calls the ‘abundance’ of reality, 
its capacity to sustain a plurality of mutually incompatible epistemic systems. 
Feyerabend defended a strong version of the contingency of the sciences. His earlier 
historical studies of the sciences emphasised the role of contingent social and 
intellectual factors in shaping the emergence of quantum theory. Such remarks were 
often made in the context of challenging the ‘hegemony’ of the Copenhagen 
interpretation, a claim which has been subsequently examined at length by James 
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Cushing (1994). Feyerabend suggested that particular scientific projects emerge from 
the confluence of contingent material, social and intellectual factors. This raises the 
possibility that alternative contingencies could have generated alternative scientific 
projects and this chimed well with Feyerabend’s commitment to proliferation and 
pluralism. Such emphases on the material, social and intellectual contingency of the 
sciences generated a substantial literature within the history and sociology of science 
and the epistemology of experimentation. These studies emphasised the intimate 
dependence of scientific projects upon social conditions, political and institutional 
structures and a whole range of other values and conditions reflecting cultural, political 
and historical contingencies. The scholars cited include Galison, Hacking, Pickering, 
Rudwick, and Schaffer.61 Feyerabend enthusiastically cited such studies and praised 
them as excellent examples of how science studies should proceed.62 
Feyerabend embraced the contingency of the sciences for three reasons. The first is 
that it encourages a sensitivity to the material, social and intellectual particularities of 
scientific research. This was consonant with his emphases upon the pluralistic nature of 
the sciences and the need for sensitivity to the realities of scientific practice, rather than 
the idealisations of philosophical models of science. The second is that contingency 
provides an argument for proliferation: if our current scientific practices emerged from 
the confluence of certain contingent conditions then alternative conditions might 
generate alternative scientific projects. These alternative, unrealised scientific projects 
might well offer novel practical and cognitive resources and maximise the possibilities 
for fruitful inter-theoretic criticism. The third is that Feyerabend argued that one can 
radicalise the idea of the contingency of science and thus enable us to pose new 
questions about the value of the sciences. The first two arguments have already been 
treated in earlier Chapters and the issue of proliferation and pluralism will recur 
throughout the remainder of this Chapter. My focus is therefore on the third argument, 
which one could call the ‘argument from the radical contingency of science’.63 
Feyerabend maintained that the very emergence and entrenchment of the sciences was 
itself a contingent development and that appreciation of this fact should render the 
presumption of the omnicompetence of science quite untenable. 
The first explicit statement of Feyerabend’s argument from the radical contingency 
of science can be found in his neglected paper ‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’ 
(Feyerabend 1976b). This paper opens with two questions which he thought were 
foundational to the philosophy of science, namely ‘what is science’ and ‘what’s so great 
about science’. The critical aspect arises from his radical proposal that ‘science as we 
know it today is not inescapable, and ... we can construct a world in which it plays no 
role whatever’ (Feyerabend, 1976b: 228). It is important to note that Feyerabend is not 
saying that the sciences should be displaced from their privileged place within 
developed world cultures, nor that he would be in favour of any such displacement. 
Feyerabend does somewhat impishly suggest that such a ‘post-scientific world ‘would 
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be more pleasant to behold than the world we live in today, both materially and 
intellectually’ (see my comments on this paper in Chapter two).  
There are two ideas informing Feyerabend’s proposal here. The first is that the value 
of the sciences should be assessed by their contribution to the material and intellectual 
wellbeing of those affected by them; and judging this will require us to invoke a host of 
epistemic and non-epistemic values, including those which relate to moral, social, and 
political concerns. Feyerabend argued that ‘decisions concerning the value and the use 
of science are not scientific decisions; they are what one might call ‘existential’ 
decisions; they are decisions to live, think, feel, behave in a certain way’. The 
continuing value of science therefore depends upon one’s answer to the perennial 
philosophical question of ‘what kind of life one wants to live’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 30). 
And again in his final book Conquest of Abundance (2001: 202, 269), Feyerabend 
reaffirms his conviction that ‘there is more than one way of living’, that the value of the 
sciences should lie in their capacity to ‘enrich human existence’ and maximise ‘life, 
liberty, and happiness’. Should the sciences ever begin to fail in their capacity to serve 
our values and ideals then the possibility could emerge that they will lose their 
privileged position within our culture (and this offers another good reason for pursuing 
Feyerabend’s proposals that the sciences should be diversified further). 
The second idea is the obviously radical claim that it is possible that the sciences 
may not persist as central and valued features of developed world cultures into the 
future. Feyerabend is one of the few philosophers of science to take this possibility 
seriously; Kitcher notes that he is ‘one of the few philosophers to have seriously raised 
the question of the value of scientific knowledge’ (Kitcher, 2001: 212).64 Feyerabend 
argues that into the future the sciences may become unable to adequately fulfil the 
guiding values and interests of our culture. This may be because our values and projects 
change so that sciences and technologies are less obviously related to them or because 
they begin to introduce powerful new reasons to reassess their salience within our 
culture. Feyerabend is open-minded about how and why the significance of sciences 
and technologies within our culture may change but he often favours the pessimistic 
and polemical suggestion that it will increasingly be seen as failing to fulfil its 
‘humanitarian’ aims of ‘enriching’ our existence. Both the possible reasons for the 
displacement of the sciences from the central and privileged place within our culture 
and the plausibility of this scenario are not my concern here. I only need to secure 
Feyerabend’s point that the radical contingency of the sciences could indeed see human 
beings ‘constructing a world’ within which scientific knowledge, practices, and 
institutions play little or no significant role in human life. 
It is worth recapping Feyerabend’s argument for the radical contingency of the 
sciences and the conclusions he wants to draw from it. My presentation of this 
argument is drawn both from Feyerabend’s own writings and from the work of David 
                                                           
64
 A recent exception of the general neglect of the radical contingency of science is 
Howard Sankey who, in a recent paper on the historical contingency of the sciences, 
remarked that ‘[i]t is not inevitable that science will continue to be pursued by humans’ 
(Sankey, 2008: 263). 
Kidd                             Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 
 
67 
 
E. Cooper (2002: 195-202ff) who provides a similar argument for the historical 
contingency of the sciences. Cooper’s argument pertains to the historical past of the 
sciences and Feyerabend’s refer to their future and my account here is intended to 
complement Cooper’s.65 The argument runs as follows. The emergence and 
entrenchment of the sciences within early modern European culture was a ‘contingent’ 
historical and intellectual development. The continued establishment and extension of 
scientific knowledge and practices within and beyond Western cultures is also 
contingent; for instance, upon particular, ongoing political and economic imperatives. 
Changes, dramatic or gradual, in Western cultural, intellectual, political or other factors 
can and will affect appraisals of the value and centrality of the sciences within 
modernity.66 Such changes can, of course, occur, and doubtlessly will do. Therefore, 
there is no good reason to suppose that the sciences will continue to play a central, or 
even a peripheral, role within (some or all) future world cultures. For instance, future 
cultures might ‘lose interest’ in science, or abandon it altogether, either in favour of 
alternative epistemic traditions (such as revived natural theologies). We have no good 
reasons for claiming that science will continue to play a central and integral role in 
future world culture. Its status may fluctuate, remain stable, or perhaps fade and 
disappear. 
Feyerabend certainly thought that the foregoing scenario was plausible. However his 
discussions of the contingency and value of science are unsystematic and too often 
obscured by rhetoric and polemic. The most sustained treatment of the radical 
contingency of the sciences which he offers can be found in Science in a Free Society in 
the following passage where he is discussing the diversity of the sciences and the 
distribution of epistemic excellence across human practices and systems (this is the 
‘development’ referred to): 
 
‘It is quite possible that an open debate about this development will find that 
some traditions have less to offer than others. This does not mean that they 
will be abolished—they will survive and keep their rights as long as there 
are people interested in them—it only means that for the time being their 
(material, intellectual, emotional etc.) products play a relatively small role. 
But what pleases once does not please always; and what aids traditions in 
one period does not aid them in others.’ (Feyerabend, 1978: 106-107) 
 
This passage indicates Feyerabend’s ideas about the connections between contingency, 
values, and the ‘humanitarian’ functions of science. The diversity of human cultures 
offers a variety of practices and systems which can serve many different explanatory 
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goals. The modern sciences fulfil many of the goals of developing world cultures very 
well, perhaps superlatively well. However their current successes—and hence value—
cannot be taken for granted for two reasons. The first is that those goals may change in 
ways that demand the development of new or alternative sciences or, more radically, 
practices and systems of knowledge which would not fall under even a capacious 
definition of ‘science’. The second is that the superlative cognitive and practical 
efficacy of Western scientific practices and systems has not yet been definitively 
established: ‘the comparative excellence of science has been anything but established’ 
and too many of the arguments offered ‘dissolve on closer inspection’—therefore ‘we 
have not the faintest ideas whether other traditions could not be much better and so ‘we 
must find out’ (Feyerabend, 1978: 106).67  
The radical contingency of science that Feyerabend defends is perhaps not as radical 
as it might initially appear. The value of the sciences—understood as epistemically 
excellent practices—lies in their capacity to serve various goals and projects which are 
central to modern developing world cultures, including economic and industrial 
activities and our epistemic values such as our valuation of knowledge of the world for 
its own sake. Into the future these values and projects may change in ways that render 
the sciences more or less successful and salient; in the former case the sciences will 
become more entrenched within our culture but in the latter case they may gradually 
lose their central and privileged place and become peripheral or perhaps even obsolete. 
And even in the case that the sciences remain valued features of our culture it has not 
yet been established that the efficacy of our contemporary practices and systems is 
greater than that of alternatives. The argument from the radical contingency of science 
therefore applies both to scientific and  ‘post-scientific’ future societies: if our values 
and projects remain fairly stable then we should seek the most efficacious practices and 
systems—these may be drawn from our current sciences or perhaps from the 
alternatives offered by non-Western cultures. There is therefore a pragmatic imperative 
for us to determine the actual distribution of cognitive and practical efficacy across the 
range of human epistemic practices and systems. And if into the future the guiding 
values and projects of developed world cultures change radically then we should have 
recourse to alternative non-scientific theories and practices, if only as a sensible 
insurance policy. 
Feyerabend suggests that the radical contingency of science provides a case for 
proliferation and diversity. The fact that our practices and systems are cognitively and 
practically efficacious does not imply that alternatives with equivalent or superior 
degrees of efficacy are not possible (or indeed that they might not already exist in non-
Western cultures). The presumption of the omnicompetence of science tends to prevent 
our taking non-scientific alternatives to our practices and systems seriously and 
obscures the fact that they have not, in the overwhelming majority of cases, been 
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subjected to fair and impartial assessment. The possibility of multiple sciences has 
therefore not been definitively rejected. As David E. Cooper (2002) argues, 
 
‘[T]he failure of any rival to the scientific image to become our entrenched 
view was not due to the recognition, after patient and prolonged 
investigation, that the entities and processes postulated by the rivals did not 
pass muster in comparison with those proposed by physics. The fact is that 
no one has ever tried, in detail, to develop the ‘research programmes’ 
indicated by such rival images of reality, or to compare them, in terms of 
explanatory scope, with those of the natural sciences.’ (Cooper, 2002: 194) 
 
Feyerabend made parallel claims. The entrenchment of the modern sciences has ‘all the 
success of a manoeuvre carried out in a void’ because it was not achieved through 
critical competition with viable, well-developed alternatives (Feyerabend, 1993: 30). 
This argument finds its origins in Feyerabend’s earlier insistence that the improvement 
of theories proceeds upon their critical interaction with well-developed alternatives.68 
The modern sciences may enjoy practical and cognitive efficacy but their comparative 
excellence has not in most cases been established because there are no other 
sufficiently-developed ‘alternatives’ against which they could be critically assessed. 
Harding (2008: Ch5) uses the same point to urge us to activate—or reactivate—the 
dormant scientific and technological traditions of non-Western cultures.  
The core idea animating Feyerabend’s idea here is that ‘[t]he question [of] whose 
achievements are better ... cannot be answered for there are no realistic alternatives to 
provide a point of comparison’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 30). The efficacy of our sciences 
can be asserted, but their superlative efficacy in relation to alternatives cannot—in the 
absence of well-developed alternatives and ‘patient and prolonged investigations’ of 
their comparative merits one can only appeal to ‘rumours to that effect’ (Feyerabend, 
1978: 106). Therefore the practical and cognitive efficacy of the modern Western 
sciences does not indicate the inefficacy of alternatives and the actual distribution of 
epistemic excellence across global epistemic systems remains uncertain. 
Scholars have noted the nascent arguments from contingency throughout 
Feyerabend’s writings. The general theme of their discussions is that comparative 
assessments of scientific and non-scientific practices and systems have not been 
achieved. They also emphasise that this problem has both philosophical and political 
dimensions and they connect it with Feyerabend’s remarks on public control of the 
sciences and the political and epistemic disenfranchisement of indigenous cultures (a 
set of issues discussed in the next Chapter). In so doing they help to align the later 
Feyerabend with postcolonial science and technology studies which is the topic of the 
next section. Preston (1997) suggests that ‘[a] fair competition between scientific and 
non-scientific views would involve each view having access to an equal share of 
resources’. However such competitions have ‘never been staged [and] we cannot even 
anticipate [their] outcome’ (Preston, 1997: 205f). Hoyningen-Huene (2000) agrees and 
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connects the need for such competitions with the question of the distribution of 
epistemic excellence: 
 
‘[T]he alleged superiority of scientific knowledge over other forms of 
knowledge has not been thoroughly examined without prejudice in any field. 
Instead, other forms of knowledge have often been simply swept aside by 
science [and so] scientific knowledge has its special social status without 
justification. It is one form of knowledge among others, which has 
advantages and disadvantages just like others.’ (Hoyningen-Huene, 2000: 
13) 
 
Hoyningen-Huene and Preston concur that Feyerabend is making the claim that the 
mere fact of the emergence and entrenchment of cognitively and practically efficacious 
sciences does not constitute a proof of their unique or superlative efficacy. The fact that 
‘our’ sciences happen to fulfil our practical and cognitive needs only indicates their 
own success, not the inadequacy of alternatives. Of course, these alternatives may well 
be less successful, or not successful at all, but this should be a matter of ‘patient and 
prolonged’ examination, not prejudice or presumption. As Cooper warns, the 
assumption that ‘rivals’ to the modern scientific image ‘could never have successfully 
been worked and lived with, and that no satisfying placement of scientific enquiry 
within their terms could have been possible, is arrogant pre-emption’ (Cooper, 2002: 
194).  
The contingency of the sciences therefore provides a case for proliferation and 
pluralism. The modern Western sciences are just one set amongst a range of actual and 
possible sciences and no a priori judgements can be legitimately made about their 
superlative status. This could only be determined through careful processes of 
examination and assessment; however these assessments will be difficult to effect in 
practice.  The redistribution of material, financial, and intellectual resources necessary 
to facilitate such a pluralistic scientific programme would require enormous 
administrative resources—and persuading scientific research centres to do this would be 
extremely difficult. However, against these objections, one can offer a pragmatic case 
for exploring the possible diversity of the sciences: certain alternatives to our current 
practices and systems could offer us more efficacious resources. Therefore, the practical 
and epistemic benefits of attempting such a reassessment greatly outweigh the costs.69  
Fortunately a reassessment of the distribution of epistemic excellence need not begin 
ex nihilo. Feyerabend offered a variety of resources that one could appeal to in order to 
begin to effect a reassessment of non-scientific practices and systems of knowledge. 
These include the history of science and technology, cultural and medical anthropology, 
and development and environmental studies. Feyerabend in fact often expressed his 
surprise and dismay that the possibilities for pluralising the sciences had gone 
unexploited for so long and this is one reason why he was so critical of the presumption 
of the omnicompetence of science (and indeed of any and all dogmatic positions which 
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encourage epistemic conservatism and militate against attempts to increase the diversity 
of the sciences).70 Feyerabend ambitiously explains the many disciplinary sources 
which could help us to reassess non-scientific practices and systems: 
 
‘[A]lternatives ... may be taken from the past as well. As a matter of fact, 
they may be taken from wherever one is able to find them—from ancient 
myths and modern prejudices ...The whole history of a subject is utilised in 
the attempt to improve its most recent and most ‘advanced’ stage. The 
separation between the history of a science, its philosophy, and the science 
itself dissolves into thin air.’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 33-34)71 
 
This passage makes clear Feyerabend’s optimism about the diverse epistemic resources 
that our historical and anthropological senses offer. An attractive feature of his later 
writing is the optimistic emphasis upon human cognitive and creative capacities and the 
apparent ability of the world to sustain radical epistemic diversity. This is the 
‘abundance’ of the world which is discussed in later Chapters. In the next section I say 
more about how and why Feyerabend thinks that the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science successfully obscured our appreciation of global epistemic 
pluralism. 
 
4.4 Exceptionalism and triumphalism. 
Feyerabend devoted much of his later writings to diagnosing how and why the 
presumption of the omnicompetence of science arose. This continued the critical theme 
of his earlier work although it was of course greatly expanded into the later work. As 
well as historical and philosophical studies of the physical sciences one finds 
Feyerabend experimenting with ambitious accounts of the intellectual history of 
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Western culture, exploring the role of science and technology in European colonialism 
and critically discussing modern international development projects. Such appeal to 
diverse disciplines and methodologies is, of course, characteristic of Feyerabend but it 
encouraged and exacerbated certain familiar criticisms of his work (such as the four 
charges discussed in Chapter one). Certainly it may not be immediately apparent quite 
how the emergence of philosophy within Ancient Greece is pertinent to concerns about 
the legitimacy of indigenous classificatory systems, or what abstract metaphysical 
concerns such as the ‘problem of reality’ have to do with environmental management 
policies in the developing world. However these eclectic interests and issues become far 
more coherent once one appreciates that they emanate from Feyerabend’s concern with 
how and why the presumption of the omnicompetence of the sciences emerged within 
developing world cultures. Feyerabend wanted to understand how and why the sciences 
came to enjoy their considerable cognitive and cultural authority within modern 
Western cultures; to this end, he explored and exploited intellectual history, cultural 
anthropology, contemporary developmental studies and any other discipline he felt 
might help him to understand the many ways in which Western science and technology 
influence the modern world.  
The political and philosophical project of reassessing the efficacy of the sciences in 
relation to indigenous practices and systems is not unique to Feyerabend. In the last 
twenty five years it has been pursued in various ways by anthropologists, historians, 
indigenous rights activists and a variety of scholars whose work can be classed as 
‘postcolonial science and technology studies’ (PSTS). Feyerabend made use of the 
work of all of these different groups, but my focus here is on the latter. PSTS is a 
relatively new movement within the broader science studies program; it includes 
historians, philosophers and sociologists of science and focuses upon the relationship 
between Western and non-Western scientific and technological traditions. I focus on the 
work of Sandra Harding (Harding 2008; forthcoming). My aim is twofold. Firstly I 
want use Harding’s work to interpret the later Feyerabend’s scattered remarks on 
indigenous practices and systems of knowledge and his discussions of the political 
issues the question of their efficacy raises. Secondly in so doing I hope to show that 
Feyerabend was an important early figure within PSTS; so far his appearances within 
the burgeoning PSTS literature has been limited to identifying him as a figure within 
post-positivist philosophies of science.72 I hope to demonstrate that Feyerabend 
deserves to be recognised as an important early figure within PSTS and to outline how 
he could contribute to current debates within the discipline. 
Recall that a key aim of Feyerabend’s criticisms of the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science was to demonstrate that epistemic excellence is not 
confined to the Western sciences. Practical and cognitive efficacy is instead distributed 
over a wide range of practices and systems of knowledge including many of those 
found in global indigenous cultures. An important strategy in challenging the 
omnicompetence of science is therefore to expose two of its constituent claims: namely, 
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‘exceptionalism’ and ‘triumphalism’. Harding defines these terms: exceptionalism is 
‘the belief that Western sciences alone among all human knowledge systems are 
capable of grasping reality on its own terms’. They alone are ‘entitled to be called 
sciences’ and to ‘permit effective interactions’ with the world (Harding, 2008: 3-4). The 
Western sciences are therefore exceptional because they have achieved practical and 
cognitive successes beyond the capacities of alternative epistemic practices and 
traditions and have done so by insulating themselves from the historical and social 
contingencies of their home cultures. Triumphalism is the related claim that the history 
of the sciences consists of ‘a narrative of achievements’ which includes ‘no significant 
downsides’. According to triumphalist historiographies the many deleterious 
environmental, social and political phenomena which scientific knowledge and 
practices have been implicated in are attributable entirely to external ‘social and 
political projects’ (Harding, 2008: 4).  
Both exceptionalism and triumphalism come in degrees and admit of weaker and 
stronger forms. They are also mutually sustaining, insofar as the claim they both 
contribute to a conception of the Western sciences as being both cognitively and 
culturally exalted. Feyerabend and Harding offer a variety of criticisms of 
exceptionalism and triumphalism. I cannot discuss all of them here and so will focus on 
just one: namely, the argument that there have been and continue to be mutually 
enriching contacts between the scientific and technological traditions of Western and 
non-Western cultures. This fulfils two purposes. The first is that it provides a useful 
focus for comparing Feyerabend and Harding’s complex discussions of global scientific 
and technological traditions. A detailed comparison of their mutual contributions to 
PSTS would make for an engaging future project but not one that can be attempted 
here. The second is that both Feyerabend and Harding emphasise the value of global 
cultural and epistemic diversity and the importance of preserving them. They both 
argue that practical and cognitive efficacy is not confined to the Western sciences and 
that reassessing the merits of non-Western practices and systems of knowledge will 
increase the range of epistemic resources at our disposal. This is not only practically 
and epistemically advantageous but also fulfils projects of social justice since they are 
both alert to the fact that the present prioritisation of Western sciences and technologies 
has and is resulting in environmental, social and intellectual destruction (these moral 
and political issues are discussed in the following Chapters). 
Feyerabend and Harding both emphasise the historical interactions between Western 
and non-Western scientific and technological traditions. Contrary to exceptionalist 
historiographies, these interactions have been regular and bidirectional and have 
contributed enormously to the empirical and theoretical sophistication of the scientific 
traditions on both sides of the exchange (see Appendix II). Contemporary historians of 
colonial science are only the most recent of a long series of revisionist historians to 
have explored and substantiated this claim. Feyerabend is admittedly less rigorous than 
Harding in providing scholarly corroboration for this claim, a fact which probably 
encouraged accusations that he was engaging in polemics. Exceptionalism and 
triumphalism tend to devalue non-Western epistemic practices and systems of 
knowledge in two ways. The first is that it obscures the historical interactions between 
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Western and non-Western scientific and technological traditions. Exceptionalism 
obscures the contributions of non-Western practices and systems to the Western 
sciences and so undermines the instrumental case for their preservation (namely, that 
our sciences have benefited and can continue to benefit from the existence of alternative 
scientific traditions). The second is that exceptionalism implies that the practices and 
systems of non-Western cultures have lesser degrees of cognitive and practical efficacy: 
if Western sciences and technologies are exceptional and either uniquely or 
superlatively successful, then the peoples of non-Western cultures are using inferior 
practices and systems of knowledge. This claim can and has provided a normative 
argument for their replacement by ostensibly superior Western practices and systems; 
this claim is developed at length in Chapter six where it is traced to John Stuart Mill 
and so I postpone discussion until then. 
Western and non-Western cultures have benefited from mutually enriched exchanges 
between their respective scientific and technological traditions. Exceptionalism and 
triumphalism obscure the value and indeed the existence of these exchanges and so 
sustain the presumption of the omnicompetence of the sciences. Feyerabend and 
Harding warn that ignorance of these fruitful intercultural exchanges will be to the 
detriment of the Western sciences—a point which stands independently of any concern 
for the epistemic practices and systems of knowledge of non-Western cultures, or the 
social justice projects one can associate with them. They have two related claims. The 
first is the pragmatic argument that engagement with indigenous practices and systems 
of knowledge maximises the range of cognitive and practical resources available to us. 
When confronted with a range of practical and theoretical problems it makes sense to 
keep our epistemic options open and have recourse to a pluralistic range of practices 
and systems. The second is the epistemological argument presented in Chapter two; 
namely, that our theories and practices will develop best when they profit from the 
benefits of tolerance and interaction offered by epistemic pluralism. These twin sets of 
benefits of course arise within a scientific pluralism but they are maximised by a radical 
epistemic pluralism which incorporates both scientific and ‘non-scientific’ practices and 
systems—and of course, Feyerabend rejects this distinction in any case.  
Feyerabend and Harding share a common commitment to the value of global 
epistemic and cultural diversity. The diverse range of practices and systems of 
knowledge generated across the history of human cultures offers us a remarkable range 
of possibilities for investigating and acting upon the world. The practical and cognitive 
efficacy of these diverse practices and systems varies—some are excellent, others 
abysmal, and most fall somewhere in-between. Moreover historical studies indicate that 
this epistemic pluralism has been generated and sustained by regular intercultural 
exchange as well as internal innovation and social and historical change. Therefore 
there is a mutually constitutive relationship between epistemic pluralism and cultural 
diversity. However our appreciation of the actual distribution of practical and cognitive 
efficacy—or what Dupré calls ‘epistemic excellence’—has been increasingly deformed 
by a commitment to the presumption of the omnicompetence of science. This 
presumption often manifests in exceptionalism and triumphalism and Feyerabend and 
Harding therefore challenge both of them on historical and philosophical grounds and 
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urge us to effect a practical and philosophical reassessment of the nature and value of 
both Western and non-Western epistemic practices and systems of knowledge. Of 
course, neither Feyerabend nor Harding make any definitive predictions about how this 
reassessment will affect our ranking of the diverse range of practices and systems; after 
all, that will require long processes of examination and assessment whose outcome 
cannot be determined in advance. However it is clear enough to both of them that it 
will, at the very least, result in the rehabilitation of certain indigenous practices and 
systems; as Dupré puts it, a ‘reconception of epistemic merit’ should bring in its train ‘a 
kind of unity of knowledge’ (Dupré, 1993: 243). It is possible that certain scientific 
projects may see their fortunes change dramatically whilst others may remain relatively 
unchanged; however it is almost certain that many practices and systems that are 
currently classified as ‘unscientific’ will find their epistemic merits newly appreciated 
such that they assume a place within the ratings of human epistemic achievement. 
 
4.5 Conclusions. 
A key aim of Feyerabend’s later philosophy is to defend global cultural and epistemic 
diversity. Chapter two outlined Feyerabend’s normative arguments for epistemic 
pluralism and this chapter built on these by showing why this pluralism should include 
the ‘non-scientific’ practices and systems of non-Western cultures. I did this by 
introducing one powerful obstacle to the radical pluralisation of science that 
Feyerabend urges, namely, the presumption of the omnicompetence of science. This 
refers to a variety of scientistic claims to the effect that the Western sciences enjoy 
unique or superlative cognitive and practical efficacy. I criticised this presumption and 
argued that it is preventing us from performing an fair and impartial assessment of the 
actual distribution of what Dupré calls ‘epistemic excellence’ across the range of 
epistemic practices and systems found in world cultures. My discussion connected the 
later Feyerabend with the contingency debate in contemporary history and philosophy 
of science and postcolonial science and technology studies (PSTS). The contingency of 
the Western sciences ensures that alternative scientific practices and systems are 
possible and many of these may exist within non-Western cultures. Feyerabend urges us 
to consult these alternatives and interpret them as possible resources for the 
pluralisation of the sciences.  
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Chapter Five 
Ch5 Cultural Pluralism and Human Wellbeing 
 
5.1. Feyerabend’s debts to John Stuart Mill. 
5.2. What did Feyerabend take from On Liberty? 
5.3. The value of cultural diversity. 
5.4. Pluralism and convergentism. 
5.5. Conclusions. 
 
There is a longstanding scholarly debate about the nature and extent of John Stuart 
Mill’s influence upon Feyerabend. It is clear that Feyerabend admired Mill’s pluralism, 
but the current debate has tended to presume that it was theoretical pluralism that 
Feyerabend took from Mill. This Chapter challenges this presumption and argues that 
what Feyerabend took from Mill was the conviction that cultural pluralism—a diversity 
of ‘modes of living’—was an essential precondition of human wellbeing. 
5.1. Feyerabend’s debts to John Stuart Mill. 
The aim of this chapter is to establish Feyerabend’s positive claims about the value of 
cultural and epistemic pluralism. There are many empirical, historical, and 
philosophical arguments for ‘theoretical pluralism’ evident throughout Feyerabend’s 
work from the 1960s onwards. I have argued that these constitute a defence of 
epistemic pluralism. In this chapter, the connections between epistemic and cultural 
pluralism are examined. It is well established that Feyerabend defended ‘scientific 
pluralism’, but what is less commonly appreciated is that, into his ‘later’ period, this 
pluralism was extended to encompass the ‘modes of inquiry’ and ‘forms of knowledge’ 
evidenced in cultures that fall outside the boundaries of Western modernity. Chapters 
two and three examined Feyerabend’s claim that both ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ 
traditions have claims to cognitive and practical efficacy, and that each can benefit from 
the resources offered by the other.  
This chapter continues this theme, by exploring Feyerabend’s claim that epistemic 
and cultural pluralism is valuable not only because it maximises our cognitive and 
practical resources, but also, at a deeper level, for its contribution to human ‘wellbeing’. 
I focus on how Feyerabend appealed to John Stuart Mill to support his case for cultural 
and epistemic pluralism, and, in so doing, hope also to contribute to two ongoing 
debates in Feyerabend scholarship: first, the question of what, if anything, Feyerabend 
took from Mill, and, second, to explain why the later Feyerabend includes long paeans 
to, and defences of, ‘eccentric’, indigenous beliefs and practices. 
Certainly these advocacies contributed to Feyerabend’s ‘bad reputation’ as a cultural 
relativist, and as an enthusiast of voodoo and astrology, even if, as Preston suggests, 
they raised his profile as a ‘hero of the anti-technological counter-culture’ (2009: 
§2.17). One clue to a possible strategy for exploring Feyerabend’s defence of cultural, 
and epistemic, pluralism comes from Elizabeth Lloyd (1996). Lloyd offers a 
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‘deflationist’ reading of Feyerabend’s ‘more unusual stances’, such as his defences of 
voodoo, astrology, and alternative medicine. These are, she suggests, ‘best interpreted 
as attempts to play certain roles’, such as ‘eccentric defender of minority opinions’, 
which are ‘necessary to fulfilling Mill’s conditions for rational exchange and optimal 
human development’ (Lloyd, 1996: S407).  
This strategy has two attractions. First, it offers the enticing prospect of excusing 
Feyerabend from any serious commitment to ‘eccentric’—or, less sympathetically, 
‘unscientific’—beliefs and practices. Interpreted as exercises in Millian tolerance, any 
worries regarding such ostensibly erratic ‘stances’ are easily dissolved (even if the issue 
of sincerity does persist). It also makes life easier for those who wish to defend 
Feyerabend: one could simply ‘explain’ that his praise of voodoo was simply an 
exercise in Millian tolerance, a rehearsal of On Liberty, but nothing reflective of any 
serious views about such ‘exotic’ cultures and their practices. Second, the ‘deflationary’ 
reading seems to make good sense of the many references to Mill throughout 
Feyerabend’s works. As will be discussed later, the scholarly consensus is that, by and 
large, Feyerabend seems to confuse Mill’s arguments for pluralism, mistakenly and 
illegitimately transplanting them into the philosophy of science. If Lloyd is correct, then 
such worries can be dismissed, because Feyerabend was not taking anything substantive 
from Mill, rather than a general sense of the value of diversity. According to both of 
these reasons, interpreted through Lloyd’s ‘deflationary’ perspective, there is much less 
going on in Feyerabend’s treatment of Mill than it might seem. 
Attractive as Lloyd’s deflationary reading of Feyerabend’s ‘unusual stances’ may be, 
there are two problems with it, which this chapter explores. First, it seems to betray the 
point, which is obviously important to Feyerabend, namely, that ‘non-scientific’ beliefs 
and practices can, and often do, enjoy cognitive and practical efficacy. One can easily 
imagine Feyerabend objecting that Lloyd’s strategy is a prime example of the 
‘reductive’ attitude, common throughout Western cultures, when faced with ‘alien’ 
beliefs and practices. In this case, an earnest effort to suggest the possible value and 
efficacy of ‘non-scientific’ beliefs and practices is met with a deflationary attempt, and 
is therefore ‘defused’ by a particular ‘interpretation’ (1993: 264). Feyerabend does 
maintain, persistently and sincerely, that ‘non-scientific’ beliefs and practices have 
cognitive and practical value. Therefore, Lloyd’s ‘deflationary’ reading fails to account 
for an important feature of the ‘later’ work. Second, Feyerabend does make it clear that 
his appeals to Mill reflect more than a common enthusiasm for liberalism, tolerance, 
and diversity. If one examines the instances in which Mill is cited throughout 
Feyerabend’s works, it becomes clear that the aim of these discussions is not just to 
celebrate liberal politics (although that is a part of it). Rather, Feyerabend develops an 
important connection between pluralism and human wellbeing—one which is not 
exhausted by Lloyd’s suggestion that, by praising indigenous cultures, Feyerabend was 
just ‘playing certain roles’. Therefore, although Lloyd is correct to note the importance 
of Feyerabend’s debts to Mill, her identification of what these were, and how, they 
affected his work, surely fails to capture their depth and import. 
With these remarks in mind, it is worth my saying what it is that binds Feyerabend 
and Mill together. Both share the sentiment that our epistemic and ‘humanitarian’ 
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interests are best served by cultural and epistemic pluralism. The ‘growth of 
knowledge’ and the ‘development of human beings’ is maximally facilitated by the 
presence, preservation, and proliferation of a diversity of modes of inquiry, values, 
forms of knowledge, and ‘ways of life’. Feyerabend adds two points to Mill’s account. 
First, this thoroughgoing pluralism includes, but is not exhausted by, Western epistemic 
and cultural practices. Although ‘the West’ has contributed much to the ‘abundance’ of 
the world, its own contributions do not reflect the full variation and richness which 
human cultures have, over time, developed. Second, Feyerabend alleges that certain 
intellectual and political trends within Western modernity actually militate against 
global epistemic and cultural diversity, posing an urgent and tangible threat to the 
‘pluralism’ upon which, if they are correct, our ‘wellbeing’ depends. It is this point 
which locates Mill relative to the ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative which structures 
the later Feyerabend. 
This chapter uses Feyerabend’s appeals to Mill as a focal point for a wider 
discussion of his defence of cultural and epistemic pluralism. I begin, in section two, by 
outlining the current scholarly debate concerning what, if anything, Feyerabend took 
from On Liberty, and whether he was justified in doing this. Against the consensus, I 
suggest that the point taken was that cultural and epistemic diversity maximally 
facilitates our epistemic and ‘humanitarian’ interests. In sections three and four, I 
examine the arguments for cultural and epistemic diversity in Mill and Feyerabend and 
identify a tension between their competing accounts. This relates to the question of 
whether diversity should be understood in convergentist terms or not, and I conclude 
the Chapter that Feyerabend defends a form of non-reductive cultural and epistemic 
diversity. 
 
5.2. What did Feyerabend take from On Liberty? 
Feyerabend greatly admired John Stuart Mill. Throughout his writings, over an 
unusually long period, there are enthusiastic references to Mill and to On Liberty. Such 
consistent praise is unusual for Feyerabend, who was notoriously capricious in his 
praise and criticism of other philosophers. Some, like Aristotle and Mach, are 
celebrated, whilst others, notably Karl Popper, are scorned (see Oberheim, 2006: §1.3). 
The fact that Mill was regularly eulogised therefore suggests that Feyerabend thought 
highly of his work—indeed, it would be quite proper to identify Mill as one of the most 
important and enduring influences upon Feyerabend’s work. The puzzle, however, is 
quite what Feyerabend took from Mill, and whether he was right to do so. In the 
following paragraphs, I provide some examples of Feyerabend’s citation of Mill, and 
then outline the discussion which scholars like Kent Staley (1999) and Struan Jacobs 
(2003) offer of them. 
If Feyerabend could be an acid critic, he could also be a mellifluous hagiographer. 
Throughout his writings, one finds Mill praised in the highest terms. Notably, his praise 
focuses upon Mill’s philosophy, on the one hand, and his character, on the other. The 
great virtue of Mill’s philosophy, suggested Feyerabend, is that it is ‘not only an 
expression of [his] liberal attitude’, but also ‘reflect[s his] conviction that a pluralism of 
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ideas and forms of life is an essential part of any rational inquiry concerning the nature 
of things’ (1993: 31). Mill’s pluralistic sentiments are clearly what Feyerabend admires, 
as he quotes Mill’s warning, in On Liberty, that monism—or the absence of a diversity 
of ‘experiments in living’—conflicts with, or at the least, fails to encourage, ‘the 
cultivation of individuality which [alone] produces, or can produce, well-developed 
human beings’ (Mill 1998/1859: 71, quoted in Feyerabend 1993: 12). On Liberty itself 
is described as Mill’s ‘immortal essay’, and Feyerabend celebrates it as ‘still the best 
modern exposition and defence of a critical philosophy’ (Feyerabend, 1981b: ix-x), and 
elsewhere as the ‘outstanding presentation of a libertarian epistemology’ (Feyerabend, 
1987: 281). Indeed, Feyerabend assures us that ‘[i]t is not possible to improve upon 
[Mill’s] arguments’ (1978: 86). Mill himself is praised for his ‘humanity, simplicity, 
and perceptiveness’ (Feyerabend, 1981a: 141). 73 From these brief remarks, it should be 
clear that Feyerabend enormously admired Mill; indeed, there is no evidence I can find 
that Feyerabend ever diverged from his positive opinions of Mill.  
These remarks give some clue as to Feyerabend’s enthusiasm for Mill. Their general 
theme is the value of a liberal and tolerant social (or cultural) pluralism—the diversity 
of ‘experiments in living’ which are outlined in On Liberty. The point of such cultural 
pluralism, for Feyerabend, was that it was maximally conducive to ‘human wellbeing’, 
that is, the ‘full development’ of human ‘faculties’, with the end being their 
‘flourishing’ or ‘happiness’. Such ‘concern for individual happiness is a characteristic 
feature of Mill’ (Feyerabend, 1988: 34, fn2), and is what Feyerabend most admires. 
Consider three statements. In 1968, Feyerabend affirmed the need for a new ‘unifying 
ideal’ to reconnect the arts and sciences—suffering the schism introduced by C.P. 
Snow, perhaps—and suggests that this should be ‘the preservation of human happiness’ 
and, perhaps, ‘an increase in the powers of human beings to become what they are 
capable of becoming’ (Feyerabend, 1968: 134). Some fifteen years later, in 1981, 
Feyerabend describes ‘the most important question of all’: ‘to what extent the happiness 
of individual human beings, and to what extent their freedom, has been increased’. 
Underlying this question, again, is the conviction that ‘the happiness and the full 
development of an individual human being is now as ever the highest possible value’ 
(Feyerabend, 1981b: 143). Finally, at the end of Feyerabend’s career, the same 
pluralistic and ‘humanitarian’ values are still strong and central to his philosophy. 
Conquest of Abundance affirms that ‘there is more than one way of living’, that the arts 
and sciences should aim ‘to enrich human existence’, and that the maximisation of ‘life, 
liberty, and happiness’ ought to be our primary concern (Feyerabend, 2001: 202, 269). 
The constancy of these convictions is striking. Throughout Feyerabend’s career, there 
remains the strong and central commitment to the value of social and cultural diversity 
and an affirmation of the primacy of ‘humanitarian’ values. Indeed, one could safely 
make the strong claim that Feyerabend and Mill share a common conviction, namely, 
                                                           
73
 See further Feyerabend (1981b: Ch4). 
Kidd                             Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 
 
80 
 
that each of them was committed to ‘find[ing] conditions for the full and free 
development of individuality’ (Feyerabend and Lakatos, 1999: 240).74  
How do these remarks tally with Mill’s own philosophy? Opening On Liberty, one 
finds the remark that ‘the free development of individuality is one of the leading 
essentials of well-being’. ‘Individuality’ is ‘not only a co-ordinate element with all that 
is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a 
necessary part and condition of all those things’ (Mill, 1998/1859: 63). What is the 
value of individuality? Mill identifies two broad set of benefits. A diversity of ‘modes 
of living’ is not only ‘one of the principal ingredients of human happiness’ but also ‘the 
chief ingredient of individual and social progress’ (1998/1859: 63). In a beautiful and 
oft-quoted remark, Mill argues that  ‘while mankind are imperfect there should be 
different opinions, so is it that there should be different experiments of living; that free 
scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury to others; and that 
different modes of life should be proved practically’ (1998/1859: 63). (Notice the 
caveat ‘while mankind are imperfect’, since this point, subtle as it is, has important 
implications for Feyerabend’s interpretation of Mill, which I return to in section three). 
Considering these remarks upon ‘individuality’, ‘diversity’, and the primacy of ‘human 
happiness’, it is clear that Feyerabend shares with Mill these key ‘humanitarian’ values. 
Mill also outlines ‘epistemic’ benefits to the ‘diversity’ he celebrates. In the third 
chapter of On Liberty, he explains that his pluralism pertains ‘to men’s modes of action, 
not less than to their opinions’ (1998/1859: 63). In the second chapter, ‘On the Liberty 
of Thought and Discussion’, Mill famously presents a series of arguments for the 
freedom of thought and discussion, each directed against the ‘peculiar evil’ of silencing 
discussion. Staley notes that Feyerabend cited Mill as ‘the originator of much of what 
he had to say in defence of epistemological anarchy’, and notes, too, that these citations 
are to On Liberty (Staley, 1999: 604). He goes on to suggest that this generates a 
tension within Mill’s philosophy of science, which was outlined in A System of Logic. 
The tension arises because, in System, Mill defends a methodology of science which, 
prima facie, seems incompatible with the ‘epistemological anarchism’ which 
Feyerabend had in mind. Staley goes on to argue that the theories of knowledge 
espoused in Logic and Liberty are ‘entirely compatible’, on the grounds that they reflect 
‘underlying principles of rationality’ accompanied by a clear emphasis upon ‘quite 
broad liberty of belief and expression’ (Staley, 1999: 606). 
Staley’s ‘compatibilist’ reading of Mill’s epistemologies in Logic and Liberty was 
criticised by Struan Jacobs. Jacobs argues that Feyerabend’s interpretation of Mill as a 
‘proto-pluralist/anarchist on scientific theories and methods’ relies upon a ‘strained 
interpretation’ of the second chapter of On Liberty. Moreover, Staley ‘tortured Mill’s 
texts’ in his double claim that Liberty, first, articulates a ‘pluralist anarchist’ 
epistemology, which is, second, compatible with that in Logic (2003: 210). For reasons 
explained shortly, I will not treat the details of Staley and Jacobs’ arguments, and 
instead move to Jacobs’ conclusion. He suggests that Feyerabend was wrong to 
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interpret Mill as a nascent ‘epistemological anarchist’; indeed, if Mill were, then he 
would surely have been required to repudiate System of Logic, which he never did. 
(Indeed, the book went through multiple re-editions long after Liberty appeared). 
Although there may be ‘commonalities’ between the two texts, their emphases and 
epistemologies ‘are decidedly different’, since whereas ‘the Logic is overwhelmingly 
concerned with science’, Liberty ‘hardly touches on it’. Jacobs concludes that 
Feyerabend was mistaken in ‘believ[ing] Mill’s arguments apply to science’, and that 
he therefore ‘anachronistically misread Liberty as a defence of methodological and 
theoretical pluralism in science’ (Jacobs, 2003: 210). 
Staley and Jacob are both correct that Feyerabend derived arguments for pluralism 
from Mill. This is also noted by Lloyd, although she does not confine this to theoretical 
(or epistemological) pluralism. However, the debate between Staley and Jacobs rests on 
an assumption which is, I suggest, mistaken: namely, that what Feyerabend took from 
On Liberty were arguments for theoretical pluralism in the sciences. There are three 
reasons to be suspicious of this assumption. First, Feyerabend tellingly remarked to 
Lakatos that, when speaking of Mill, ‘I am always talking of On Liberty’ (Feyerabend 
and Lakatos, 1999: 239). This is important, since Liberty is, of course, a defence of 
social and cultural pluralism; the epistemological arguments in chapter two are intended 
to support Mill’s claims about freedom and individuality, not scientific research. 
Moreover, Mill’s philosophy of science, including his account of methodology, is set 
out in System of Logic, yet Feyerabend hardly refers to it (and the few references are to 
incidental points; see, for instance, Feyerabend, 1993: 260fn8). Therefore, the sort of 
pluralism that Feyerabend was, prima facie, taking from Mill is social and cultural.  
Second, the many remarks that Feyerabend makes about Mill, quoted earlier, all 
pertain to individuality, diversity of ‘modes of living’, and human ‘wellbeing’. 
Feyerabend explicitly praises Mill for celebrating ‘humanitarian’ concerns, and for 
making them primary. Consider, for instance, Feyerabend’s remark that what he found 
attractive in Mill was the fact that his remarks on scientific knowledge are ‘part of a 
theory of man that aims to find conditions for the full and free development of 
individuality’, such that ‘the fate of the individual is more important than the fate of 
science’ (Feyerabend and Lakatos, 1999: 240). Feyerabend shares with Mill the strong 
claim that human ‘wellbeing’ should be the primary value and that our other activities, 
the sciences included, should be assessed according to their contribution to this end. 
Therefore, Feyerabend places ‘wellbeing’ ahead of epistemic ideals—like ‘truth’ and 
‘knowledge’—which he often recorded his scorn for. In a letter to Kuhn in the early 
1960s, Feyerabend makes clear his conviction that humanitarian values assume priority 
over epistemic ideals in a way consonant with a Millian emphasis upon individuality: 
one should ‘judge the importance of a topic’ from its potential contribution to the ‘well 
being of mankind’, understood in a broad sense as the ‘exercise of one’s imagination, 
from the full development of human faculties, and from spiritual happiness’. 
Feyerabend suggested to Kuhn that the significance of a topic—scientific inquiry, say—
assumes ‘importance’ according to its potential to effect an ‘increase, or a decrease of 
that well being’. Humanitarian values therefore assume priority over epistemic ideals, 
like the ‘pursuit of truth’, and Feyerabend recorded his ‘total opposition’ to ‘any 
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attitude which says: “I am out to find the truth, come what may”. What truth? And 
why? would be my question’ (quoted in Hoyningen-Huene, 2006: 613-614).75 
The third reason why Staley and Jacobs are mistaken in their treatment of 
Feyerabend and Mill is that it is clear enough, especially into the ‘later’ period, that the 
primary interest of all of Feyerabend’s philosophical work was ‘humanitarian’. 
Although Feyerabend is, of course best known as a philosopher of science, it is clear 
that what unifies his work is a commitment to ‘humanitarian values’. Indeed, 
Feyerabend explained that the motivation behind Against Method ‘was humanitarian, 
not intellectual’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 3).  
It is worth recapping these points. I argued that Staley and Mill are mistaken in their 
competing accounts of Mill’s influence upon Feyerabend. First, Feyerabend makes it 
clear that the work of Mill’s which most influenced his ideas was On Liberty, and, 
second, this accounts for the fact that the majority of his references to Mill pertain to 
individuality, diversity of ‘modes of living’, and human ‘wellbeing’. Third and final, 
these latter points converge in the fact that Feyerabend made ‘humanitarian’ values 
central to his philosophy from an early stage, and kept them constant straight through to 
his ‘later’ period. Indeed, one can find a deep unity to his disparate concerns by 
identifying them as reflections of the fundamental concern of ‘find[ing] conditions for 
the full and free development of individuality’ (Feyerabend and Lakatos, 1999: 240). 
Both Mill and Feyerabend believed that pluralism was primary amongst these 
‘conditions’, and it is this point—the connection between pluralism and the 
‘humanitarian’ concern for human ‘wellbeing’—which was what Feyerabend really 
took from Mill. Pluralism is a precondition for epistemic and, more importantly, 
‘humanitarian’ progress. 
 
5.3. The value of cultural diversity. 
Feyerabend took from Mill the point that pluralism is preconditional for epistemic and 
humanitarian progress. This point is not specific to the sciences, although, of course, 
Feyerabend did think that theoretical pluralism (or ‘epistemological anarchism’) in the 
sciences would contribute to human ‘wellbeing’. These points were inherited from Mill, 
whose ‘utilitarian approach to philosophy suggests that the growth of knowledge is 
itself a “condition of human happiness and flourishing”’. Furthermore, Mill’s ‘most 
forthright and unequivocal defence of epistemic diversity is to be found in Chapter 2 of 
the essay On Liberty’ (Kelly, 2006: 250)—the very chapter praised by Feyerabend. 
Indeed, the value of scientific knowledge and institutions must be understood relative to 
humanitarian concerns. In ‘Consolations for the Specialist’, for instance, Feyerabend 
asks whether the scientific monism defended by Kuhn (1962) is ‘beneficial to us’, and 
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warned that it would not: monism would ‘inhibit the advancement of knowledge’ and 
also, perhaps more urgently, ‘increase the anti-humanitarian tendencies’ characteristic 
of “post-Newtonian science”’ (Feyerabend, 1970d/1981: 141, 131). 
This worry about the beneficence of the sciences became a central theme in the later 
philosophy, especially when Feyerabend explored the possibility that the sciences were 
complicit with Western cultural and intellectual imperialism. From the late-1970s 
onwards, one focus of Feyerabend’s work became the claim that certain features of 
Western modernity are actively hostile to global epistemic and cultural diversity. The 
aim of this section is to demonstrate how Feyerabend’s appeals to Millian pluralism 
came to manifest, in the later work, in a much more complex set of concerns about 
global cultural and epistemic diversity. In so doing, I hope to show that Feyerabend did, 
in fact, importantly misunderstand certain features of Mill. My account of this 
misunderstanding differs from that of Staley and Jacobs, but it is, if accurate, far more 
radical, and points to features of Mill’s thought that are diametrically opposed to the 
later Feyerabend. 
The ‘misunderstanding’ concerns the purposes of pluralism. Feyerabend, of course, 
wants not only to affirm the value of epistemic and cultural pluralism, but also to 
protect and preserve them. Pluralism is valuable in itself. Feyerabend is especially 
hostile to the various forms of ‘dogmatism’ and ‘monism’—such as those he saw in 
Kuhn and Popper—which, to his mind, militate against pluralism. Mill, by contrast, 
sees pluralism as a means to an end. One feature of Liberty that is not often properly 
appreciated is the point, strange as it might seem, that the ‘ideal society’ that Mill has in 
mind will not be ‘pluralistic’. A diversity of ‘experiments in living’ is a means to the 
end of what will be, if Mill is correct, a fairly uniform society. The purpose of 
encouraging social and cultural pluralism is to maximise our ‘experimentation’ in 
‘modes of living’, so that we might better identify the most efficacious sorts. Similarly 
for truth, the value of preserving a diversity of opinions is to assist us in the criticism 
and, therein, the rejection of ‘false’ beliefs and theories. Mill, therefore, sees pluralism 
as a means to an end, and his ‘ideal society’ will not exhibit the ‘diversity’ which 
Feyerabend saw him as celebrating. 
The disagreements between Mill and Feyerabend’s views on epistemic and cultural 
pluralism can be stated as four points. First, Mill saw social and epistemic pluralism as 
a means to an end. Feyerabend does not. Second, Mill is a convergentist, arguing that, 
over time, contemporary ‘diversity’ would gradually dissolve, as we converge upon 
‘true’ knowledge and superior ‘modes of living’. Feyerabend disagrees with this 
convergence upon (social and epistemic) monism, and actually sees it as a Bad Thing. 
Farewell to Reason, for instance, opens with the statement that cultural diversity ‘is 
beneficial, while uniformity reduces our joys and our (intellectual, material, emotional) 
resources’, and Feyerabend goes on to explicitly criticise ‘powerful traditions’ which 
affirm pluralism, but ‘add that there must be limits to variety’. Recent history, he warns, 
is characterised by ‘new and powerful uniformities’—such as the phenomenon of 
globalisation—which reflect a general hostility towards the ‘the flood of styles, 
theories, points of view’ which constitute global cultural and epistemic diversity’ 
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(Feyerabend, 1987: v, 1, 2). (These ‘monistic’ tendencies are part of the wider 
‘conquest of abundance’ narrative discussed in the later chapters). 
These two points relate to the abstract concerns about the value and ends of 
pluralism and the latter two points are more concrete implications of the convergentist 
monism that Mill affirms. Third, then, Mill thinks that modernity enjoys a higher level 
of epistemic and cultural progressiveness than non-Western indigenous cultures—
indeed, this is why Mill could, for all his affirmation of ‘liberty’ and ‘pluralism’, also 
support (and, indeed, contribute to) British imperialism. Fourth, because Mill sees 
modernity as enjoying a higher level of ‘development’, he is therefore compelled to 
support British (and, more broadly, European) imperial interventions into ‘non-
Western’ indigenous cultures. Feyerabend, of course, disagrees that modernity is 
epistemically or culturally ‘superior’ to global indigenous cultures, and he is extremely 
hostile, on philosophical and political grounds, to the very idea that policies of ‘Western 
imperialism’ are at all justifiable. Indeed, much of Feyerabend’s later work consisted of 
a persistent critique of Western cultural and intellectual imperialism, and he connected 
this with his advocacy of an epistemic and cultural pluralism. For these four reasons, 
Feyerabend should actually disagree strongly with much of what Mill has to say about 
epistemic and cultural pluralism—and, in fact, on certain readings Feyerabend should 
interpret Mill as defending exactly the sort of positions that he devoted much of his 
later work to opposing. 
It is worth dwelling on the connections between Mill’s commitments to liberalism 
and imperialism, for two reasons. First, an extended analysis will make it easier to see 
how and why Feyerabend’s appeals to Mill are erroneous, and so it will serve a useful 
scholarly purpose. Certainly it should strengthen the case I made for suggesting that 
what unites—and, ultimately, separates—Feyerabend and Mill is a commitment to, but 
diverging account of, the value of pluralism. Second, a deeper understanding of how 
Mill could reconcile his liberal, pluralist sympathies with British imperialism will, I 
suggest, help us to better understand the connections between modernity, culture, and 
science. Since those three terms are rather elastic, it will help, before beginning, to offer 
a brief sketch of the argument that will follow. 
My account is largely drawn from Uday Singh Mehta’s study Liberalism and Empire 
(1999), ‘a study in nineteenth-century British liberal thought’.76 I focus on Mehta 
because his interest is in the ‘epistemological perspective’ underlying British Victorian 
liberal and imperial political theory, and how the ‘framework established’ by this 
‘perspective’ served to organise the ‘diversities of experience and life forms’ reflected 
by Indian culture (1999: 20, 8-9). British political theorists like the two Mills—father 
John and son John Stuart—and Edmund Burke ‘encountered’ the history and culture of 
India through an ‘epistemological framework’ which located all world cultures on a 
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‘civilizational scale’. The cultural and epistemic progressiveness of cultures was 
assessed according to its level, higher or lower, on this scale; and, it goes without 
saying, Victorian Britain was much higher up the scale, whilst India lurked on the lower 
rungs. Inherent in this ‘civilizational scale’ were, of course, a system of normative 
judgements, such that, no matter how genuinely liberal and tolerant theorists like Mill 
strove to be, they could not ‘avoid notions of superiority and inferiority, backward and 
progressive, and higher and lower’ (1999: 20).  
Mehta’s study of Victorian British liberalism and imperialism is complex, far more 
so than my account here can, or, thankfully, needs to be. All that is needed for my 
purposes is his statement of the ‘central problem’ of liberalism and imperialism, and the 
solution he offers. I suggest that Mehta’s explanation of why British political theorists 
could embrace liberalism and imperialism can help us to understand Mill, and, in turn, 
Feyerabend. 
Mehta’s opening question is how British political theorists, like J.S. Mill, 
‘committed to ideas of equality and liberty’, could experience the ‘plurality of extant 
life forms’ indigenous to their colonies as ‘little more than an occasion to assert a 
rational paternalism’, and one with often destructive implications for the cultures 
indigenous to those ‘colonial possessions’. Despite a sincere commitment to 
individuality, freedom, and self-determination, liberal theorists supported an imperial 
project which was, very often, destructive of the indigenous cultures of the colonial 
territories. Mehta puts the problem succinctly: ‘how did ideas of equality, liberty, and 
fraternity lead to empire, liberticide, and fratricide?’ (Mehta, 1999: 190). Certainly it is 
discomfiting to find J.S. Mill, renowned as a champion of ‘liberty’ and ‘freedom’, 
denying those very values to the Indian subjects which occupied him during his long 
career as a clerk for the East India Company. 
The solution to this puzzle arises in an ‘enduring and pressing tension’ arising 
between two liberal commitments. Classical liberal theory includes a commitment, 
firstly, to ‘intervention being progressive, [f]or bettering life’, and, secondly, to 
‘limiting the use of political power’. Historically, notes Mehta, ‘the arguments for the 
betterment of life or progress have always held a strong if not trumping suit’ (Mehta, 
1999: 79). In the case of British colonial India, liberal theorists like Mill invoked their 
commitment to the ‘betterment’ of the lives of the indigenous Indian population. 
Crucial to this, however, was, perhaps obviously, the conviction that ‘betterment’ was 
not only possible, but necessary—and this conviction was provided by the 
‘civilizational scale’. Indigenous cultures could be located on a ‘scale’ according to 
which their ‘progressiveness’, vis-à-vis their colonial ‘superintendents’, could be 
ascertained, at which point a powerful moral and political imperative for ‘improvement’ 
could be initiated. Victorian Britain ranked higher than India on this scale, and so 
colonial administrators, like Mill, saw it as incumbent upon themselves to progressively 
‘superintend’ Indian culture.  
This normative ‘scaling’ of cultures also transformed British colonial perceptions of 
the cultural integrity and heritage of India itself, because, as had been well known since 
at least the seventeenth-century, India was very far from being a stagnant, backwater 
culture. The noted philologist and Indologist Sir William Jones, founder of the Royal 
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Asiatic Society, had described Asia as ‘the nurse of Sciences’, rich in ‘delightful and 
useful arts’, ‘glorious actions’, and enjoying diversity and sophistication in ‘laws, 
manners, customs, and languages’ (Jones,1784: 1-10 passim). The British colonial 
administrators therefore had to respond to the ‘delightful and useful’ cultural, 
philosophical, and linguistic abundance of Indian culture in order to justify their 
‘superintendence’ of it. Translated into Feyerabend’s terms, colonial British 
administrators had to justify their ‘conquest’ of the cultural ‘abundance’ in evidence in 
India—but how? 
Mehta supplies an answer. Although J.S. Mill and other liberal theorists, especially 
Burke, were aware (and, indeed, admiring) of Indian cultural heritage, their perceptions 
of it were not neutral. On the contrary, ‘India’ was encountered through an 
‘epistemological perspective’ which rendered it as ‘an unfamiliar world’, which was, in 
every sense, ‘provisional’. India may enjoy a striking richness in thought, belief, and 
practice, but these were merely provisional, remnants—however admirable—of the 
lower stages of the ‘civilizational scale’. The Hindu cosmology, the caste system, 
Sanskrit, and the other features of Indian culture eagerly documented by scholars like 
Sir William were fascinating, to be sure, but they were ‘provisional’ and, therefore, 
destined to be erased as India began to ascend to a higher stage in the civilizational 
scale. Mehta argues that the perception of indigenous cultural beliefs and practices as 
‘provisional—and the interventions in their lives it permits’, provides the ‘conceptual 
and normative core of the liberal justification of the empire’ (Mehta, 1999: 191).  
Coupled with the ‘progressive’ imperative bequeathed by liberal political theory, the 
civilizational scale provides a functioning justification for imperialism: indigenous 
cultures, occupying lower ‘stages’ in the ‘civilizational scale’, require the 
‘superintendence’ that the more developed colonial powers, like Britain, could offer. 
Moreover, it was morally and politically incumbent upon those powers to make 
progressive ‘interventions’ into those cultures, especially if, as in the case of India, they 
had lapsed into ‘stagnation’. Mill himself, for instance, noted in On Liberty that there is 
‘too great a tendency in the best beliefs and practices to degenerate’, and this is a point 
that Feyerabend himself approvingly quoted (Feyerabend, 1993: 29-31ff). However, a 
point that Feyerabend did not note was Mill’s illustration of this point—namely, China, 
which, wrote Mill, became ‘stationary’, and had ‘remained so for thousands of years’, 
to the extent that, ‘if they are ever to be farther improved, it must be by foreigners’. 
Mill clearly locates cultures on an objective ‘civilizational scale’. Victorian Britain 
rates higher than colonial India and this introduces two important points. First, it 
affirms a powerful normative imperative for Britain to assume ‘superintendence’ of 
India, one which reflects not gross economic interest, but, rather more nobly, a 
powerful moral and political purpose. Second, since India rates ‘lower’ on the scale, it 
does not—indeed, cannot—enjoy the benefits of more elevated political values, like 
those of liberty and equal opportunity. This explains why Mill could celebrate liberty, 
yet deny it to millions of Indians subject to the British Crown. ‘Liberty’, states Mill 
explicitly, ‘as a principle, has no application to any state of things anterior to the time 
when mankind have become capable of being improved by free and equal discussion’—
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and this is not a condition which India, to his mind, fulfilled.77 Because India existed at 
a lower stage of civilization, the ‘higher order’ political principles—like that of 
liberty—do not apply to it. For this reason, British imperialists were justified in their 
‘superintendence’, because only by ‘developing’ Indian culture could it ascend the 
civilizational scale and enjoy ‘liberty’, in the full sense. 
Mehta concludes that nineteenth-century British liberals, like Mill, understood 
‘political institutions such as representative democracy’ as being ‘dependent on 
societies having reached a particular historical maturation or level of civilization’. 
Certain such societies do not achieve ‘maturation’—due perhaps to accidents of history, 
wars, or whatever—and so, in such cases, ‘empire services the deficiencies of the past 
for societies that have been stunted through history’ (Mehta, 1999: 81). Since ‘stagnant’ 
cultures, like India and China, clearly lacked the ‘great energies’ and ‘genius’ necessary 
to invigorate themselves, they must come from without: that is, from vigorous, 
progressive nations like Britain. Mehta suggests that the rhetoric of the ‘dynamism of 
empire’ was, in fact, ‘thoroughly wedded’ to the liberal desire for the ‘betterment of the 
world’. Indeed, it becomes ‘easy to see why the deployment of power’ was persistently 
reaffirmed, ‘despite its acknowledged and sustained abuses’ (such as the abuses of 
Robert Clive and Warren Hastings). These abuses extended, in many cases, to the 
‘wholesale erasure of extant life forms’, assuaged by the faith that it was ‘justified by a 
higher purpose’ (Mehta, 1999: 87). 
By this point, it should be clear that Mill and Feyerabend are actually quite apart. 
Mill defends a ‘cultural convergentism’, whereby global cultural diversity will 
gradually converge towards an ideal ‘form of life’. This ‘end state’ will demonstrate 
none of the diversity which is praised in On Liberty, since it is made very clear there 
that these ‘experiments in living’ are intended as just that: experiments, whose purpose 
is to identify the most efficacious forms of living, such that those ‘ineffectual’ or 
‘provisional’ ones can be abandoned. Moreover, Mill clearly considers that modern 
Western cultures are more highly developed than those of their colonial territories, and 
that this fact justifies imperial ‘superintendence’ and ‘development’.  
Mill locates world cultures on a ‘civilizational scale’, upon which Victorian Britain 
rated higher than India (and the other British colonial territories) and that these 
disparities justified—indeed, demanded—the ‘superintendence’ of those ‘lesser-
developed’ cultures. This ‘scale’ itself relies upon an ‘epistemological vision’ which 
judged indigenous cultures to be imperfect, ‘provisional’ manifestations of certain 
‘ideal types’. As Mehta puts it, indigenous cultures were each perceived as 
‘embodiment of an abstract type’, such that their ‘singularity, individuality, [and] social 
and political identity’ were erased (Mehta, 1999: 25). This is how and why the richness 
of Indian culture could be understood as ‘provisional’. Within this ‘epistemological 
framework’, the ‘integrity’ of Indian culture disappeared, as its constituent beliefs and 
practices were reassessed according to alien and abstract criteria: ‘their pains and joys, 
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 The introduction to On Liberty includes the remark that the ‘doctrine of liberty’ is, of 
course, ‘meant to apply only to human beings in the maturity of their faculties’, not to 
‘[t]hose who are still in a state to require being taken care of by others’. 
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the meanings they attach to particular things and events, in short, the integrity of their 
life forms, are completely read out of the civilization or collectively of which they are 
deemed to be a part and its standing within a pre-established scale’ (Mehta, 1999, 82). 
As Feyerabend might put it, certain ‘abstractions’, developed by external ‘specialists’, 
were imposed upon a stable culture, and used to retroactively deny and distort its 
achievements, successes, and integrity.  
Since these abstractions were held to enjoy a privileged epistemic status, they 
correspondingly narrowed the British administrators’ capacity to conceive of 
meaningful and intelligible ‘modes of experience’ divergent from their own. This is 
why, for Mehta, the epistemological problem of imperialism lies in ‘how different 
realms of experience can and should relate to each other’ (Mehta, 1999: 192). The 
indigenous cultures of India and other British colonial territories employed ‘modes of 
experience’ radically divergent from that of Victorian Britain. When confronted by 
‘[p]eople who literally claimed to “see” and “touch” multi-headed or winged gods 
singlehandedly moving mountains’, the conclusion was that such persons ‘had more 
than just deformed imaginations or strange beliefs’: ‘they instantiated in concrete and 
tactile forms an “irrational” worldview and lived amid its directives and comforts’ 
(Mehta, 1999: 35). British political theorists therefore lost sight of the (actual and 
possible) diversity of ‘modes of experience’, as they interpreted global indigenous 
cultures as imperfect, ‘provisional’ forms of life, whose development into ‘higher’ 
forms became a moral and political duty. As Mehta puts it, ‘Once Mill has established 
the normative primacy of progress, the argument for empire, for tutelage, in a word for 
progressive superintendence, is all but complete’ (Mehta, 1999: 105). 
Feyerabend’s is therefore not as much of a Millian as he supposes, since he 
overestimates his commitment to tolerance and pluralism. There are four points of 
disagreement. First, Mill is a cultural and epistemic convergentist, and therefore a 
monist, whereas Feyerabend is certainly not. Second, Mill sees pluralism as a means to 
an end, as an ‘experimental’ process of trial and error, whereas for Feyerabend, 
pluralism is an end in itself. Third, Feyerabend worries that Western modernity is 
hostile to global cultural and epistemic diversity, whereas Mill considers it to represent 
the highest ‘stage’ of contemporary human development. Fourth, Feyerabend thinks 
that the sciences, or the ‘scientific worldview’, are a part of the problem, because they 
provide intellectual legitimacy to Western ‘imperialism’. Considering these four points 
of difference, one could in fact make the strong claim that Feyerabend and Mill are, far 
from being philosophical allies, poles apart. 
 
5.4. Pluralism and convergence. 
Feyerabend was wrong to identify Mill as a precursor to his pluralism. So, although I 
argued that the scholarly debate is misguided, the core point—that Feyerabend is 
mistaken to identify Mill as a ‘proto-pluralist’—is correct (though not for the reasons 
that Staley and Jacobs suggest). First, I argued that they are wrong to suppose that 
Feyerabend drew arguments for theoretical pluralism from Mill. This is not consonant 
with Feyerabend’s own remarks, since he explicitly states that what he admires in Mill 
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are the ‘humanitarian’ concerns with individuality, tolerance, and social diversity. 
Second, I then argued that, in fact, Feyerabend seems to misunderstand Mill’s position 
on social diversity, in two ways. In the first case, Whereas Feyerabend sees social 
pluralism as a beneficent end in itself, Mill makes it quite clear that, on his terms, a 
diversity of ‘modes of living’ is a means to an end—that end being, in fact, a fairly 
uniform ‘end state’. Therefore, Feyerabend and Mill have incompatible accounts of the 
value of social pluralism. In the second case, Mill clearly holds that modern ‘Western’ 
cultures are superior—or more ‘progressive’—than those of ‘non-Western’ indigenous 
cultures (such as India), and he argues, further, that Western cultures are therefore 
justified in their ‘superintendence’ of their ‘inferior’ neighbours. Feyerabend is opposed 
both to Mill’s assessment of the ‘superiority’ of Western cultures and the associated 
conviction that ‘imperialist’ intervention into indigenous cultures are therefore justified. 
Ironically, perhaps, Feyerabend should actually be opposed to Mill. The reading of 
Mill’s political philosophy offered in this chapter suggests that Feyerabend would be 
grossly mistaken to appeal to Mill and On Liberty to defend the sort of non-reductive 
social and cultural pluralism that the later philosophy espouses. After all, Mill sees 
contemporary global and epistemic pluralism as a ‘provisional’ state which will, in 
time, gradually dissolve. This is precisely the sort of ‘conquest of abundance’ which 
Feyerabend is implacably opposed to. This is not to say that Mill defends an intolerable 
sort of cultural monism, whereby the current diversity of ‘forms of life’ will be 
gradually reduced to one. Mill does not foresee cultural uniformity; however, he 
certainly does not share Feyerabend’s position that a diversity of ‘forms of life’ should 
be a constant and unceasing feature of human life. Mill is not as pluralistic as 
Feyerabend supposes, but nor is he as monistic as the foregoing discussion may have 
implied. 
Feyerabend and Mill do agree that epistemic diversity should be preserved for its 
capacity to protect against dogmatism and elitism. Mill warns that ‘[i]f resistance waits 
till life is reduced nearly to one uniform type’, then humankind ‘speedily becomes 
unable to conceive diversity, when they have been for some time unaccustomed to see 
it’ (Mill, 1998/1859: 82). Therefore, as Kelly puts it, epistemic diversity should be 
preserved because it prevents such ‘uniformity’ ever arising. Feyerabend and Mill 
concur that appeals to epistemic diversity should be intended ‘to support political and 
social diversity and hence freedom. The defence is cast in political rather than 
epistemological terms [and so e]pistemic diversity remained an end to be preserved not 
overcome’ (Kelly, 2006: 255, 257). Where Feyerabend parts company is in the idea that 
Western cultural and epistemic practices are superior and that the scope of such 
diversity can be confined within their parameters. Indeed, John Gray (1996: 115f) 
argues that Feyerabend was unique amongst commentators in noticing that Mill’s 
commitment to epistemic convergentism threatens to undermine his argument that 
epistemic diversity safeguards cultural diversity. If epistemic diversity provides the 
essential ‘checks’ that prevent dogmatic elites, then convergentism will undermine it; 
however, the fact that Feyerabend did not make this objection explicit weakens Gray’s 
attribution of it to him—but certainly it is entirely plausible. 
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One question remains: did Feyerabend ‘misunderstand’ Mill’s political philosophy, 
or did he simply ignore the more unpalatable aspects? This is a difficult question to 
answer. One could suggest that Feyerabend simply misunderstood Mill’s remarks in On 
Liberty, or that he failed to notice the caveats about ‘maturity of faculties’ and ‘stages 
of development’. However, this seems untenable, for two reasons. First, these remarks 
are omnipresent throughout On Liberty and it is surely impossible that Feyerabend 
missed them—especially when one bears in mind his enthusiasm for that ‘great essay’. 
Second, it seems rather unjust to Feyerabend to suggest that he failed to understand the 
significance of these remarks. Therefore, I conclude—albeit with some regret—that 
Feyerabend was aware of the ‘imperialist’ content of Mill’s political philosophy, but 
that he chose to ignore it. I suggest that Feyerabend decided to import those aspects of 
Mill’s political philosophy which corresponded with his own interests—such as the 
value of tolerance, diversity, and humanitarian concern—but left out those aspects 
which did not (such as ‘civilization stages’, and convergentism). 
Such selective use of Mill is not, in itself, objectionable. There is no reason why one 
must adopt a philosophy in its entirety, and so Feyerabend would have been justified in 
incorporating some aspects of Mill’s political philosophy, but not others. What is 
objectionable, however, is Feyerabend’s failure to mention the differences between his 
views and Mill’s. This is a failure to observe certain scholarly norms. Either 
Feyerabend is trying to conceal certain aspects of Mill’s philosophy, or he fails to do 
justice to Mill—but in either case, he is misleading us, whether deliberately or not. 
Indeed, it would be fairly simple for Feyerabend to detach the ‘imperialist’ aspects of 
Mill’s political philosophy from the ‘liberal’ aspects. For instance, one could rather 
painlessly abandon the account of ‘civilizational stages’ and thereby dissolve the 
justification for imperial ‘superintendence’. Such a move would, I think, detach Mill’s 
liberalism from its possible imperialist implications, and would therefore allow 
Feyerabend to make a qualified—but entirely legitimate—appeal to Mill. 
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Chapter Six 
Ch6 Cultural Diversity and the Scientific Worldview 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
6.2 Ethics, cultural diversity, and ‘the good life’. 
6.3 Kekes’ pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’. 
6.4 Cultural diversity and modernity. 
6.5 Conclusions. 
 
This Chapter outlines Feyerabend’s argument for the value of cultural diversity. This 
rests upon his pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’, an idea I develop with appeal to 
the work of John Kekes. Once Feyerabend’s ‘ethical pluralism’ is in place I discuss his 
concern that the cognitive and cultural hegemony of the Western sciences poses a threat 
to it. 
6.1. Introduction.  
Feyerabend maintained that cultural diversity was a precondition for human wellbeing. 
There is a striking plurality of norms, values, and structures which can constitute a 
meaningful human life and so a correspondingly diversity of ‘forms of life’ is necessary 
to enable us to explore and realise these existential possibilities. Cultural diversity is 
therefore valued on ‘existential’ grounds, since it ensures the fullest possible range of 
values, aspirations, and ‘projects’ upon which meaningful human lives can be provided 
for and sustained. The value of cultural diversity is therefore primarily invested in 
social and political issues—or what Feyerabend called ‘humanitarian’ concerns.  
My aims in this chapter are twofold. First, I develop Feyerabend’s remarks upon the 
value of cultural diversity by considering it in the light of John Kekes’ pluralistic 
account of ‘the good life’. This should provide corroboration for Feyerabend’s 
appropriations from Mill, and serve to fortify his remarks upon the function of cultural 
diversity in providing multiple ways of meaningfully living within the world. Second, 
once the pluralistic account of ‘the good life’ is in place, I consider Feyerabend’s 
charge that global cultural diversity is under threat from the hegemonic tendencies of 
Western modernity. It is important to consider that Feyerabend’s remarks about cultural 
diversity are always located relative to his wider historical narrative—the ‘conquest of 
abundance’. Since the cognitive authority of the Western sciences is, on Feyerabend’s 
account, central to this notion of ‘conquest’, they have an important place within his 
treatments of cultural diversity. At the end of this chapter, one should have a deeper 
understanding of Feyerabend’s account of the value of cultural diversity and the threats 
which Feyerabend thinks are posed to it by Western modernity. 
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6.2 Ethics, cultural diversity, and ‘the good life’. 
Feyerabend’s pluralism was comprehensive. Earlier chapters detailed his defence of 
epistemic and cultural pluralism, and some remarks have already been made about the 
value of the latter. Drawing upon both the history and philosophy of science, and other 
disciplines like anthropology and development studies, Feyerabend provided a wealth 
of historical, philosophical, and practical arguments for the value of cultural pluralism. 
Amongst other things, a diversity of cultures increases the range of epistemic, social, 
and political forms available to human beings, constituting what Dupré calls a ‘library 
of the possibilities for human behaviour and belief’ (Dupré, 2003: 110). In this section, 
I focus on the claim that cultural diversity maximises the ‘existential’ possibilities 
available to human beings—that is, the many ways in which a meaningful human life 
can be conceived and lived.  
This was an abiding concern of Feyerabend throughout his career, beginning at least 
in the early 1960s. Invoking Socrates,  Feyerabend assures us that the ‘fundamental 
problem’ facing human beings is ‘which kind of life shall we lead?’, and that 
epistemology, properly understood, ‘concern[s] the welfare of human beings’ and is 
‘therefore ethical’ in nature (Feyerabend, 1961: 55-56).78 Such sentiments remained 
constant throughout Feyerabend’s career. Jumping from the early 1960s to the mid-
1990s, for instance, one finds him reminding us of ‘the normative component inherent 
in all statements of reality’, and of the ‘“existential” component’ of our epistemology: 
‘different ways of life entail different interpretations of expert knowledge’, including, 
today, ‘scientific knowledge’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 249, 202). 
Feyerabend clearly subordinates epistemology to ethics. The general idea he 
expresses is that, since the possibilities for human thought and action are delimited and 
structured by our understanding of reality, epistemology is inseparable from ethics. Our 
ideas about what the world is like are intimately linked to our ideas about how a life can 
be meaningfully lived—so much so that the demarcation between ‘ethics’ and 
‘epistemology’ is, at the deepest level, unsustainable. In making this claim, Feyerabend 
is appealing to a long tradition within the history of philosophy which makes ethics the 
basis of all philosophy which goes to Socrates.79 Ethics, in this sense, is understood as 
sustained reflection on ‘the good life’, rather than on discrete topics of moral concern, 
like euthanasia or obligations to distant strangers. Indeed, many recent writers have 
welcomed the revival of ‘larger, and more exciting’ conceptions of ethics than that 
which was current amongst many early-twentieth-century philosophers, such as Ayer 
(1936: Ch6) (Cooper, 1998: 2).80 Contemporary ethicists, often those sympathetic to 
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 These remarks, and others like them, are discussed in Preston (1996: 20-22). 
79
 For a very useful historical perspective, see MacIntyre (1995). 
80
 An important early work here is Anscombe (1958) who criticised the prevailing 
moral philosophies of the day for their myopic focus upon moral language. It is perhaps 
worth noting that Feyerabend knew and studied with Anscombe; indeed, it was her 
influence that got his first paper (Feyerabend 1955) accepted for publication (see 
Feyerabend, 1995: 92-93ff). She and later moral philosophers shared the more 
ambitious and interesting idea that, as Mary Midgley wittily puts it, ethics should 
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‘virtue ethics’, insist that since the scope of ethics, properly understood, is ‘human life’, 
it makes no sense to confine it to certain ‘big issues’—like euthanasia—since it should, 
rather, inform and illuminate all aspects of human life. This is the ‘larger’ conception of 
ethics—and, indeed, of philosophy—as a ‘way of life’, as the late Pierre Hadot (1995) 
put it. 
No matter what one thinks about this ‘larger’ conception of ethics, two problems 
emerge when one tries to locate Feyerabend relative to it. The first is that Feyerabend 
explicitly disavowed ethics in the sense just described. When asked by an interviewer, a 
few months before his death, why he ‘never or very seldom discuss questions of ethics, 
of morals’, Feyerabend replied, with characteristic candour, ‘[b]ecause most of the stuff 
I read bored me to tears’ (Feyerabend, 2001a: 166). The second is that, true to the first 
point, one would be hard pressed to find any sustained ethical reflection in 
Feyerabend’s work—that is, any developed accounts of ‘the good life’, or how to 
achieve it. As Paul Tibbets complained, Feyerabend’s talk of ‘the good life’ is 
‘notoriously fuzzy’, since it lacks ‘a detailed account of what constitutes the good life 
and what social/political structure would most guarantee and promote human 
happiness’ (Tibbets, 1976: 368). So, perhaps oddly for someone who insisted that ethics 
is ‘primary’, Feyerabend in fact had very little to say about it—a point compounded by 
the general absence of ethicists from his bibliographies. Taken together, these two 
points pose a serious problem to the claim that Feyerabend has anything meaningful to 
contribute to ethics, and it may even seem to cast him into hypocrisy, since he actually 
‘did’ very little of the ethics which, he insisted, was the ‘fundamental problem’ of all 
philosophy.81 In what sense can Feyerabend meaningfully be described as ‘doing’ 
ethics? 
The answer to this question will invoke the idea of ‘human well-being’. Feyerabend 
was always concerned with identifying and sustaining the conditions under which 
human beings can flourish—realise their talents, cultivate their faculties, live happily, 
and so on. That is obvious enough in his appeals to John Stuart Mill and in the remark, 
quoted earlier, that the ‘fundamental problem’ of philosophy is ‘how do I live?’ Recall, 
for instance, that Feyerabend insisted to Kuhn that the ‘importance of a topic’ reflects 
its potential contribution to the ‘well-being of mankind’: meaning the ‘exercise of one’s 
imagination, from the full development of human faculties, and from spiritual 
happiness’ (quoted in Hoyningen-Huene, 2006: 613-614). It is clear enough that by 
‘well-being’, Feyerabend does not simply mean being well-fed and watered. Consonant 
with both Aristotle and Mill, the idea of ‘wellbeing’ includes, broadly, the satisfaction 
                                                                                                                                                                          
concern itself with ‘the meaning of life, not just the meaning of words’ (Midgley, 2007: 
xi). 
81
 Liz McKinnell suggested to me that Feyerabend’s failure to ‘do’ ethics need not open 
him to the charge of hypocrisy, on the grounds that he could well affirm its fundamental 
importance yet humbly leave it to others who would do it better. On these terms, 
Feyerabend may argue that ethics is important, but that it is in fact so important that it 
should be left to professional ethicists. This seems plausible, but how it would square 
against Feyerabend’s disdain for ‘specialists’ is another question! 
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of diverse human needs—physical, moral, intellectual, social, and so on, and is 
therefore close to the Greek ideal of ‘flourishing’.82 Feyerabend is therefore 
programmatically engaged in ethics insofar as his philosophy has at its core a 
commitment to identifying the conditions under which human beings ‘flourish’.  
A core feature of Feyerabend’s ethical claims is an emphasis upon the plurality of 
conceptions of ‘the good life’, or what may be called ‘ethical pluralism’. Feyerabend 
maintained that human beings can live and flourish within a striking diversity of ‘forms 
of life’, ranging from specialist communities to large-scale cultures. Such ethical 
pluralism affords maximum scope for expressing different values, ideals, social and 
cultural forms, and so on. Farewell to Reason opens with the claim that diversity is 
beneficial while uniformity reduces our joys and our (intellectual, emotional, material) 
resources’ and this is juxtaposed with a complaint about the ‘homogenisation’ of world 
cultures (Feyerabend, 1987: 1-3 passim). Feyerabend’s worry here exactly parallels 
Mill’s concerns about cultural ‘stagnation’ and both clearly oppose what they see as the 
increasing uniformity of their cultures. Both also see cultural pluralism as the antidote 
to such stagnation, but Feyerabend, unlike Mill, sees a diversity of forms of life as 
having an inexhaustible value. Feyerabend insisted that ‘there are many ways of living 
[and] that cultures different from our own are not mistakes but results of a delicate 
adaptation to particular surroundings’; indeed, such cultures may have ‘found, rather 
than missed, the secrets of a good life’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 4).  
Feyerabend is therefore critical of what Bhiku Parekh (2000) calls ‘moral monism’, 
the idea that underlying human cultures is a uniform, totally knowable, social 
transcendent ‘human nature’ which, in turn, legitimates claims about the existence of a 
single, ‘true’ form of life. Parekh argues that an irreducible cultural (or ‘ethical’) 
pluralism therefore offers our best resource for fully realising and expressing human 
‘capacities’ and ‘potentialities’. In a passage that Feyerabend would applaud, Parekh 
argues that cultural diversity adds ‘richness and variety’ to the world and stimulates 
‘imagination, creativity, curiosity, and love of difference’. He goes on to say that: 
 
‘Diversity also led to progress because it created a climate conductive to the 
emergence of exceptional and original minds, provided new sources of 
inspiration, and encouraged a healthy competition between different ways of 
thought and life. Furthermore, since no way of life developed all human 
potentialities, no type of character all desirable traits and no system of 
morality all virtues, each needed others to balance and complement it.’ 
(Parekh, 2000: 41-42)  
 
                                                           
82
 It may be profitable to interpret Feyerabend’s political philosophy with the 
‘Aristotelian social democracy’ defended by Nussbaum (1990), who argues that, for 
Aristotle, the task of political planning is ‘to make available to each and every citizen 
the material, institutional, and educational circumstances in which good human 
functioning may be chosen’.  
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Parekh’s remarks on the value of cultural pluralism here are strikingly similar to 
Feyerabend’s arguments for epistemic pluralism (as discussed in Chapter three). The 
guiding claim in both cases is monism should be rejected because it fails to capture the 
richness and complexity of phenomena. Any given system of knowledge or form of life 
includes and emphasises certain features and aspects at the expense of others, which 
may be occluded or even suppressed. Therefore, one must have recourse to a plurality 
of systems or forms of life, both to maximise the aspects of the world, or human nature 
being expressed, and to enable criticism between these competing systems and forms. 
Parekh remarks that these arguments for cultural pluralism issue in the claim that ‘the 
good life could be lived in several different ways, that each profit[s] from a dialogue 
with the rest’, and that it was wrong to ‘construct a ideal mode of human existence’ on 
the basis of ‘some one or some small number of patterns’ (Parekh, 2000: 43). I suggest 
that Feyerabend would concur in this judgement: since no one ‘form of life’ can 
adequately reflect all aspects of human nature, or capture all possible conceptions of 
‘the good life’, one must encourage and sustain a vigorous cultural pluralism.83  
There is a strong Aristotelian dimension to Feyerabend’s conception of ethics. 
Unsurprisingly, then, Aristotle was the figure most often invoked in the later 
Feyerabend’s discussion of ethics. Conquest of Abundance features regular appearances 
from Aristotle, especially in chapter seven, simply titled ‘Aristotle’.84 Feyerabend even 
names his own ethical principle ‘Aristotle’s principle’, and explaining it will shed light 
on his own ethics. Feyerabend often used Aristotle’s criticisms of Parmenides as an 
example of an ethics-based criticism of scientific and philosophical theories. There 
were two main forms of arguments used by Aristotle against Parmenides: first, he 
demonstrated mistakes in Parmenides’ reasoning and arguments, and second, he pointed 
out that change and plurality were essential to human life (see Feyerabend, 2001: 200 
passim). 85 In a remark that Feyerabend was fond of quoting, Aristotle declared that it 
would ‘next door to lunacy’ to regard change and plurality as unreal (On Generation 
and Corruption 324a18): the reason, of course, is that change and plurality are both 
obvious and central features of our social and political lives.  
Feyerabend interpreted Aristotle as criticising Parmenides on both rational and 
ethical terms, criticising both his arguments and the implications of his theories for 
human life. This is also the same interpretation that Feyerabend makes of the Church’s 
criticisms of Galileo; in the neglected chapter thirteen of Against Method, Feyerabend 
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 Indeed, a pregnant footnote in Conquest of Abundance includes the proposal that 
‘cultural differences [are] special and changeable manifestations of a common human 
nature’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 34fn25, original emphasis). There are no further remarks to 
appeal to, but certainly one could argue that Feyerabend would be very sympathetic to 
the idea that there is some uniform  human nature which expresses, and also changes 
itself  by manifesting in a plurality of ‘forms of life’. 
84
 Chapter seven, ‘Aristotle’, was an essay whose publication history is unknown. 
Feyerabend may have intended it to be included in Conquest of Abundance. 
85
 For similar remarks, see Nicomachean Ethics 1096b33, On Generation and 
Corruption 325a18, and Physics 185a12). See Feyerabend (2001: 208). 
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argues that the Catholic Church criticised both the ‘scientific content’ and ‘ethical 
([and] social) implications’ of Galileo’s new science and was right to do so on both 
counts (Feyerabend, 1993: 128; see further Feyerabend, 1993: Ch13 passim). In both 
cases, that of Parmenides and Galileo, one sees a familiar critical strategy: certain 
philosophical or scientific doctrines are criticised not only on empirical and/or 
theoretical grounds but also because of perceived deleterious social or ethical 
consequences. Feyerabend argued that a ‘humane’ science and philosophy would be 
sensitive to both sets of concerns: 
 
‘[A] humane science must be adapted to the requirements of a balanced and 
rewarding life ... The task of thought, he [Aristotle] seems to say, is to 
comprehend and perhaps to improve what we perceive and do when engaged 
in our ordinary everyday affairs; it is not to wander off into a no-man’s-land 
of abstract and empirically inaccessible concepts.’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 217-
218) 
 
Feyerabend’s ethics therefore consists in two commitments. First, the ‘end’ of all 
human activities is to contribute to human wellbeing, or, to ‘the good life’. This is the 
end according to which one should assess values, practices, and institutions, no matter 
how exalted or allegedly ‘independent’ they are, or seem to be. Second, ethics, so 
conceived, is fundamental in the sense that there is no higher authority which could 
serve to undermine it. Feyerabend argued that ‘citizens’ must retain control over the 
institutions and regulations which affect their lives and he was consistently suspicious 
of any which tried to assert their special authority. The modern sciences, he argued, 
were guilty of just such ‘authoritarianism’. The paper ‘How to Defend Society against 
Science’ (Feyerabend 1975c) reflects this very concern. Feyerabend argued that there is 
‘nothing inherent in science or in any other ideology that makes it essentially 
liberating’—which is true enough—and that ensuring the emancipatory possibilities of 
science requires us to understand and use it properly. This is a key function of the 
philosophy of science, and one in which Feyerabend strongly felt that the discipline had 
grossly failed. Science can therefore contribute to human wellbeing but only insofar as 
those affected by it understand its limits and possibilities. Its ‘humane’ potential is 
contingent, not inevitable, and dependent in large part upon our enjoying a proper 
understanding of it which is not marred by distorting philosophical models. 
Feyerabend’s worry was that science was forsaking its ‘humane’ potential to 
contribute to ‘the good life’ because it had insulated itself from external controls. It was 
increasingly captivated by ‘abstractions’ and therefore detached from the values and 
needs of the general population. These antidemocratic tendencies were justified by 
appeals to various false honorifics, such as the idea that science is ‘value-free’, 
‘rational’, ‘methodologically unified’, and so on. The history and philosophy of science 
can help us to challenge these false images of science. Feyerabend maintained that, 
 
‘Any ideology that breaks the hold a comprehensive system of thought has 
on the minds of men contributes to the liberation of man. Any ideology that 
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makes man question inherited beliefs is an aid to enlightenment. A truth that 
reigns without checks and balances is a tyrant who must be overthrown, and 
any falsehood that can aid us in the over throw of this tyrant is to be 
welcomed.’ (Feyerabend, 1999a: 181) 
 
Many concerns inform this remark, but the one pertinent here is the worry that science 
may become a ‘comprehensive system of thought’ which ‘reigns without checks and 
balances’. Feyerabend had made this same point in his earlier argument that theoretical 
monism undermines the possibility of criticism and thus enables the hegemony of some 
one theory, as discussed in Chapters two and three (see Oberheim, 2006: Ch5; Preston, 
1996: Chs5 and 7). In this case, citizens will no longer be able to participate in, or exert 
control over, its aims and activities. Feyerabend suggested that this was the message of 
Aristotle’s ethical criticisms of Parmenides:  
 
‘[W]e are dealing with political decisions superimposed upon scientific 
arguments. An overriding respect for experts tends to blur the distinction 
between the political and the scientific elements of our notions of reality; we 
are inclined to believe that the pronouncements of the experts are knowledge 
of the purest kind, without admixture. A study of Aristotle ... restores clarity 
and returns to the citizens a power they relinquished by mistake.’ 
(Feyerabend, 2001: 220) 
 
A science divorced from and uninformed by the general citizenry will likely fail to 
adequately reflect their values and concerns. There is a political point here, but also an 
ethical one: science not only exerts enormous influence over our educational, medical, 
environmental, and other institutions and practices,86 but also affects our conception of 
reality and, therein, our ideas about the sorts of meaningful and intelligible life one can 
live within that reality. Feyerabend had already made this explicit in his 1962 paper, 
‘Explanation, Reduction, and Empiricism’: 
 
‘[T]he influence, upon our thinking, of a comprehensive scientific theory, or 
of some other general point of view, goes much deeper than is admitted by 
those who would regard it as a convenient scheme for the ordering of facts 
only ... [S]cientific theories are ways of looking at the world and their 
adoption affects our general beliefs and expectations, and thereby also our 
experiences and our conception of reality.’ (Feyerabend, 1962/1991a: 45) 
 
The sciences are of ethical concern because they affect the range of ‘conceptions of 
reality’ that are intelligible and meaningful within Western modernity. They can do this 
                                                           
86
 C. Fred Alford (1985: 205) notes that ‘[b]y science, in this [political] context, 
Feyerabend means all those modern institutions which claim a rational and objective 
basis for their authority; for instance, the medical establishment, and much of the 
educational establishment’. 
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in two ways. First, they can promote certain ‘conceptions of reality’, for instance, those 
which conform to a broadly materialistic or naturalistic outlook. These conceptions of 
reality are strengthened by the cognitive and cultural authority of the sciences and, more 
tangibly, by the influence of the sciences upon national educational curricula (see, for 
instance, Kitcher 2008). Second, they can occlude certain other conceptions of reality, 
either by denigrating them, or, more often, by denying the tenability of the metaphysics 
they invoke. Obvious examples would be the various magical, mythological, and 
theological cosmologies of the worlds’ religions and indigenous cultures. Colin 
McGinn (1993: 16) assures us that it would be ‘madness’ to acquiesce in such non-
scientific cosmologies, whilst Brian Ellis (1990: 19) argues that ‘[o]ne would have to 
have very good reasons indeed, or be very arrogant, not to accept the scientific 
viewpoint on questions of ontology as the best there is’; further testimonies could be 
provided. Of course, the fact that developing world cultures tend to afford the sciences 
cognitive authority does not necessarily preclude the toleration of alternatives, even 
radical ones. Feyerabend’s worry therefore arises only when one conception of reality is 
‘absolutised’ and asserted to be uniquely and exclusively descriptive of ‘how the world 
is’ in a way that does preclude alternatives (the metaphysical issues here are discussed 
in Chapters eight and nine). 
Feyerabend’s ethical worry about scientific ‘conceptions of reality’ may seem 
unfounded. After all, one reason that the sciences did emerge and become entrenched 
within Western cultures was the fact that they fed into their central ‘projects’, such as 
the application of technology to the amelioration of human life. Therefore his ethical 
worry, whilst intelligible, is unfounded. There are two responses to this. First, there is 
good evidence that many members of Western modernity have in fact experienced 
scientific ‘conceptions of reality’ as ethically impoverished in the sense that they fail to 
provide adequate conceptions of ‘the good life’. Cooper writes that, from the early 
modern period onwards, a sense of ‘disenchantment’ arose for those dissatisfied with 
the emerging ‘scientific image’. 
 
‘Those same people might also feel that the world, on the increasingly 
dominant conceptions of it, was a flat or thin one—insufficiently rich, at 
least, for knowledge of it to provide guidance to life. Richer metaphysical 
conceptions, it might appear, could be arrived at only through speculations 
that exceeded the strictures of the mathematised sciences, while conceptions 
that did not exceed them portrayed a world stripped of those ingredients—
purpose and beauty, for example—which could serve to guide our activities’ 
(Cooper, 2002: 56) 
 
The ‘disenchantment’ of the world by the sciences is an old theme in the history of 
philosophy. The earliest forms of it can arguably be found in the writings of 
Democritus, Epicurus and Lucretius in the ancient world and has persisted through the 
writings of Henry More, the Romantics, and grew force, for obvious reasons, 
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throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.87 It became a dominant theme in 
modern European philosophy, clearly visible through Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Weber 
(to whom we owe the term), Husserl (1970)88, Heidegger (1977), and Marcel (1962)89, 
amongst others (see Gutting 2005). There is too much to go into here, so I will simply 
note that Feyerabend shared this worry—indeed, he surely fits neatly in the tradition of 
‘Continental philosophy of science’. Conquest of Abundance contains many such 
complaints about the ‘spiritual’ poverty of the ‘scientific worldview’, and Feyerabend 
warned that scientific conceptions of reality tend to ‘reduce abundance and devalue 
human existence’, since they ‘lack almost all the properties and events that make our 
existence important’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 16). Feyerabend therefore concurs that 
scientific conceptions of reality are ethically impoverished insofar as they tend to lack 
the ‘properties and features’ which make human life meaningful. And in case one 
objects that Aristotle, allegedly Feyerabend’s ethical hero, provided a conception of 
‘the good life’ with no such ‘richer metaphysical conceptions’, there is the second 
point, namely, that Feyerabend’s worry about the ethical poverty of scientific 
‘conceptions of reality’ gain most of their force when one considers the many ‘non-
scientific’, contemporary global indigenous cultures.  
Feyerabend’s worry that scientific ‘conceptions of reality’ fail to provide adequate 
conceptions of ‘the good life’ becomes most urgent when applied to ‘non-scientific’ 
cultures. These include the many historical and contemporary global indigenous 
cultures which are an express concern of the later Feyerabend. Cooper, for instance, 
notes that Feyerabend’s concern ‘emerges when we ask about the scientific realist’s 
attitude towards forms of life in which the postulates and theories of science would not 
and could not “receive a response”’ (Cooper, 2002: 196). Many non-Western cultures 
may share our enthusiasm for the practical utility of science and technology but fail to 
buy into the wider naturalistic outlook that, in our culture, they are coupled with. Indeed 
there is a rich literature upon the pragmatic selection of certain Western scientific and 
technological products by non-Western cultures according to pre-existing cultural 
interests and values. Feyerabend’s preferred example was the ‘Japanese Enlightenment’ 
of the early 1870s.90 In such cases, other cultures select certain values, practices, and 
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 For excellent historical and philosophical discussions of the ‘disenchantment’ theme 
in the history of Western philosophy and science, see Midgley (1992) and (2001). 
88
 Heidegger (1977: 178) objected to Husserl’s talk of a ‘crisis’ in the sciences, on the 
grounds that there is ‘in no way a crisis of science as such. Today science goes its way 
more securely than ever before’. 
89
 Marcel (1962: 14, 123) warned that ‘a materialistic conception of the universe is 
radically incompatible with the idea of a free man’, since it fails to provide a basis for 
aspirations and ambitions beyond those provided by the sciences. Therefore, the ‘most 
serious error’ of contemporary humankind ‘lies in this failure of men to ask themselves 
what becomes of science’. 
90
 See Feyerabend (1987: 86) and (2001: 160). An excellent recent study of the 
‘Japanese Enlightenment’ and its effects upon modern Japanese culture is Wakabayashi 
(1998). 
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systems of thought from Western cultures; however this never, if ever consists in the 
wholesale import of conceptions of reality and of ‘the good life’ and so one should not 
imagine the Western scientific and cultural practices and systems will enjoy the same 
appeal for the members of the many non-Western cultures.91 As Cooper puts it, much of 
the prestige of the sciences within Western modernity lies in their providing us with 
workable, even attractive, conceptions of ‘the good life’ which ‘extend and lend 
sophistication’ and ‘visibly engage’ with ‘central “projects”’ of modernity (Cooper, 
2002: 186).  
The sciences can in fact make good claim to fulfil many of our values and needs, 
because their historical emergence was informed by them—technological imperatives, 
say. No such claims can be made for non-Western cultures, most of which did not 
generate sophisticated indigenous scientific traditions (see Selin 1997). This is not to 
say that the sciences are confined to Western Europe and its former colonies; as Selin 
warns, ‘[i]f we continue to think of science as a purely Western phenomenon, we 
eliminate a world of possibilities and preserve a narrow view of life’ (Selin, 1997: xix). 
However, the sciences do not enjoy the same depth and degree of cognitive and cultural 
authority in these cultures, and they often fail to ‘resonate with’ their values, practices, 
and institutions. Feyerabend can therefore legitimately raise ethical criticisms about the 
‘conceptions of reality’ proffered by the Western sciences: they fail to reflect the 
abiding conceptions of ‘the good life’ of those cultures—many of which will be 
religious, say—and they may well be incompatible with the cosmologies upon which 
those cultures’ conceptions of ‘the good life’ depend. This is evident in the following 
passage: 
 
‘[T]he argument that established the illusory character of unscientific beliefs 
and ontologies ... started from an alleged scientific reality and concluded 
that people with different surroundings (centred spaces, spiritual entities) 
lived in an illusion.’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 248)  
 
Feyerabend invokes his radical epistemic pluralism. Global cultures, across time and 
geography, generated ‘conceptions of reality’ radically divergent from those of the 
modern sciences. These conceptions (or ‘ontologies’, in Feyerabend’s looser language) 
included a startling range of ‘exotic’ entities and processes, from anthropomorphic gods 
to ancestor spirits, transmigration of the soul, and kamma. However, those conceptions 
of reality, in the majority of cases, provided a coherent conception of ‘the good life’, 
one which provided an account of a ‘flourishing’ life and how to live it. Feyerabend 
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 Preston rightly points out that,’ [t]oo often, for Feyerabend, our choice is between a 
completely scientific culture (or part of a larger culture) and a completely non-scientific 
one’. Indeed, this ‘all or nothing’ attitude towards intercultural exchange conflicts with 
Feyerabend’s later emphasis upon the ‘ambiguous’ nature of cultures. Preston 
concludes that Feyerabend should have ‘imbibed the deeper pluralism that he advertises 
here, in which cultures are open, interact, and are transformed via their interaction with 
others’ (Preston 2001: 621-622.). 
Kidd                             Pluralism and the ‘Problem of Reality’ in the Later Philosophy of Paul Feyerabend 
 
101 
 
argued that the inhabitants of many non-scientific cultures, historical and contemporary, 
‘noticed, reacted to, and arranged their lives around all sorts of entities’—including 
gods and demons and magical entities—and yet ‘were by no means more disoriented 
than we are’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 246). 
Feyerabend defends a pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’ connected to a radical 
epistemic pluralism. The values and practices of certain of these conceptions rely upon 
a diversity of ontological commitments and epistemic authorities many of which are 
mutually incompatible with one another (and Feyerabend liked to contrast the gods and 
demons that appear within some forms of life with the ontologies of the physical 
sciences). There are many ways of meaningfully and intelligibly conceiving of and 
living within the world, only some of which are represented by Western scientific and 
cultural practices. Such interlinked epistemic and cultural pluralism is what 
Feyerabend refers to as the ‘abundance’ of reality and it ought to be praised and 
cherished. Such pluralism is defended, primarily, on ethical grounds: since ‘well-being 
is evaluated differently at different times and in different cultures’ it makes sense to 
preserve a diversity of ‘forms of life’, both to maximise the range of ‘possibilities’ 
available to us, and to prevent the dissolution of extant, successful ‘forms of life’ 
(Feyerabend, 1987: 31). And this defence of epistemic and cultural pluralism is not an 
‘anything goes’ attitude. Feyerabend resisted the charge that he was romanticising 
indigenous cultures as idealised pastoral paradises:  
 
‘I do not mean to say that all is well in indigenous societies and that outside 
help is never needed ... There is no perfect society just as there is no perfect 
human body. However, the authors I criticise [in Farewell to Reason] go 
much further. They not only assume that help may be needed, they take it 
for granted that any change in the direction of Western civilization and 
especially of Western science is bound to be an improvement. This is simply 
not true.’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 26fn10) 
 
Feyerabend therefore maintained that there are many ways of living within and making 
sense of the world and so defends epistemic and cultural pluralism. Only some of these 
correspond to the conceptions predominant within Western modernity; however, there 
are many agencies and institutions within Western modernity which deny this 
‘abundance’ and so attempt to ‘conquer’ it. The sciences play a key role in this 
‘conquest’ because their claims to superlative practical and cognitive efficacy are used 
to justify the displacement of ‘inferior’, ‘non-scientific’ beliefs and practices. This 
argument finds its origin in Against Method and the challenge it posed to the special 
epistemic authority of the sciences. It gained force throughout the 1970s and 1980s, as 
Feyerabend began to engage with anthropological, environmental, and development 
studies literature—and, of course, as he experienced the political climate of the period; 
this was a period of radical social and political unrest, since it saw the civil rights 
movement, feminism and environmentalist movements, and increasing indigenous 
rights activism. The ‘conquest of abundance’ is therefore sustained, at least in part, by 
exaggerated conceptions of the efficacy of the sciences, and a denial of the pluralistic 
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nature of ‘the good life’. As Feyerabend put it, studies of indigenous peoples indicate 
that ‘there are many ways of living, that cultures different from our own are not 
mistakes but results of a delicate adaptation to particular surroundings, and that they 
found, rather than missed, the secrets of a good life’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 4). In the next 
section, I secure Feyerabend’s ethical claims by considering them in the light of John 
Kekes’ recent defence of a pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’ and the danger posed 
to it by science.  
 
6.3 Kekes’ pluralistic conception of ‘the good life’. 
Kekes (2000) argues that philosophical pluralism is essential to responding to the 
pursuit of ‘the good life’. Against the ‘craving for generality’ that has characterised the 
history of ethics, Kekes urges us to re-conceive ‘philosophical thinking about good 
lives’ to respect ‘the plurality of reasonable conceptions of a good life’ (Kekes, 2000: 
1). Our historical and anthropological sense shows us that human beings have 
conceived of ‘the good life’ in a startling variety of ways, in response to varying 
cultural, environmental, and intellectual conditions. Others will doubtless emerge in the 
future. The ‘good life’ has been conceived as a life of Stoic virtue, obedience to 
ancestor spirits, Christian faith, Buddhist ‘release from suffering’, humanist 
‘authenticity’, Nietzschean creation of a ‘table of values’ of one’s own, or modern 
liberal capitalism. Any number of others could be included, disputed, or conceived (see 
Hadot 1995 and Kupperman 2006).  
Considering the plurality of conceptions of ‘the good life’, Kekes urges us to reject 
the ‘absolutist strategy’ of ‘assign[ing] precedence to a favoured mode of reflection’, 
such as science, which might ‘relegate rival modes to an inferior status’ (Kekes, 2000: 
5f). Of course the sciences have a great influence to shape and inform our conceptions 
of the ‘good life’, in a way that aesthetics or religion, perhaps, do not. Although moral, 
aesthetic, and religious concerns and values may continue to inform certain of our 
activities they are not likely to enjoy much authority to determine our views about what 
reality is like; in Theodore Brown’s (2009) terms, these may enjoy ‘moral authority’ but 
not ‘epistemic authority’, insofar as they can tell us how the world should be, but not 
how it in fact is and this latter point about epistemic authority constrains the moral 
authority of, say, aesthetic and religious concerns. The epistemic authority of the 
sciences may therefore impose parameters upon the moral authority of competing 
conceptions of ‘the good life’. However, this fact should not obscure the point that: 
 
‘[R]eflection on our lives ... occurs in an irreducible plurality of modes, 
which include the scientific, historical, religious, moral, aesthetic, and 
subjective [and] each of these modes of reflection provides a perspective 
that is believed to make an important contribution to good lives.’ (Kekes, 
2000: 4-5)92 
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 Geertz (2001) offers interesting anthropological perspectives on the themes germane 
to Kekes’ remark here. My thanks to Liz McKinnell for this reference. 
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Kekes clearly opposes the presumption that reflections on the ‘good life’ should 
prioritise the ‘modes of reflection’ offered by the sciences. This point is amplified by 
Feyerabend’s worry that the premiere cognitive and cultural authority of the sciences 
has a tendency to disenfranchise other ‘modes of reflection’, both within Western 
modernity, and especially in other cultures for whom the sciences enjoy much less, if 
any, prestige.  
Kekes’ pluralistic account of ‘the good life’ and his resistance to ‘absolutist’ 
prioritisation of any single ‘mode of reflection’—scientific, say—find strong parallels 
with Feyerabend’s own remarks. I will take each point in turn. First, there is the plural 
nature of ‘the good life’. Feyerabend argues that ‘there are many ways of ordering the 
world that surrounds us’, only some of which are represented by Western cultural 
practices. ‘People all over the world’, spread across cultures, history, and geography, 
developed cultures which ‘enriched their lives, protected them, and gave them meaning’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: 162, 3). Many, if not all, of these cultures were ‘non-scientific’, in 
the sense that the sciences—understood as sustained, systematic inquiries into the 
empirical world—play little to no role in them. Indeed, many of these cultures, 
especially those in the distant past, would have had no conception of the sciences at all. 
Yet despite the absence of scientific ‘modes of reflection’, these cultures served the 
practical and cognitive needs of their members, and, more importantly, provided tenable 
conceptions of ‘the good life’. As Feyerabend asks, in full rhetorical flow, 
 
‘[A]re we really to believe that people who were not guided by a scientific 
worldview but who still managed to survive and to live moderately happy 
and fulfilling lives were the victims of an illusion? … [O]n the contrary, 
their lives were occasionally less scattered, aimless, and cruel than our own. 
Is it plausible to assume that all this was a grandiose mistake?’ (Feyerabend, 
2001: 246) 
 
Feyerabend therefore concurs with Kekes that there are many conceptions of ‘the good 
life’. 
Second, Feyerabend criticises the unwarranted prioritisation of scientific ‘modes of 
reflection’ and conceptions of ‘the good life’. This is of course an aspect of his rejection 
of the presumption of the omnicompetence of science. Human beings ought to consult 
the fullest possible range of ‘modes of reflection’, rather than remaining within the 
confines of just one, such as science. This point is consonant with Feyerabend’s general 
philosophical commitment to the critical value of pluralism and proliferation. Indeed, 
Feyerabend was enthusiastic about the value of the arts in defining and constituting 
meaningful human lives: ‘[t]he arts ... are not a domain separated from abstract thought, 
but complementary to it and needed to fully realise its potential’, such that one needs a 
mode of inquiry that ‘unites [the] power [of the arts] with that of science and religion’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: 267).93  
                                                           
93
 See further Feyerabend (1967). 
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Feyerabend made clear that the value of philosophy consists in its capacity to 
nourish and inform our conception of ‘the good life’. Recalling his lectures on Aristotle, 
Plato, Mill, Wittgenstein, and Kierkegaard, Feyerabend remarked that,  
 
‘I don’t study and discuss these authors to embellish a subject, or to 
construct a system, or to cultivate ideas … but to provide myself and my 
listeners with a survey of the possibilities of human existence.’ (Feyerabend, 
1991b: 495) 
 
Of course, not only science and philosophy, but also the arts, religions, and the entire 
history of human cultures should contribute to this goal. Feyerabend was especially 
keen to include non-Western traditions because they of course included ‘possibilities of 
human existence’ radically alternative to those of Western culture. Dupré concurs, 
offering the similar claim that: 
 
‘[C]ultural diversity should be valued and protected just as increasingly 
many people are insisting we should value biological diversity, and for 
essentially similar reasons. Just as biological diversity provides an 
enormous library of chemical and behavioural possibility, so does cultural 
diversity provide a library of the possibilities for human behaviour and 
belief.’ (Dupré, 2003: 110) 
 
Non-scientific cultures ‘express ideals of life and possibilities of human existence’, but 
were ‘ridiculed and replaced as a matter of course’ by European and, later, Western 
religious, political, and scientific groups and agencies with competing conceptions of 
the ‘good life’ (Feyerabend, 1993, 264).94 In another polemical passage, Feyerabend 
complains that: 
 
‘The ‘progress of knowledge and civilization’—as the process of pushing 
Western ways and values into all corners of the globe is called—destroyed 
these wonderful products of human ingenuity and compassion without a 
single glance in their direction.’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 3) 
 
There is exaggeration here. Many early modern Europeans did express genuine 
admiration for the lives, values, and beliefs of global indigenous cultures and happily 
imported them into their home cultures, and such enthusiasm continues today.95 
                                                           
94
 Charles Taylor (1991: Chs9-10) argues that the predominance of scientific 
conceptions of ‘the good life’ have generated the social, political, and existential 
problems which, he and others allege, beset Western modernity. 
95
 This is characteristic of the Romantics, eighteenth-century ‘Orientalism’, and 
European enthusiasm for the archaeological and cultural heritage of their colonial 
territories. Johann Gottfried Herder is arguably the first figure in the European tradition 
to make this point explicit; see Denby (2005). 
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However, the muted point that Western modernity has, across its history, generally 
tended to displace alternative conceptions of ‘the good life’ has been largely 
substantiated, especially by ‘post-colonial studies’ scholars, such as Frantz Fanon 
(1968), or the testimonial literature on and by oppressed indigenous peoples gathered 
by groups such as Survival International. Global cultural diversity provides us with a 
vastly greater range of epistemic and existential resources than Western modernity by 
itself can offer, and there is no good reason not to explore them.  
Feyerabend seems to have two points in mind here. First, global cultural diversity 
may offer ‘possibilities for human existence’ that could then be seriously considered 
and perhaps chosen by the members of Western modernity. Not all indigenous cultures’ 
ways of life will be intelligible or attractive to us, but there is no reason that they should 
be. Some may strike us as abhorrent, such as those which persist in sexist social 
structures, or rigid theocratic structures.96 Others may neither invite nor sustain our 
interest or simply provide opportunities for ‘cultural tourism’ and nothing more. And of 
course, many ‘Westerners’ do choose to embrace the ‘ways of life’ of non-Western 
peoples, whether in part or in whole. Second, one may consult global cultural diversity 
as a means of gaining wider perspective upon Western modernity. That is, many 
Westerners may explore and delight in the diversity of languages, values, beliefs, 
practices, and ‘forms of life’ evident throughout world cultures and take from it, not an 
enhanced sense of their ‘possibilities for existence’, but simply of the richness and 
contingency of their own ways of life. Feyerabend, after all, praises choice, and so 
would want us only to make an informed choice regarding our own way of life. As 
Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend nicely puts it, Feyerabend’s point is that, ‘[w]e can choose 
to live in a world that makes sense to us’ (Borrini-Feyerabend, 2001: xi). 
 
6.4 Cultural diversity and modernity. 
Feyerabend maintains that human beings ‘flourish’ best by appeal to conceptions of ‘the 
good life’. Following Mill and Kekes, a broad cultural pluralism is therefore 
preconditional to ‘ethics’ in the ‘rich’ sense outlined earlier. The fullest diversity of 
conceptions of ‘the good life’ can only be achieved if the possibilities offered include 
radical alternatives to one another, rather than being mere variants on some narrow set. 
Feyerabend also maintains that a primary role of philosophy, science, and the state to 
sustain and facilitate a diversity of conceptions of ‘the good life’—this is the core of his 
claim to be practising ‘ethics’. However, allied to these positive claims, there is also a 
                                                           
96
 An obvious worry which arises here is that Feyerabend’s pluralistic conception of 
‘the good life’ will commit him to embracing social systems which include, for 
instance, oppressive social, political or religious systems. Feyerabend’s views on 
intercultural criticism vacillated in line with his changing conceptions of, and 
sympathies towards ‘cultural relativism’. In his very late writings, he does in fact agree 
that intercultural criticism is quite legitimate and that intervention can be justified after 
sustained contact with a representative sample of the culture in question. See 
Feyerabend (2001: 34fn25). 
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negative, critical dimension, and one which concerns the role of the sciences within the 
modern world. Feyerabend maintained that certain powerful intellectual and cultural 
features of Western modernity are hostile to cultural diversity. My aim in this section is 
to examine and assess this claim in the light of Feyerabend’s later philosophy. 
An interesting historical story could be told about science, modernity, and cultural 
diversity and our success in understanding our contemporary situation may well rest 
upon the availability of such histories. Recent historians of science, culture, 
colonialism, and race are providing materials which will doubtless feature in such 
future histories (see Keal 2003). ‘Until recently’, write two historians of colonial 
science, ‘the connections between early modern European science and Europe’s 
increasing engagement with the rest of the world have been overlooked by historians’ 
(Delbourgo and Dew, 2008: 7). These connections are now becoming clearer and are 
providing fertile ground for historians of science, economics, culture, and travel. 
Although summarising this large and growing literature is beyond the scope of this 
chapter, an emerging theme evident throughout much of it is the fact that the sciences 
were ‘fostering new confidence in the universal validity’ of European scientific 
knowledge (Delbourgo and Dew, 2008: 7). Two of the luminaries of Enlightenment 
science, Linnaeus and Newton, between them made ambitious claims to provide truly 
universal systematic explanations of the physical and biological worlds. Such scientific 
ambitions were coupled with European political and economic interests to generate a 
‘planetary consciousness’ (Pratt 2008: 15-37ff) which encouraged a general perception 
that the ostensibly ‘local’ European sciences in fact enjoyed trans-cultural epistemic 
authority. Margaret C. Jacob concludes that ‘[t]he resulting knowledge, wealth, and 
political power laid the foundation for an unprecedented geopolitical hegemony’ 
(Jacob, 2008: 333).97 The historical story here is interesting, but my interest is with 
contemporary phenomena which indicate that cultural diversity is under threat. 
Evidence is not hard to come by; there is extensive documentation of the ongoing 
disappearance of indigenous cultures—including phenomena such as ‘language death’, 
urbanisation, the displacement of tribal populations, and so on (see Blaser, Harvey, and 
McRae 2004; Crystal 2002; Gray 2002).98  
There are a vast range of reasons for these phenomena, across the spectrum of 
political, economic, social, and religious concerns, plus others, most cases involving the 
interaction of any number of these. Feyerabend, however, argues that the sciences have 
supplied specific epistemic reasons for hostility towards cultural diversity. The sciences 
are widely thought to provide descriptions of reality which are independent of cultural, 
linguistic, religious, or historical particularities; and since these are also judged to be 
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 Jacob (2008, 333) is, however, surely wrong to talk about ‘the massive imbalance of 
power that once existed between the West and the rest’ in the past tense. If anything, 
such imbalances have grown over time. 
98
 See also the United Nation’s Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
Of course, one could argue that such global declarations and the international political 
institutions associated with them are themselves impositions of Western value systems 
upon non-Western cultures.  
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uniquely veracious, any contradictory accounts must be corrected—this was the idea 
informing Mehta’s account of British ‘superintendence’ in colonial India. As 
Feyerabend puts it: 
 
‘The assumption that there exist universally valid and binding standards of 
knowledge and action is a special case of a belief whose influence extends 
far beyond the domain of intellectual debate. This belief may be formulated 
by saying that there exists a right way of living and that the world must be 
made to accept it.’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 10-11) 
 
This is not just the claim that scientific practices enjoy superior practical and cognitive 
efficacy, but, at a deeper level, that they alone describe how the world is and so can—
and perhaps must—act as arbiters for our beliefs and practices. Since reality is thus 
construed in the terms of epistemic monism, only one way of conceiving of and living 
within the world are legitimated. Alternative conceptions of ‘the good life’, for 
instance, are ruled out in advance because they require ontological commitments which 
are incompatible with a naturalised ontology—typical examples include gods, ancestor 
spirits, magical forces, or supernatural processes like transmigration of the soul or 
providence. These are all ontological commitments central to the religious and ethical 
thought and practice of the majority of the world’s peoples, past and present, and yet 
they are certainly incompatible with even the most liberal thesis of naturalism. 
Feyerabend rejects ontological naturalism on ethical grounds. The entities and 
processes disclosed by scientific inquiries reflect, as Dupré notes, a rather narrow set of 
cognitive and practical values; they certainly neglect the moral, aesthetic, teleological 
and other values which constitute a meaningful human life. Feyerabend argues that: 
 
‘The entities unearthed by science ... are important only if the resulting 
world is pleasant to live in, and if the gains of manipulation more than 
compensate for the losses entailed by the removal of the non-scientific 
layers. The objection that the entities and laws that connect them are “real” 
and that we must adapt to them, no matter how dismal the consequences, 
has no weight.’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 12) 
 
This passage clearly states Feyerabend’s ethical criterion for the assessment of 
scientific conceptions of reality.  It is non-epistemic moral, social, and political values 
which are made primary, not epistemic criteria, because the ‘consequences’ referred to 
are the implications for human wellbeing. At the least, Feyerabend urges us to take 
seriously what he calls the ‘existential’ consequences of the adoption of a scientific 
conception of reality. Of course, this is not a common view in the philosophy of 
science. The priority of epistemic values in assessing ontological commitments is 
described by Yvonne Raley (2005) in her account of ontological naturalism: 
 
‘We should take protons and electrons to be real if physics tells us they’re 
real, and we should take numbers and sets as real if mathematical practice 
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says so. Witches, elves, and phlogiston, on the other hand, are not to be 
taken as real; and this is simply because they do not play a role in science.’ 
(Raley, 2005: 284) 
 
There are many problems with ontological naturalism so described. An obvious 
objection, often raised by Feyerabend, is that the sciences, disunified and pluralistic as 
they are, do not offer us anything like a coherent or unified ontology (see Galison and 
Stump 1996). Another is that the ontological commitments of the sciences fluctuate 
over time, as the theoretical and empirical evidence for particular entities changes over 
time, sometimes dramatically (see Daston 2000a and 2000b). The ontological 
commitments of the sciences therefore vary across history, disciplines, and theories, and 
so to take our ontological cues from those entities which ‘play a role in science’ is a 
very shaky strategy. Feyerabend, however, presses a values-based objection: the main 
values upon which scientific knowledge and practices should be assessed are their 
capacity to contribute to ‘the good life’, to human wellbeing in the broadest sense—that 
is, ‘humanitarian’ values. The ‘value-free ideal’ of science is therefore illusory, insofar 
as the sciences are, in fact, informed by cognitive and practical values and, in most 
cases, further sets of moral and other values. Dupré argues that certain areas of the 
science, such as physics, may be largely free from non-epistemic values, but insists that 
many other areas of the sciences will not and, perhaps, cannot be. If ethics is primary, 
as Feyerabend argued it must be, then the sciences must have non-epistemic values built 
into them: otherwise the sciences will fail to provide a meaningful and intelligible 
world, in the way that the majority of ‘non-scientific’ indigenous belief-systems do. 
Critics may dismiss the claim about the primacy of ethical criteria. Such objections 
may take the form of an insistence that scientific knowledge and practices simply 
provide the means for pursuing ends, rather than specifying ends in themselves. 
However, this argument surely serves the opposite end; rather than dismissing the 
primacy of the ethical, it sustains it, for the following reason. The very fact that the 
sciences are pursued within Western modernity and are afforded a considerable degree 
of prestige and authority means that they must hold some value for us. That is, the 
sciences are judged to be valuable, and this judgement must, in itself, invoke certain 
values—certain ideas about what matters, and why. Of course, the critic could reply that 
the sciences are directed towards broadly epistemic aims, such as ‘Truth’, rather than 
towards non-epistemic aims—moral, aesthetic, or whatever—which one may refer to as 
the ‘Good’. The sciences could therefore be oriented towards Truth rather than the 
Good in a way that could secure the independence of science from ethics.  
Persuasive as this argument may seem, it surely fails. Even if the distinction between 
Truth and the Good as broad aims of science can be sustained, the value of the former is 
surely dependent upon one’s conception of the latter. That is, if the value of the 
sciences is judged to lie in their capacity to secure Truth, even if only in principle, then 
this must, in turn, imply that Truth itself is held to be valuable or important in some 
wider sense—and this wider sense is defined by one’s conception of the Good. As 
David E. Cooper puts it, even if the aim of the sciences is construed as their capacity to 
generate ‘propositional knowledge’ or to fulfil ‘some practical purpose’, then these 
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must be ‘already invested with an orientation towards the Good’ (Cooper, 2009: 13).99 
Simply put, the claim that the sciences simply fulfil our epistemic interests requires that 
one has already invested such epistemic values—like ‘truth’ or ‘knowledge’—with 
value, and that value cannot, in itself, be conferred by the epistemic values themselves. 
Rather, the value afforded to truth and knowledge is secured once those values are 
located within a wider, deeper conception of the Good, of ‘the good life’, one in which 
epistemic values—like scientific knowledge and understanding—are considered 
significant or salient.  
It is worth recapping the pertinence of the foregoing remarks to Feyerabend. 
Feyerabend asked the question, ‘What’s so great about science?’ Initially, this question 
was interpreted as a concern with the epistemological status of the sciences, especially 
regarding their efficacy vis-a-vis other, ‘non-scientific’ epistemic activities. Although 
this interpretation captures much of Feyerabend’s meaning, it neglects the important 
‘humanitarian’ aspect of his concerns about science: namely, do the sciences fulfil our 
‘ethical’ needs, satisfying the host of ‘non-epistemic’ values which define our 
conception of a meaningful life? Feyerabend worried that the ‘scientific ethos [is] 
simply too thin a foundation for a life worth living’, and stated his desire to ‘protect 
people from being corrupted by a narrow ideology that ... was incapable of sustaining a 
harmonious life’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 131, 133).  
The ‘ideology’ in question is the scientistic claim that science is ‘omnicompetent’ 
insofar as it can fulfil all human values and needs. It is one thing to claim that scientific 
knowledge and practices enjoy striking cognitive and practical efficacy, and quite 
another to claim that it should be the sole authority informing and structuring human 
life. A host of writers, including Kekes, Midgley, and Dupré, all express their concerns 
about such grossly exaggerated conceptions of the explanatory powers of the 
sciences—or, better, of ‘the monster, Science’ which Feyerabend directed much of his 
later work towards slaying. Feyerabend therefore calls for a thoroughgoing epistemic 
and cultural pluralism. The flourishing of human beings is best served through recourse 
to a wide range of beliefs, practices, traditions, and ‘forms of life’, only some of which 
will be recognisably ‘scientific’ or ‘Western’. There is also an important role for 
disciplinary pluralism, since the arts and humanities and social and natural sciences all 
have a role to play in nourishing and sustaining the vigorous pluralism that Feyerabend 
has in mind.100  
Unifying these diverse resources is, of course, a guiding ethical concern: namely, the 
project of identifying and facilitating the conditions under which human beings can best 
identify and pursue ‘the good life’, however that might be conceived. The major 
obstacle to this ambition is, however, the enormous cognitive and cultural authority of 
the Western sciences. Feyerabend and the other writers cited, plus others, of course, all 
concur that there are powerful intellectual and cultural trends within Western modernity 
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 See Kidd (forthcoming d) for a discussion of Cooper’s claim here as it might apply to 
Feyerabend. 
100
 See further Dupré (2002) and Midgley (2004) for similar calls for a vigorous 
epistemic pluralism, especially regarding our understanding of human beings. 
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which militate against epistemic and cultural pluralism. Epistemic monism strives to 
find ‘the’ single, efficacious set of epistemic practices and activities, which are usually 
expected to be coherent with the current sciences. Cultural monism similarly tries to 
identify a singular conception of ‘the good life’—for instance, a secular way of life 
invested in a naturalistic outlook. In any case, whatever this monistic form of life may 
consist of it will owe its hegemony not to a progressive critical rejection of alternatives, 
but to the unwarranted exclusion of other possibilities. As Charles Taylor argues in his 
magisterial study, A Secular Age (2007), we are too often blind to: 
 
‘[T]he possibility that Western modernity might be powered by its own 
positive visions of the good, that is, by one constellation of such visions 
among available others, rather than by the only viable set left after the old 
myths and legends have been exploded ... [The sciences] “naturalise” the 
features of the modern, liberal identity. They cannot see it as one, 
historically constructed understanding of human agency among others.’ 
(Taylor, 2007: 571) 
 
Feyerabend is resistant to the exclusion of other available ‘visions of the good’ and 
urges us to capture them, for instance, by a sympathetic engagement with historically 
and culturally distant ‘forms of life’. The aim of such surveys is not to establish or 
identity any one ‘definitive’ conception of ‘the good life’—Feyerabend has no interest 
in becoming an authority in this sense—but, rather, in affirming to us the fact that 
alternative ways of conceiving of and living within the world is possible. At the least, 
one ought to become aware that the recent history of Western modernity, from 
colonialism to contemporary ‘globalisation’, reflects a common phenomenon: 
 
‘What is being imposed, exported, and again imposed is a collection of 
uniform views and practices which have the intellectual and political 
support of powerful groups and institutions. By now Western forms of life 
are found in the most remote corners of the world and have changed the 
habits of people who only a few decades ago were unaware of their 
existence.’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 3) 
 
Now, this claim is not, in itself, distinctive. Similar complaints about the expansionist 
policies of European and, later, Western cultures have been made by many writers, 
philosophers, indigenous rights groups, and others from at least the fifteenth century 
onwards. Indeed, many ‘postcolonial’ scholars object that talk of ‘post-coloniality’ is 
mistaken, for at least two reasons. First, recognisably colonial or ‘neo-colonial’ policies 
and practices are still in place throughout many parts of the world, such that the 
suggestion that we have left them behind is misleading. Second, even during the earliest 
stages of colonialism, there was criticism of and resistance to them such that 
postcolonialism was born, as it were, with colonialism. ‘Modernity’, writes Sandra 
Harding, ‘has been contested and “in crisis” in the West from the moment it emerged’ 
(Harding, 2008: 176), a sentiment echoed in the title of Bruno Latour’s We Have Never 
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Been Modern (Latour 1993).101 Feyerabend concurred: his emphases upon the false 
claims about the unique and superlative practical and cognitive efficacy of the Western 
sciences, and their alleged beneficence to global cultures are explicit challenges to a key 
claim of modernity—namely, that the sciences are a privileged epistemic and 
humanitarian resource.  
What is distinctive about Feyerabend’s contribution is that he provides a 
philosophical account that exposes the complicity of the Western sciences in this 
process. The sciences lend intellectual legitimacy to colonialist and neo-colonialist 
projects because they implicitly or explicitly assert the inferiority of ‘non-scientific’ 
indigenous beliefs and practices. Of course, such assertions reply upon historically and 
philosophically suspect credentials, such as the existence of a distinctive ‘scientific 
method’. Feyerabend challenged these false credentials, and traced their practical and 
political implications, especially their impact upon indigenous cultures. In so doing, he 
anticipated the later discipline of ‘postcolonial science and technology studies’, a field 
which, to date, has offered him little credit.  
Mainstream philosophy of science has also been slow to warm to Feyerabend’s 
political concerns with the impact of scientific knowledge and practices upon 
indigenous cultures. This is despite the fact that at the core of these political concerns 
are familiar issues in the epistemology of science (see Harding 2006: Chs7-9).102 
Fortunately, aside from the growing school of postcolonial philosophies of science, 
more mainstream philosophers of science have begun to discuss these concerns. Dupré, 
for instance, concurs with Feyerabend’s judgements about the role of inflated 
conceptions of the efficacy of the sciences in eroding global cultural diversity: 
 
Though most people find the self-evident superiority assumed by the 
Victorian Englishman somewhat ludicrous nowadays, the superiority of 
Western culture is by no means a view that has disappeared. The most 
conspicuous contemporary variant emphasises the superiority of science to 
the systems of belief in all non-Western cultures, and might reasonably be 
referred to as ‘Imperialist Science’. (Dupré, 2003: 112) 
 
6.5 Conclusions. 
Feyerabend’s remarks on cultural diversity reflect his commitment to the priority of 
ethics. He offers many arguments for the value of cultural and epistemic diversity and 
these are unified by a commitment to the pluralistic nature of the good life, and the 
corresponding insistence upon the need for a diversity of ‘forms of life’ to 
accommodate such ethical pluralism. This cultural diversity in turn requires epistemic 
pluralism, since the values, practices, and institutions of many cultures reflect modes of 
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 See further Harding (2008: Ch7). 
102
 As one writer notes, what makes Feyerabend ‘relatively unique and provocative is 
the way he employs his conceptual insights from the history and philosophy of science 
to defend a view of human freedom and self-determination’ (Tibbetts, 1976: 362). 
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inquiry and forms of knowledge very different to those of Western modernity and the 
sciences. Cultural and epistemic diversity are therefore interlinked—and this is why 
Feyerabend identified the cognitive and cultural authority of the Western sciences as a 
threat to cultural diversity. Commitment to the broad naturalistic framework of Western 
modernity will automatically undermine the epistemic practices upon which many 
cultures and communities rely—and, in the next chapter, I document the various 
policies and practices by which this epistemological claim is practically and politically 
manifested. Feyerabend can therefore legitimately claim to have an ‘ethical’ core to his 
later philosophy because his guiding concern is to identify and sustain the conditions 
under which human wellbeing is best served. 
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Chapter Seven 
Ch7 Feyerabend’s Political Philosophy of Science 
 
7.1 Feyerabend’s early political philosophy. 
7.2 Science, choice, and hegemony. 
7.3 Golems and ‘the monster “science”’. 
7.4 Feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science. 
7.5 Conclusions. 
 
There are two senses in which Feyerabend could be described as having a ‘political 
philosophy of science’. The first is the idea that he developed a political philosophy 
intended to provide some tenable system for the social control of science within 
democratic societies. This is the most common interpretation of Feyerabend’s various 
remarks upon the relationship between science, politics, and liberty and it is generally 
agreed to be unsuccessful (see Preston, 1996: 200-209 passim; also Koertge 1980; 
Yates 1984; Siegal 1989). The second is the suggestion that Feyerabend’s philosophy of 
science was motivated, at least in part, by overtly political concerns about the authority 
of the sciences in the modern world. On this reading, Feyerabend was not trying to 
engage with political and policymaking issues regarding the sciences per se, but only to 
emphasise the presence and salience of such issues to the philosophy of science. In case 
the distinction between these two senses is unclear, it could be stated in the following 
way: the first sense identifies Feyerabend as trying (and failing) to produce a 
substantive political philosophy whereas the second sees him as trying to produce a 
philosophy of science which is sensitive to political issues and concerns. The scholarly 
consensus is that Feyerabend’s ventures into political philosophy, such as his 
‘democratic relativism’, are unsuccessful and best left ignored (which is presumably 
why so few philosophers, of science or of politics, talk about them). However that 
charge only applies if one understands Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science in 
the first sense—and that is, I will argue, mistaken, since he is best understood in the 
second sense as someone trying to introduce political concerns into the agenda of 
philosophy of science. My aim in this chapter, then, is to argue that Feyerabend’s aim 
was to provide a philosophy of science which was sensitive to political issues. This is 
an important component of the later philosophy because such political concerns relate 
to Feyerabend’s emphasis on protecting global cultural and epistemic diversity. 
 
7.1 Feyerabend’s early political philosophy. 
My aim in this section is to outline Feyerabend’s political philosophy, such as it is, and 
assess the judgement that it is unsuccessful. I present Feyerabend’s account of the ‘free 
society’ and then offer four criticisms of it. Feyerabend began to venture into political 
philosophy in the mid-1970s. There was always an implicit political dimension to his 
work from an early point; this is evident in the regular appeals to John Stuart Mill’s 
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political liberalism and the more general affirmation of the value of political freedom 
and self-determination. Such sentiments do not in themselves justify talk of a political 
philosophy in any developed sense, nor did Feyerabend at this stage make any concrete 
political proposals.  
This began to change with the publication of Against Method and Science in a Free 
Society.103 Science in a Free Society issues the notorious call for a separation of science 
and the state, mirroring the separation of church and state in the United States. 
Feyerabend here ‘pays increasing attention to the problem of the proper role of 
scientific experts in a democratic society’ (Koertge, 1980: 385) and this included an 
earnest effort to ensure individual freedom of choice in a society with certain 
predominant values and institutions. Feyerabend perceived the cognitive and cultural 
hegemony of the sciences as a threat to our political freedom, a point indicated in the 
title of his paper, ‘How to Defend Society against Science’ (Feyerabend, 1975c).104 Into 
his later period, Feyerabend preserved his interest in political control of the sciences 
and continued to explore the claim that the hegemony of the sciences posed a threat to 
human freedom.  
Unfortunately, scholars concur that Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science is 
generally unsuccessful and that there is, as Oberheim puts it, ‘a general consensus that 
Feyerabend’s contributions to political philosophy were of far less worth than his 
contributions to epistemology and the philosophy of science’ (Oberheim, 2006: 22). 
Certainly it needs more careful articulation, and of course it has suffered both for its 
perceived lack of argumentative rigour and its association with cultural relativism and 
various ‘New Age’ movements. C. Fred Alford notes that Feyerabend’s solution to the 
problem of the public control of science—namely, ‘citizens committees’—‘hardly 
seems consonant with its magnitude’, even if there is ‘a certain virtue in [its] naiveté’ 
(Alford, 1985: 206). And perhaps there is something to Joseph Agassi’s (1995: 160) 
double-edged remark that ‘Feyerabend is an ally of democracy who is more of a 
liability than an asset to its cause’.  
Feyerabend was a liberal and championed freedom, autonomy, and choice. A central 
feature of his early political philosophy was the idea of a ‘free society’ (see Feyerabend, 
1978a: 73-107 passim). This was presented as a society in which individuals are free to 
choose and control the values and institutions which structure and organise their lives. 
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 The former, of course, has the pregnant subtitle ‘an anarchistic theory of knowledge’ 
and its opening pages include long quotations from Lenin and Marx. Interestingly, Rom 
Harré (1977, 294) described Against Method as ‘an attack on “Puritanism” in thought, 
word, and deed in favour of an ostensibly libertarian ideology’. 
104
 It is interesting to compare Feyerabend’s title with that of Michel Foucault’s 1975-
1976 Collège de France lectures, ‘Society Must Be Defended’ (Foucault 2003). 
Hattiangadi (2000) argues that the ebb in the authority of the sciences after the Second 
World War was partly due to Popper (1962), Feyerabend (1978a), and Foucault’s 
(1966) ‘anti-intellectualist critiques’ and their ‘rediscovery of the close connection 
between epistemology and political theory’ (Hattiangadi, 2000: 126f).  
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Feyerabend’s account of an open society is clearly influenced by Popper’s own (Popper 
1945).105 A free society should therefore be structured to facilitate and maximise our 
capacity to choose between a wide range of options—in education, say, or medical care. 
There is a parallel here with Feyerabend’s account of methodological and theoretical 
pluralism in the sciences: the guiding principle is that human beings should have 
recourse to a plurality of options when engaged in diverse (scientific, political) 
activities. Indeed, this pluralism is the dominant theme throughout Feyerabend’s 
work—and, as Oberheim (2006) argues, constitutes ‘Feyerabend’s philosophy’. Alford 
was therefore only half-right when he remarked that ‘Feyerabend's political theory is 
presented largely as a series of asides to his epistemological argument’ (Alford, 1985: 
209fn13). It is truer to say that both Feyerabend’s political theory and his epistemology 
of science reflect a deeper commitment to pluralism.  
Feyerabend initially argued that a free society would be one in which no one 
tradition or ‘ideology’ enjoyed a privileged place. Such hegemony would jeopardise the 
authority and integrity of other traditions and thus hamper our capacity for free choice. 
Science in a Free Society includes the proposal that ‘a free society is a society in which 
all traditions have equal rights and equal access to the centres of power’ (Feyerabend, 
1978a: 106). This would entail all traditions being granted equal rights to financial and 
bureaucratic resources, social prestige, and state educational services. The free society 
should subsidise the whole range of traditions which its citizens demonstrate an interest 
in, such as forms of alternative medicine, or the teaching of religious doctrines in 
schools. Underlying Feyerabend’s account of a free society is the idea that the 
predominance of any one tradition necessarily constitutes hegemony—and the 
corresponding idea that ‘liberation’ necessarily entails the presence of a plurality of 
well-developed, competing alternatives. The parallel with Feyerabend’s arguments for 
pluralism in the sciences should be obvious here.  
Feyerabend clearly thought that modern Western societies were not free societies 
because the sciences enjoyed a hegemonic cognitive and cultural authority which grants 
them special access to state resources and institutions, across education, environmental 
management, and healthcare (see Feyerabend, 1978a: 76-91). Feyerabend’s political 
philosophy can be seen as an attempt to expose and counteract what he sees as the anti-
democratic influence of what he liked to call ‘the monster, Science’ within modern 
Western cultures—and, by extension, upon the non-Western cultures affected by the 
sciences through international development programmes.106 
Clearly there is much wrong with Feyerabend’s political philosophy as outlined 
above. An obvious problem is the ideal of the ‘free society’ that he outlines, within 
which autonomous citizens seem to float free of the practices and institutions of their 
society. There are two problems with this. The first is that Feyerabend never provides a 
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 There is a surprising lack of literature on the relationship between Popper and 
Feyerabend’s political philosophies; studies on this topic would be a fruitful future area 
of research. 
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 Feyerabend (2001) uses the term ‘monster’ to refer to science (53, 243, 264) and 
Xenophanes’s one God (54). 
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persuasive argument for his presumption that an individual’s capacity for unprejudiced 
reflection and choice is necessarily compromised by their belonging to a particular 
culture. There are good empirical reasons to doubt this presumption; for instance, the 
very fact of political dissent and diversity indicates that people are not indoctrinated by 
the political or cultural systems to which they belong. The second is that individuals 
must appeal to certain values and processes in order to enable them to articulate, 
critically reflect upon, and make decisions regarding the social and political form of 
their society. In the case of developed world societies, these enabling values and 
processes could include a commitment to democratic process, personal autonomy, and 
the value of education and ‘political literacy’. Feyerabend’s presumption that 
individuals must be isolated from any tradition is therefore false: firstly, such isolation 
is not possible—unless one were to remove oneself to a state of radical solitude—and, 
secondly, many traditions do in fact encourage and enable the sort of critical political 
awareness that Feyerabend wants to safeguard. Indeed, the ‘free society’ that 
Feyerabend envisions owes a lot to the Western liberal political tradition, most 
obviously to John Stuart Mill. 
These foregoing remarks are general political points and Feyerabend runs into 
further difficulties when he suggests that the alleged hegemony of the sciences poses a 
more substantive threat to our political freedom. Feyerabend thinks that one must 
‘defend society against science’ because the sciences have, he alleges, come to assume 
a degree of cultural and cognitive authority which is incompatible with the democratic 
principles of Western cultures. 107 The premier authority of the sciences ensures that 
‘equal rights of access to positions [are] defined by a special tradition—the tradition of 
Western Science and Rationalism’ (Feyerabend 1978a: 9). As Theodore Brown (2009: 
23) recently put it, the sciences enjoy both ‘epistemic’ and ‘moral’ authority insofar as 
within Western societies they have an unrivalled capacity ‘to convince others of how 
the world is’ and also ‘how the world should be’. Brown’s distinction between these 
two forms of authority helps us to understand Feyerabend’s political philosophy of 
science: Feyerabend thinks that the moral and epistemic authority of the sciences is 
intimately entwined; however, he also maintains that too often people fail to appreciate 
that science has moral authority—and, if they do, that they are uncritical of it, because 
they are, by and large, persuaded of the epistemic authority of the sciences. 
Feyerabend’s political challenges to the authority of the sciences are, therefore, 
attempts to explore the implications of his rejection of the various false ideas of science, 
such as the ‘myth of method’. This much is plausible, but Feyerabend errs by 
presuming that free societies—in this case, Western societies—can and should be 
liberated from the sciences.  
There are four main arguments against Feyerabend’s claim that Western societies 
will become ‘free societies’ once they are ‘liberated’ from the hegemony of the 
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 This is a complex claim and Feyerabend does not do enough to develop it, although 
later writers such as Kitcher (2001), Douglas (2009), and Brown (2009) have done 
excellent work addressing the mass of political and policymaking issues Feyerabend 
raises. 
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sciences. The first is that the sciences are nowhere near as controlling as Feyerabend 
suggests: the ‘monster, Science’ which he suggests is running rampant throughout 
Western cultures is a chimera, albeit one with great rhetorical and polemical power. 
Although it is true that the sciences have considerable influence upon many aspects of 
our culture—ranging from healthcare to agriculture to cosmology—it is hardly the case 
that they exert the sort of ‘antidemocratic’ authority Feyerabend suggests. The second is 
that the sciences are subject to enormous moral, regulatory, and political control, 
whether they are state-sponsored, or commercial and independent. Scientific knowledge 
and practices are monitored and controlled by a whole variety of regulative 
mechanisms, ranging from government select committees, ethics panels, international 
legislation, and licensing by professional organisations. Imperfect as these may be, they 
do provide multiple levels of control over the sciences and they reflect a variety of 
moral, social, and political concerns and interests.  
The third is that the sciences are a definitive and valued feature of Western cultures. 
The enormous presence and prestige of the sciences within modern Western societies is, 
as David E. Cooper (2002: 186) points out, ‘not an accident’ for the good reason that 
the sciences ‘extend and lend sophistication’ to prevailing beliefs about what the world 
is like and because they ‘visibly engage with central ‘projects’ of modernity, such as the 
amelioration of life through technological intervention’. The entrenchment of the 
sciences within our societies is a reflection of their capacity to respond to our practical 
and cognitive needs in ways consonant with our guiding values and concerns. As C. 
Fred Alford remarks, ‘were one to count all institutions in society which benefit from 
what Feyerabend regards as the unjustified prestige of science, the list would be 
virtually coextensive with the institutions of modern industrial society itself’ (Alford, 
1985: 206). The reason, of course, is that the scientific knowledge and products provide 
the material and cognitive resources which are essential to the projects of modern 
Western cultures. Feyerabend is therefore wrong to suppose that the special status of the 
sciences is a sign of totalitarian conspiracy or take-over; rather, the sciences are central 
features of our societies because we have chosen to pursue them and elected to make 
them central to our practices and policies.  
The fourth, and final, objection is that the dislocation of the sciences from their 
privileged place within Western cultures would arguably not contribute to our freedom, 
but would, rather, incapacitate us. For instance, Feyerabend argued in the early 1980s 
that a citizen of a free society ‘will use the standards of the tradition to which (s)he 
belongs’ (Feyerabend, 1981b: 27). However, in the case of Western societies the 
‘tradition’ in question would of course be heavily influenced by the sciences. 
Feyerabend’s project of freeing society from science of course rests upon the idea that 
the sciences are separable from the wider structures and values of Western cultures. 
However, to suggest that our decisions—about educational curricula, say—should be 
uninfluenced by the dominant scientific theories of the day is, if not impossible, then 
surely bizarre. Since the sciences are, by common consent, our most successful and 
efficacious cognitive and practical resources it would require very good reasons indeed 
for us not to consult them and, indeed, not to make them central in questions of politics 
and policy. Feyerabend seems to suggest that political deliberation and decision-making 
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in Western societies can be successfully decoupled from scientific knowledge; 
however, if this were to happen, then Feyerabend owes us an account of which 
epistemic authorities we should turn to in order to make our decisions. Every society 
and culture needs certain authorities which can provide at least a loose framework 
within which reflections on and judgements about the natural world can proceed. The 
sciences fulfil this function in modern Western societies and to make plausible the 
suggestion that they should not would require a far more persuasive case than 
Feyerabend offers. 
It is worth dwelling on the fourth objection. The definition of a free society is one 
whose citizens are not rigidly committed to any one tradition or epistemic authority—
such as the sciences. However, if Feyerabend is to be consistent in his defence of a free 
society then he should apply the same principle to the global indigenous cultures which 
his later philosophy is, I argued, committed to the defence of. Applied in practice, this 
would mean that Feyerabend should be committed to challenging the privileged 
cognitive and cultural authority of the dominant traditions evident in global cultural 
diversity: yet one can hardly envision Feyerabend accepting the proposal that he must 
therefore challenge the political and social values, moral norms, religious beliefs and 
institutions, sacred texts, ancestral authorities, tribal councils and other traditions which 
structure and organise the lives of the overwhelming majority of the world’s people.  
A schism thus opens in Feyerabend’s political philosophy: he is very keen to 
displace our dominant epistemic authority—the sciences—in order to liberate us and 
make ours a free society, and yet he is utterly unwilling to apply the same, presumably 
beneficial programme to the world’s indigenous peoples. Indeed, Feyerabend makes it 
abundantly clear that he is utterly opposed to the ‘conceited assurance with which some 
intellectuals interfere with the lives of people’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 252).108 Preston 
notes that this asymmetry persists into Feyerabend’s political thinking as far as 
Conquest of Abundance:  
 
‘Why is it only the intellectuals, specialists, experts, whose views are 
wrong? … Don’t intellectuals comprise one of the more ‘successful’ (sub-) 
cultures ever known? Why is it that one can always disagree with the 
ontological views of a philosopher, or a scientist, but never with those of a 
layperson? Is Feyerabend’s attempt at populism merely the latest form of 
the trahison des clercs: agree with the laypeople just because they are 
laypeople, and we (parasites?) ought not to offend them?’ (Preston, 2000: 
621) 
 
Preston is right to accuse Feyerabend of nourishing an undue hostility towards 
intellectuals, academics, and ‘Western science’. 109The theme of anti-intellectualism 
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 This is an enduring theme throughout his works; see Feyerabend (1994a) and (1998). 
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 Preston also suggests that Feyerabend’s later philosophy ‘might profitably be seen as 
an expression of ‘reactionary romanticism’, the desire to return to (what he thinks of as) 
a prior stage of culture, a golden age in which people got on with their lives untroubled 
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and populism is certainly a consistent one throughout Feyerabend’s career and it grew 
more explicit over time. Feyerabend had a temperamental preference for dramatic 
juxtapositions of oppressed groups on one side (indigenous peoples, say, or ‘heroic 
scientists’) and oppressive, hegemonic authorities on the other (‘Western Science’, for 
instance). Such polarisations often led to unfair demonization and uncritical praise and 
defence and these of course fuelled the criticisms of Feyerabend’s ‘relativism’. 
Feyerabend’s political philosophy therefore runs into difficulties. However this does 
not mean that his political proposals are without merit. Preston (2000: 621) is correct 
that it is ‘not well thought out’, but this of course preserves the possibility that it can be 
articulated in a tenable form. The core political concern is that the privileged place of 
the sciences within Western cultures may be a threat to human freedom. This claim, as 
Feyerabend presents it, is not persuasive but it has been the topic of intense concern for 
contemporary political philosophers of science such as Kitcher (2001; 2008; 
forthcoming) and Theodore Brown (2009). There is, therefore, good reason to suppose 
that it can be articulated in a plausible form and, if this is the case, then Feyerabend’s 
political philosophy of science could be rehabilitated.  
In the next section, then, my aim is to see what can be recovered from his ventures 
into political philosophy. I take a more sympathetic look at Feyerabend’s political 
philosophy and suggest that a positive account can be given of it, one which honours his 
guiding concern with human freedom and the authority of the sciences, but which gives 
a more useful account of the relationship between the two. 
 
7.2 Science, choice, and hegemony. 
Feyerabend valued both science and human freedom. Much of his later philosophy can 
be understood as an oscillation between these two commitments which, as the last 
section demonstrated, Feyerabend thought were in conflict with one another. Too often, 
he seemed committed to the simplistic claim that modern Western cultures were faced 
with a tragic choice between either retaining their commitment to the sciences or 
exercising their freedom.110 It is striking that Feyerabend was blind to the obvious fact 
that many Westerners in fact did and do exercise their freedom by choosing to accept 
                                                                                                                                                                          
by intellectuals and their tendency to universalize concepts and forms of thought’ 
(Preston, 2000: 621-622). Exploring the Romantic themes in Feyerabend’s thought 
would make for an engaging future project—certainly he shares many themes in 
common with ‘Counter-Enlightenment’ thinkers like Hamann and Herder. A useful 
starting point for such a study would be Berlin (1999). 
110
 I mean ‘tragic’ here in the sense articulated by Isaiah Berlin. In his classic paper 
‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ (Berlin 1958), Berlin argued that ‘[i]f … the ends of men are 
many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then the 
possibility of conflict—and of tragedy—can never wholly be eliminated from human 
life, either personal or social’ (Berlin, 1958: 54). The idea of ‘tragedy’ here could 
perhaps be employed within contemporary debates over the tenability of scientific 
pluralism. 
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scientific knowledge and practices. Or perhaps better, Feyerabend was quite aware of 
the fact that science is not nearly as totalitarian as his presentation of the issues implied 
but continued to describe it as such because it suited his polemical tendencies (this is 
another instance of the ‘sincerity charge’ discussed in Chapter one). Many 
commentators and critics have noted that Feyerabend is not nearly as hostile to the 
sciences as many of his writings suggest and they invariably raise the question of why 
he chose to present it thus. Answering this question is, I suggest, the key to 
understanding Feyerabend’s ventures into political philosophy because it should 
dissolve the false tension that he thinks arises between our commitments to science and 
human freedom. 
Feyerabend emphasised the priority of humanitarian values, such as freedom and 
liberty. This point was emphasised in the letters to Kuhn and in the various papers 
which affirm the primacy of ethics: above all else, Feyerabend was committed to the 
principle that human beings should be free and able to exercise their freedom. This 
principle was often expressed as a loose cluster of values, such as ‘liberty’, ‘freedom’, 
and ‘autonomy’. The principle of liberty maintains that human beings should be free to 
live as they wish, but of course also entails an accompanying emphasis on the 
importance of one’s making sensible, informed decisions. Liberty has moral and 
rational conditions, a point that one can find, with variations, in the work of liberal 
thinkers including Locke, Mill, and Rawls (see Gaus 2010). An individual should 
engage in the processes of thought and reflection which ensure that their liberty is 
exercised sensibly and intelligently. Otherwise, people would otherwise be free to 
exercise their liberty in any manner of selfish, wanton, or arbitrary ways—‘anything 
goes’, indeed!  
Feyerabend is certainly committed to the principle of liberty but lacks an emphasis 
upon the corresponding need for individuals to make informed decisions. This is 
evident in his presumption that one can exercise freedom independently of appeal to 
any particular traditions, and in his hostility towards epistemic authorities, like science 
or academic philosophy. This indicates a curious tension in Feyerabend’s philosophy: 
although much of his philosophy is devoted to the claim that people should critically 
assess the traditions which shape one’s life, he is hostile to those traditions—like 
science and philosophy—which enable such critical activities. As Preston remarks, had 
Feyerabend suspended his temperamental (and perhaps insincere) hostility towards 
‘intellectuals’, ‘he might have seen that science and ‘rationalism’ may be coped with 
and exploited in ways other than eradicating them, or confining them to ghettos’ 
(Preston, 2000: 621-622).111  
Feyerabend affirms our liberty but fails to acknowledge that it comes with certain 
conditions (and in Chapter six, I argued that he failed to notice or acknowledge this 
point despite his enthusiasm for Mill). Within modern Western societies, many of these 
                                                           
111
 Feyerabend seems to be committed to so-called ‘liberal optimism’, the presumption 
that liberal persons will make decisions that are morally and rationally respectable 
without any need for external supervision or assessment. This is why Feyerabend is 
indeed ‘a naive democrat’ (Freese, 1980: 412). 
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responsibilities will be defined by our scientific and political commitments (see Kitcher 
2008). Feyerabend’s proposal that citizens should be free to choose the values and 
institutions upon which their lives are organised fails because it would deprive us of any 
basis upon which to make any such decisions. It is either ‘utterly trivial or false’ 
(Preston 1996: 207). Within contemporary Western cultures, many of these values and 
institutions will betray a secular bias and will doubtlessly afford cognitive authority to 
scientific knowledge and institutions. The obvious exceptions here are the ongoing 
disputes between science and religion which, as Thomas Dixon argues, ‘virtually 
always involve disagreements about the relative authority of different sources of 
knowledge’ (Dixon, 2008: 22).112 Either way, it is clear that political decisions require 
us to appeal to some values and institutions—religious, scientific, or otherwise—
because without these one cannot identify and assess options, nor assign to them 
degrees of preference and worth. 
A better proposal could be that citizens are encouraged to reflect critically upon the 
values and institutions that structure and organise their lives (including their political 
deliberations) and that adequate educational and legislative mechanisms are put in place 
to ensure this. Attractive as that proposal may be, it is hardly radical and is itself fraught 
with complex issues which Feyerabend neither raises nor addresses. What, then, can be 
saved from Feyerabend’s political philosophy? I suggest that the answer is this:  
Feyerabend is less interested in telling us what ‘the good life’ is, or what the value of 
science is, or how society should be structured, and more interested in the deliberations 
and decisions by which people answer these questions.  
Throughout his philosophy, Feyerabend does of course offer a whole host of answers 
to these questions, some of them good, many of them quite bad, and often he seems 
surprisingly reticent about them. This has lent his political discussions a frustrating 
character which has no doubt compounded the critical judgements made of them. 
However, these frustrations disappear when Feyerabend’s ventures into political 
philosophy are interpreted as Socratic exercises. Feyerabend is not interested in 
providing definitive answers to the questions that he raises but, rather, in the whole 
process of challenging both the answers often given and the means by which they were 
derived. This is consonant with a long and venerable conception of philosophy as a 
means of challenging received wisdom, dominant views, and the intellectual and 
political status quo. It also locates Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science within 
his broader commitment to progress through criticism (see Oberheim, 2006: 215-220).  
 Feyerabend is not primarily interested in the question of the value of the sciences in 
the modern world, nor in the problem of the political control of science. These 
questions and problems all have a value only insofar as they reflect features of modern 
life which have a profound capacity to affect human wellbeing. Feyerabend therefore 
engages with them because they resonate with his humanitarian values and with his 
commitment to the primacy of ethics. Feyerabend himself makes the Socratic functions 
of his political philosophy clear throughout his writings; indeed, this is arguably the 
function of his entire philosophy. Consider Against Method, which opens with an 
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emphasis upon ‘the need for a far more complex account of scientific knowledge than 
that which had emerged from positivism and similar philosophies’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 
x). Feyerabend emphasises the complexity of the sciences and affirms the need for 
histories, philosophies, and sociologies of science to document and articulate it. There 
is no hostility to these disciplines here, and in fact they are essential in contributing to a 
long-term concern of Feyerabend’s, namely, challenging those groups and institutions 
who use ‘a frozen image of science to terrorise people unfamiliar with its practice’ 
(Feyerabend, 1993: 3). It is this false image—which Feyerabend calls the ‘monster 
“science”’—rather than the sciences per se, which ‘contains a totalitarian element’ and 
it includes the claims that science is a ‘universally accepted [and] single uniform entity’ 
whose successes are attributable to its special methodological and rational credentials 
(Feyerabend, 2001: 243, 264). Using the resources of the history, philosophy, and 
sociology of science one can provide a more accurate image of the sciences which will 
have implications for our judgements about its value and efficacy. ‘Consolations for the 
Specialist’ makes similar points, as it opens with the question: 
 
‘[Is] the pursuit of science worthwhile? Is the presence of such a discipline, 
the fact that we have to live with it, study it, understand it, beneficial to us, 
or it is perhaps liable to corrupt our understanding and diminish our 
pleasure?’ (Feyerabend, 1970d/1981b: 141) 
 
The purpose of these questions is neither to undermine the authority of the sciences, nor 
to propose that they be dismantled and abandoned. This becomes clear enough a few 
sentences later when Feyerabend complains that: 
 
‘It is very difficult nowadays to approach such questions in the right spirit. 
What is worthwhile and what is not are to such a large extent determined 
by the existing institutions and forms of life that we hardly ever arrive at a 
proper evaluation of these institutions themselves’ (Feyerabend, 
1970d/1981b: 142-143)  
 
Feyerabend calls for us to challenge the ‘aura of excellence’ which he thinks ‘checks 
any inquiry’ into the beneficence of the sciences. Although he suspects that the 
reassessments he calls for will dissolve some of the esteem which the sciences enjoy 
Feyerabend certainly does not think that the sciences will lose all credibility, nor that 
they will or should be abandoned. I suggest that the purpose of Feyerabend’s philosophy 
is to encourage and enable us to critically assess the political authority of the sciences. 
This reflects his criticisms of false images of the sciences, such as the presumption of 
the omnicompetence of science, and those political and cultural groups which exploit 
them in order  to remove science ‘from the domain of critical discussion’ (Feyerabend, 
1970d/1981b:142-143). A reassessment of the nature and excellence of the sciences 
should provide us with a more truthful image of the sciences which can then be used as 
a proper basis for judging the value and efficacy of scientific knowledge and practices 
within modern Western societies. This is not ‘anti-science’ but, on the contrary, is 
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powerfully pro-scientific insofar as the purpose of such a reassessment is to provide us 
with a truthful image of the sciences which can then enable us to fully realise their 
humanitarian (and epistemic) potential. 
 
7.3 Golems and ‘the monster “science”’. 
Feyerabend’s calls for a reassessment of the excellence of the sciences have found wide 
resonance within the philosophy of science. Dupré (1993) is one such example, and it is 
worth briefly discussing another, namely Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch’s (1998) 
famous metaphor of science as a ‘golem’, the powerful but clumsy creature of Jewish 
mythology. Science is a ‘golem’ because it is ‘[n]either all good or bad’ but something 
‘powerful ... clumsy and dangerous’, especially when allowed to work ‘[w]ithout 
control’—and, since science the golem is a ‘creature of our art and our craft’, it is ‘not to 
be blamed for mistakes; they are our mistakes’ (Collins and Pinch, 1998: 1-2 passim). 
The golem metaphor is apt for Feyerabend because it reflects his point that the sciences 
can best realise their beneficent potential only if those who perform and control the 
sciences have a proper and accurate understanding of its nature and possibilities. 
The paper ‘How to Defend Society against Science’ (Feyerabend 1975c) reflects this 
very concern. Feyerabend argued that there is ‘nothing inherent in science or in any 
other ideology that makes it essentially liberating’—which is true enough—and that 
ensuring the emancipatory and beneficent possibilities of science requires us to 
understand and use it properly (Feyerabend, 1999a: 182). This is a key function of the 
philosophy of science, and one which Feyerabend strongly felt it had failed in. Science 
can therefore contribute to human wellbeing but only insofar as those affected by it 
understand its limits and possibilities. Its ‘humane’ potential is contingent, not 
inevitable. Recall that Feyerabend’s criticisms of logical positivism and Kuhn’s model 
of science reflected his humanitarian concern that they promoted misleading images of 
the structure of science; they fail to help us understand and control the golem. 
Feyerabend’s philosophy of science is an attempt to help us challenge false and 
misleading images of the sciences by affirming its pluralistic, disunified, and value-
laden character. An urgent political function for philosophers of science is therefore to 
contribute to a comprehensive reassessment of science’s limits and to help assert control 
over them.  
David J. Stump (2002) recently affirmed Feyerabend’s remarks on the political 
possibilities of the philosophy of science. Stump notes that since at least the early 
nineteenth century philosophers of science invariably had a much wider agenda 
informing their philosophical reflections on scientific thought and practice. The reason 
was that these politically-concerned philosophers of science appreciated that there was 
‘no guarantee that adopting a scientific world conception will lead to political progress, 
unless these politically progressive values can somehow be built into this conception’ 
(Stump, 2002: 156). The ideal of ‘value-free science’ would therefore be seen as either 
incomprehensible or irresponsible, on the grounds that it indicates an abrogation of a 
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key political goal of philosophy of science—namely, to ensure the beneficence of the 
sciences.113 In a rousing remark, Stump writes that: 
  
‘[B]y taking science as the object of philosophical reflection, philosophers 
of science are engaging an institution that plays a major role in 
contemporary life and are therefore dealing with issues that are often 
directly related to issues of public concern. Philosophers of science 
therefore retain their potential to affect public discourse by performing 
their role as interpreters of science and judges of scientific practice.’ 
(Stump, 2002: 157) 
 
Stump’s remark here indicates the tension in Feyerabend’s own political thought. 
Feyerabend by his own account affirms that philosophers of science should engage with 
contemporary political issues. This is why he celebrates politically engaged 
philosopher-scientists like Aristotle, Mach, and Bohr, and why he castigates politically-
indifferent philosophers for their ‘abstract’ and ‘detached’ approach to social and 
political issues in the philosophy of science. Feyerabend would therefore applaud 
Stump’s description of the philosophy of science as ‘engaging an institution that plays a 
major role in contemporary life’—and yet at the same time he would surely blanch at 
the obvious consequence that philosophers of science can and should ‘affect public 
discourse’. Clearly, Feyerabend cannot have it both ways, and, if pushed, he should 
concede that philosophers of science can contribute usefully to public discourse about 
the sciences. 
Why did Feyerabend fail to follow through his conviction about the political 
functions of the philosophy of science? I suspect that the reason lies with Feyerabend’s 
temperamental resistance to being perceived as an authority. Throughout much of his 
work one finds him denying his credentials as a professional philosopher and 
insisting—only half-sincerely—that he just ‘told stories’ and had ‘opinions ... not a 
philosophy’ (Feyerabend, 2000a: 162).114 Such remarks may seem insincere because 
Feyerabend did indeed have many developed views on the sciences which he thought 
should inform our understanding of the value of the sciences in the modern world. 
(Otherwise it is hard to make sense of his fulminations against misleading images of the 
sciences and the environmental, social, and intellectual destruction that they have 
generated, or against the plight of global indigenous peoples, or against the wilful 
disengagement of philosophers of science from social and political issues.) However, 
the Socratic interpretation of Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science should 
assuage the charge of insincerity. Feyerabend does want philosophers of science to 
respond to what he sees as urgent social and political issues and he saw himself as 
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 See Douglas (2009) for a sustained historical and philosophical discussion of the 
emergence of the ‘value-free ideal’ in twentieth century philosophy of science. 
114
 The title of one of Feyerabend’s later autobiographical essays is ‘Not a Philosopher’ 
(Feyerabend 1994c). I discuss these remarks, and others like them, in Kidd 
(forthcoming a), where I trace them to the influence of Kierkegaard upon Feyerabend. 
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trying to encourage them to do so. I suggest that his apparent failure to pursue more 
work in this area was due to his own temperamental aversion to becoming an authority 
(or, at the least, of being perceived as one).115 Fortunately, of course, other philosophers 
of science have been far more willing to apply their philosophical resources to 
addressing the sort of political issues arising from reflection on scientific knowledge, 
practices, and institutions, including Dupré, Kitcher, Douglas, feminist philosophers of 
science such as Longino and Keller, and the whole school of ‘postcolonial science and 
technology studies’, especially as represented by Sandra Harding.  
In the final section, my aim is to demonstrate how Feyerabend’s political concerns 
can and have been realised within contemporary feminist and postcolonial philosophies 
of science. Hopefully this will demonstrate the viability of his conception of a 
politically-engaged philosophy of science and locate him within an area of 
contemporary philosophy of science which has so far neglected his work. 
 
7.4 Feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science. 
There are two important exceptions to the neglect of social and political issues within 
the philosophy of science, namely feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science. An 
obvious and important reason for this is that both women and non-Western peoples 
have tended to be excluded from participation in the sciences and have also failed to 
benefit from the products of scientific knowledge and practices. Sandra Harding 
(forthcoming) emphasises that the agendas of feminist and postcolonial philosophies of 
science are complementary to one another because their respective constituencies 
overlap. Women and non-Western peoples are disenfranchised by Western economic 
and political projects, including areas, like the sciences, structured by them (Harding 
2008, Part II). Women and non-Western peoples are generally absent from the 
practices, policies, and philosophies of the modern Western sciences at every level. 
Despite some positive action to redress this imbalance, the complaints stand, especially 
in the case of non-Western peoples. 
There are three features of feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science to 
which I wish to draw attention. My account of these features will be deliberately 
schematic since my aim is simply to indicate that Feyerabend’s later philosophy is 
consonant with feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science; the references should 
serve as a basis for substantive studies in the future. First, both feminist and 
postcolonial philosophies of science have therefore responded to the cognitive and 
cultural hegemony of the Western sciences and the deleterious environmental, social, 
and political policies it has sustained. Londa Scheibinger writes that feminist 
philosophies of science began with a suspicion of the ideal of science as a ‘“neutral” 
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 At least Feyerabend did show signs of changing his attitudes; in one of his last 
essays, one finds him arguing that philosophy must become a ‘moral and political force 
that must be taken into account’ (Feyerabend 1994a). This is a radical change from his 
earlier declarations that philosophy was ‘boring’ and that academia was filled with 
‘illiterates’! See Feyerabend (1978a, Part III).   
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and privileged vantage point, above the rough and tumble of political life’ (Schiebinger, 
2001: 107). Feyerabend challenged this same presumption. Feminist and postcolonial 
philosophers of science are suspicious of claims about the value-neutrality of the 
sciences and they look to those individuals, groups, and communities on their periphery 
to substantiate their concerns, especially women and non-Western peoples. This does 
not constitute a denial of the claim that science enjoys such honorifics; instead, it 
reflects the worry that the conceptions of rationality and objectivity which science and 
the philosophy of science has tended to employ has contained androcentric and other 
biases (see Keller and Longino 1996). There is therefore an avowedly political as well 
as philosophical motivation to these critical philosophies of science, which accordingly 
aspires to use the resources of the history and philosophy of science to respond to 
political issues, such as the marginalisation of women and non-Western peoples.  
Second, both share a common conception of the nature of the Western sciences, 
namely, as pluralistic, value-laden and culturally and historically situated or ‘local’. The 
cognitive and practical successes of the Western sciences reflect the particularities of 
the values and interests of the European cultures which generated them and so cannot 
pretend to enjoy trans-cultural validity. The Western sciences have also profited from 
colonial and neo-colonial exploitation of women and non-Western peoples, cultures, 
and environments—a point well documented by recent literature in the history of 
colonial science (see Delbourgo and Dew 2008, Jacob 2008, and Schiebinger and Swan 
2007).  
Third, both feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science emphasise the need for 
critical metaphilosophical reflection on the aims and concerns of the philosophy of 
science. Although neither rejects the need for abstract studies of, say, epistemological 
and metaphysical issues—like causation, laws, or theory choice—they maintain that 
there is an important place for practical and political concerns. Indeed, the 
‘philosophical’ and ‘political’ aspects of the philosophy of science arguably cannot be 
separated because our understanding of the nature and structure of the sciences 
necessarily affects our ideas about how the sciences are practiced and organised.116 I 
suggest that feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science can therefore be 
understood, if only for my purposes here, as reflecting a broad set of philosophical and 
political concerns about the nature of the Western sciences and their impact upon 
marginalised groups, primarily women and non-Western peoples. 
Can Feyerabend be located relative to feminist and postcolonial philosophies of 
science? I suggest that he can, since his later philosophy shares all of the features of 
such philosophies. From the early 1960s, Feyerabend argued that both science and the 
philosophy of science should be guided by a cluster of humanitarian values which 
promoted ‘human wellbeing’. During this period, much of Feyerabend’s work was 
devoted to emphasising the pluralistic nature of the sciences and with tracing out the 
implications of this for our understanding of the nature of science. These concerns came 
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 Feminist philosophers of science in particular have defended this point at length 
using examples from the biomedical sciences. See the essays in Keller and Longino 
(1996). 
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to fruition in Against Method, where Feyerabend rejected methodological monism—the 
ideal of a singular ‘scientific method’ which confers special epistemic prestige on the 
sciences—and he argued that this should prompt us to reassess the special cognitive and 
cultural authority which the sciences enjoy in modern Western cultures. Throughout the 
late 1970s and into the 1980s, one can see growing concern with the destructive effects 
of the Western sciences upon non-Western environments and cultures. Such ‘imperialist 
scientism’ arose because of mistakenly bloated conceptions of the cognitive and 
practical efficacy of the sciences which encourage a general hostility towards ‘non-
scientific’ knowledge and practices. Chapters three and four addressed these features of 
Feyerabend’s later work. 
Feyerabend described the motivation for his later work as ‘humanitarian, not 
intellectual’ since he was responding to the fact that many non-Western cultures had 
‘developed ways of surviving in partly dangerous, partly agreeable surroundings’ which 
had been ‘destroyed’ by Western policies and practices (Feyerabend, 1993: 3). The 
antidote to such deleterious practices was a reaffirmation of the value of global cultural 
and epistemic diversity, which respected both the diversity of values and ‘forms of life’ 
developed by diverse human populations and the complexity of the natural world itself. 
The title of Feyerabend’s final book, Conquest of Abundance, refers to the dissolution 
of global cultural and epistemic diversity which he identifies as resulting from inflated 
estimations of superiority of Western scientific and cultural practices and institutions. 
The later Feyerabend therefore shares many of the political and philosophical 
concerns of feminist and postcolonial philosophies of science. From Against Method 
onwards, Feyerabend began to appreciate the political implications which followed 
from his criticisms of false images of science. One example of particular interest to him 
was role of the presumption of the omnicompetence of science in legitimating the 
disenfranchisement of indigenous peoples (one of the earliest explicit statements of this 
is Feyerabend, 1978a: 135-138). In this sense, Feyerabend’s later work is more closely 
allied to postcolonial philosophies of science; it is therefore regrettable that his work 
does not enjoy more of a presence within contemporary literature on postcolonial 
science and technology studies. PSTS scholars invariably group Feyerabend amongst a 
broad group of ‘post-positivist’ philosophers of science, such as Kuhn, Lakatos, 
Shapere, and Toulmin.117 This is understandable given Feyerabend’s position within the 
history of the philosophy of science but also misleading, because into his later period 
Feyerabend’s work began to broach a much wider set of concerns than ‘mainstream’ 
philosophy of science tolerated and continues to tolerate. Most pertinently to my 
concerns here, the later Feyerabend indicated an explicit concern with moral and 
political issues concerning the cognitive and cultural authority of the Western sciences. 
This is an important example of one way in which Feyerabend’s work diverged from 
those of his contemporaries, and indeed most contemporary postcolonial philosophers 
of science emphasise the lack of mainstream presence their sub-discipline currently 
suffers. 
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 See, for instance, Ashman and Baringer (2000: 126); Harding (1998: 216n23 and 
218n48) and (2006: 135) and Spivak, (1999: 365). 
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 Both in the late-1970s, when Feyerabend first broached his wider concerns, and 
today, political and philosophical concern with those groups and communities who are 
being minoritised by the scientific and cultural agencies of Western modernity is still 
far from being a core concern of the philosophy of science. The recent emergence of 
postcolonial science and technology studies is a welcome counterexample to such 
neglect as are the feminist philosophies of science which preceded it; however, there is 
a good case to be made for the claim that Feyerabend’s later work represents an early 
and important contribution to postcolonial philosophies of science, and one which can 
indeed inform ongoing debates about the value and beneficence of the Western 
sciences. 
 
7.5 Conclusions. 
Feyerabend had political as well as philosophical interest in the sciences. A consistent 
theme of his work throughout both its ‘early’ and ‘later’ periods was the claim that the 
sciences could only fulfil their beneficent and liberating potential if they were properly 
understood. This is consonant with Feyerabend’s insistence upon the primacy of the 
ethical and his criticisms of philosophies of science which promote misleading images 
of the sciences; or of ‘the monster “science”’.118 Feyerabend’s ventures into political 
philosophy were intended to contribute to his project of ensuring the beneficence of 
science by introducing measures for the public control of science. Unfortunately, they 
failed to do so, mainly because of their lack of sophistication and the naive form of 
liberal democracy which Feyerabend relied upon. I then suggested that Feyerabend’s 
political concerns can be preserved if one interprets his later work as committed to the 
Socratic project of challenging us to account for the value and nature of the sciences.  
Feyerabend does not ask us to abandon science, but only to be able to account for 
what it is and why it matters. Indeed, these are the two questions that open his paper 
‘On the Critique of Scientific Reason’: ‘what is science’ and ‘what’s so great about 
science?’ The former question has of course exercised philosophers of science for a 
long time, but the latter question has arguably been less well-served, except for the 
notable exception of feminist and postcolonial philosophers of science who are 
sensitive to the sorts of moral and political concerns which motivated Feyerabend. 
These two questions are political insofar as they relate to the authority of the sciences in 
modern societies and philosophical because they necessarily invoke epistemological 
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 Feyerabend tended to criticise philosophers of science for promoting damaging 
myths about the sciences, but one should point out, as Robert Nola (2001: 814, my 
emphasis) does, that his challenges were directed at ‘a number of the prevailing images 
of science advocated … by scientists and philosophers’. And of course, many scientists 
themselves promote philosophical models of the sciences in popular science writings. 
Popular scientific literature and scientific textbooks often promote ridiculously out-
dated images of the sciences (for instance, much of it fails to recognise that 
falsificationism has been shown by philosophers of science to be overly simplistic. For 
a critical discussion, see Rowbottom and Aiston (2006). 
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issues about the structure and efficacy of scientific knowledge and practices. And true 
to his commitment to our liberty, Feyerabend does not want to answer these questions 
for us, although of course he certainly has opinions on both of them. Instead, what the 
later Feyerabend wanted was to ensure that the citizens of societies within which the 
sciences play a role have a proper and informed view on the what the sciences are and 
why they are valuable, that is, that they can answer his two questions: ‘what is science’ 
and ‘what’s so great about science?’ The aim of Feyerabend’s political philosophy of 
science is not to answer these questions but to introduce and affirm their importance 
and to provide us with the resources and the motivation to address them.  
With this interpretation in mind, I conclude that Feyerabend’s political philosophy is 
not a failure, since it was not intended to provide applicable policy proposals, but that is 
successful insofar as it challenges us to take seriously the very question of the value of 
science—a question which is as important as it is neglected. Therefore when 
Feyerabend (1976: 228) remarks that ‘science as we know it today is not inescapable, 
and ... we can construct a world in which it plays no role whatever’, he is not proposing 
the abandonment of science but simply asking us to account for its presence and 
prestige within our society. As Alford neatly puts it, ‘Feyerabend’s substantive 
argument is that a pluralistic way of life is conducive to self-development’; therefore, 
we ‘should not … overlook the fact that he is indeed concerned with the good life’ 
(Alford, 1985: 208-209). 
 
The last three Chapters, numbers five to seven, have detailed Feyerabend’s discussion 
of the value of cultural diversity. This is, of course, connected with his defence of 
epistemic pluralism. In the next two Chapters, therefore, I consider the arguments for 
epistemic pluralism that Feyerabend provided in his final works, especially Conquest of 
Abundance. 
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Chapter Eight 
Ch8 The Later Feyerabend’s Metaphysics and Epistemology 
 
8.1 The aims of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics. 
8.2 A reconstruction of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics. 
8.3 Criticisms and problems. 
8.4 Incommensurability and perspectivism. 
8.5 Conclusions. 
 
This Chapter describes the metaphysics developed in the later work of Paul Feyerabend. 
I argue that his later metaphysics is best understood as an attempt to provide 
foundations for a radical epistemic pluralism. Section one describes the aims and 
motivations informing Feyerabend’s decision to develop a metaphysics because these 
are essential to helping us understand it. Section two provides a reconstruction of the 
metaphysics from Feyerabend’s own scattered (and not always consistent) accounts. 
Section three identifies some of the problems of the later metaphysics and rebuts 
Preston’s charge that it is a form of social constructionism. In section four, I suggest 
that the most sophisticated interpretation of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics is as a form 
of pluralistic perspectival realism. Here I draw upon the recent work of Giere (2006a; 
2006b), and Brown’s (2009) application of it to Feyerabend. Finally in section five, I 
offer some conclusions and point the way to Chapter nine. 
 
8.1 The aims of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics. 
The aim of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics was to provide the foundations for a 
radical epistemic pluralism. Consonant with his practical, historical, and philosophical 
arguments for epistemic pluralism, Feyerabend felt the need to provide a metaphysics 
as well. Many of his very late writings, were devoted to developing this metaphysics. 
The mature expression of Feyerabend’s metaphysics is, Conquest of Abundance. 
Throughout that book, one finds emphases upon the ‘abundance’ and ‘richness of 
Being’ and long discussions of human epistemic efforts to expose and explore it. A key 
focus of that book is what Feyerabend calls the ‘problem of reality’, namely, how are 
we to make sense of the fact that there are multiple, mutually-incompatible descriptions 
of the world which, despite their incompatibilities, enjoy cognitive and practical 
efficacy? Such ‘problems of reality’ relate to Feyerabend’s defence of epistemic 
pluralism. Many scientists and philosophers sympathetic to epistemic monism see such 
pluralism as problematic. Often such monism is cast in ontological terms; for instance 
by appeal to the argument that if reality has an objectively real structure then it should 
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admit of only one true description.119 Kellert, Longino, and Waters (2006b, x) recently 
characterised the scientific monism that Feyerabend opposes: 
 
1. The ultimate aim of science is to establish a single, complete, and 
comprehensive account of the natural world based on a single set of fundamental 
principles 
2. The nature of the world is such that it can, at least in principle, be completely 
described or explained by such an account 
 
Feyerabend rejected both of these claims, which help us to clarify the aims informing 
his metaphysics. Clearly, Feyerabend wants to deny that scientific monism should be a 
plausible aim of science. This does not mean that we could not find ourselves in a 
situation in which some one theory, or set of theories, predominated; indeed, that claim 
is partly what the ‘conquest of abundance’ refers to. Feyerabend certainly thinks that it 
is an active possibility that some one scientific theory could become established; 
however, this fact would not entail that that theory was a ‘single, complete, and 
comprehensive account of the natural world’. The reason is that reality is not 
susceptible to successful description by any single theory or set of theories. Although 
reality has an objective structure and properties, these cannot be captured by any single 
theory, however well-articulated it may be. This is because our epistemic activities 
reflect particular explanatory goals, theoretical commitments, social and material 
conditions, and so on. These are necessarily and irreducibly pluralistic because the 
adoption of certain explanatory goals, for instance, precludes the adoption of others. 
Therefore the plurality of epistemic activities is necessarily diverse and they can be 
interpreted as mutually incompatible insofar as they cannot be unified or harmonised 
with one another. Reality may be unitary, but our descriptions of it cannot be, since they 
reflect a plurality of incompatible explanatory goals and other contingent factors. 
Feyerabend emphasises that the ‘abundance’ of reality arises from the interaction of 
human epistemic activities with reality itself.120 Since many of these epistemic activities 
may be mutually incompatible, owing to the diversity of goals and conditions informing 
them, the conceptions of reality they generate may be likewise incompatible.  
Feyerabend’s later metaphysics was an attempt to explain how metaphysical realism 
can be reconciled with radical epistemic pluralism. The historical record indicates the 
success of a wide range of epistemic activities, many of which are mutually 
incompatible. This is a metaphysical problem because many of these epistemic 
activities invoke ontological commitments—that is, descriptions of reality—which are 
incompatible with one another. Therefore, the success of our many epistemic activities 
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 The ‘metaphysical realism’ of Hilary Putnam is perhaps the most famous statement 
of this position. 
120
 Jonathan Lowe suggests to me that our epistemic activities simply are a part of 
reality, albeit a small one. Therefore, the distinction between epistemic activities and 
reality is a spurious one, which Lowe suggests indicates the influence of Neo-
Kantianism upon twentieth century philosophy of science. 
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generates incompatible conceptions of reality which, a monist supposes, cannot all be 
correct descriptions of reality itself. The ‘problems of reality’ that Feyerabend addresses 
in his later philosophy reflect the puzzle of reconciling epistemic pluralism and some 
workable form of metaphysical realism. 
Feyerabend began to develop a metaphysics only at the very end of his career. There 
is little certainly little explicit metaphysical theorising in his earlier work, even if there 
are many discussions of the ontological implications of scientific theories. Feyerabend 
was clearly engaging with metaphysical issues throughout his career and yet never 
advanced anything like a metaphysical system of his own until the late 1980s. The first 
sign of this is the paper ‘Realism and the Historicity of Knowledge’ (Feyerabend 1989) 
which opens with a good statement of Feyerabend’s metaphysical interests: namely, 
how can knowledge which is generated through historically contingent epistemic 
activities be understood to describe a mind-independent reality? Feyerabend began with 
the fact that our epistemic activities were the results of historically and socially 
contingent developments. This fact implied that if those historical and social conditions 
had been otherwise, then our current set of epistemic activities could have been 
radically different. And if this is the case, then our very conception of reality is itself 
potentially contingent, since the contingencies of history could have endowed us with 
alternative epistemic activities which would have generated conceptions of reality 
which may be radically divergent from those we currently enjoy.121  
This aligns Feyerabend with the contemporary ‘contingentism-inevitabilism’ debate 
within history and philosophy of science. The historical contingency of the sciences is a 
current topic of debate for contemporary historians and philosophers of science. The 
discussions so far have focused on the question of whether our modern sciences were 
‘inevitable’ or ‘contingent’.122 Howard Sankey outlines the two positions: ‘[t]he 
inevitabilist holds that science, properly conducted, will tend to converge on a single 
unified theory of the world’ whilst the contingentist ‘holds that science, properly 
conducted, might well have led to a completely different theory of the world from that 
of contemporary science’ (2008: 259). Feyerabend was well aware of the contingentism 
debate. In ‘Realism and the Historicity of Knowledge’ he cites Pickering’s Constructing 
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 As a caveat, whileour epistemic activities and the conceptions of reality they 
generate may be contingent, reality itself, of course, is not. I discuss this issue at length 
in section 8.3. Feyerabend’s claims here were arguably undermined by Davidson 
(1974). Davidson argues that the ‘retention’ of certain concepts or vocabularies across 
different theories and languages ‘in itself provides no basis for judging the new scheme 
to be the same as, or different from, the old’ (Davidson, 1974: 10-11). We should, 
Davidson urges, abandon the ‘dualism of scheme and world’, and he goes on to argue 
that ‘we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar 
objects whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false’ (Davidson, 1974: 
20). Interestingly, Davidson also cites Feyerabend (1962) as providing a ‘formula for 
generating distinct conceptual schemes’ (Davidson, 1974: 9). 
122
 Both of these terms were introduced by Hacking (1999). An important early work in 
the contingentism debate is Pickering (1984). 
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Quarks (Pickering 1984) and Galison’s How Experiments End (Galison 1987), two 
influential early works in the contingentism debate (Feyerabend 1989; 2001: 132fn4). 
In that paper he emphasises the role played by compromises, financial and institutional 
mechanisms, political and professional manoeuvring and competing theoretical and 
philosophical commitments in the formation of scientific knowledge. Such remarks are 
consonant with Feyerabend’s earlier arguments, for instance in Against Method, that 
Galileo and Newton’s scientific success relied upon rhetoric, political machinations, 
and so on.  
Feyerabend suggested that since scientific knowledge is so affected by contingent 
material, social, and intellectual factors, one must critically reassess what he calls the 
‘separability assumption’. The separability assumption maintains that: ‘what has been 
found in this idiosyncratic and culture-dependent way (and is therefore formulated and 
explained in idiosyncratic and culture-dependent terms) exists independently of the 
circumstances of its discovery, in other words, we can cut the way from the result 
without losing the result’ (2001, 133). Feyerabend rejects the separability assumption: 
our knowledge of the world cannot be detached from the modes of inquiry and forms of 
knowledge employed to generate it. Our knowledge of the world therefore relies upon a 
careful interaction of human epistemic activities on the one hand and reality on the 
other. In the following section I provide a developed account of the metaphysics and 
epistemology that Feyerabend develops to account for this interactive model of human 
knowledge. 
 
8.2 A reconstruction of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics. 
The core component of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics is ‘Being’. ‘Being’ is his term 
for reality, and he often used it interchangeably with related terms such as ‘ultimate 
reality’, ‘basic reality’, ‘Nature’, and with superlatives such as ‘Majestic Being’.123 
Being refers to objective reality, the world as it exists independently of human concepts 
and theories. Feyerabend emphasises the ‘ineffability’ of Being. One cannot have 
positive knowledge of what Being is like in itself, because our knowledge of it relies 
upon our imposition of concepts and theories and our engaging in certain epistemic 
activities.124 This reflects the neo-Kantian strain in Feyerabend’s philosophical thought. 
Oberheim (2006: 74 passim) argues that Feyerabend had a longstanding commitment to 
the Kantian idea that concepts organise and co-constitute our experiences; however, 
Feyerabend rejected the ahistorical nature of Kant’s account and instead embraced the 
position which Lipton (2001) described as ‘Kant-on-wheels’. The interaction of our 
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 For examples, see Feyerabend (2001: 196, 214-215, 238-239, 240). 
124
 It is worth restating Lowe’s objection (fn119) that Feyerabend is attempting to 
maintain a untenable distinction between our epistemic activities and reality. As Lowe 
(per. comm.) puts it, Feyerabend is ‘happy to talk in detail about … our epistemic 
activities, which are themselves just parts of ‘reality’ if they are anything at all.’ 
Therefore the claim that we can have no ‘positive knowledge’ of Being is incoherent. 
This criticism is discussed at length in Chapter nine. 
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concepts with reality generates experience, but since our concepts can and do change 
over time, so too do our experiences. Therefore our knowledge is not of how the world 
is ‘in itself’, but how the world discloses itself according to the concepts and theories 
that we happen to employ.125  
Feyerabend emphasises that our experiences are shaped by a wide variety of factors. 
These include the concepts and theories that we employ, but also our perceptual and 
cognitive capacities, language, moods, social and cultural institutions and norms, and 
our wider philosophical or religious commitments. These factors all shape and delimit 
our experience of the world. However, pace Kant, these conditioning factors are not 
fixed; our biological capacities change over our lifetimes, as does language, social 
structures, and so on. Feyerabend suggests that these contingent and variable conditions 
collectively constitute certain ‘approaches’ towards Being which is then disclosed in the 
terms set by those conditions. The ‘fit’ between Being and our approaches is often 
imperfect, since our concepts and other conditions of experiences do not necessarily 
correspond to actual structures or properties of Being itself. This is why Feyerabend 
emphasised the ‘ambiguity’ of our experience and, therefore, of our knowledge. The 
‘ambiguity’ arises from the contingency and variability of our ‘approaches’, on the one 
hand, and the imperfect fit between those approaches and Being on the other. However, 
the fit is often more than adequate for coherent and meaningful experiences to occur, 
even if confusions and inconsistencies cannot be wholly insured against or avoided. 
The successful interaction of our approaches with Being generates ‘manifest 
realities’. A manifest reality is a sustained, quasi-stable mode of experiencing Being 
according to the particular conceptual, social, and other conditions that constitute a 
certain ‘form of life’. Feyerabend deliberately introduces an anthropological component 
into his account. The conditions of experience are of course historically variable, but 
they are also culturally diverse. Other cultures are likely to invoke conceptual, social, 
and linguistic conditions which diverge from ours and so can generate novel approaches 
to Being. Manifest realities are therefore historically as well as culturally variable and 
this is one reason why Feyerabend thinks that cultural diversity has, at least in principle, 
epistemic value. The historical and anthropological record indicates that human beings 
have conceived of and lived within the world in a startling diversity of ways. Therefore 
it is a sensible pragmatic policy to pluralise the ‘approaches’ we make to Being in an 
attempt to maximise our epistemic engagement with it. Feyerabend’s later metaphysics 
continues the commitment to the principles of proliferation and pluralism that animated 
his earlier philosophy. 
The interaction between our epistemic activities and Being generates what 
Feyerabend calls ‘resistance’. Being ‘responds’ to the various approaches made by 
human inquirers, ‘yielding’ and ‘resisting’ in different measure. The nature of this 
resistance varies according to the epistemic activities in question since the standards for 
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 Oberheim (2006: 75) stresses that this nominalism remained constant throughout 
Feyerabend’s philosophical development: it is ‘not only a fundamental aspect of his 
early philosophy of science. It also underwrites one of his last major works, Conquest of 
Abundance’. 
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judging it are, to borrow Bernard Williams’ term, ‘internal to practice’. Certain 
epistemic activities find no purchase upon Being and falter, whereas others can be 
stabilised but only to a certain degree, whilst others still are immensely successful. The 
differing degrees of success of our epistemic activities are explained by their capacity to 
engage with certain aspects of Being. Feyerabend sometimes uses an activist rhetoric 
which describes Being as ‘responding to’ our epistemic activities; however this is surely 
misleading, since the differing degrees of success accompanying our epistemic 
activities can be explained without any need for Being to ‘respond’ or ‘react’ to them. A 
particular epistemic activity could meet with great resistance because its component 
concepts are particularly ill-suited to representing the aspects of the world that it is 
directed against. Another epistemic activity could be successful because the aspects of 
the world it is intended to represent are more stable than other phenomena—planetary 
orbits, for instance. Being is passive in all of these cases, and the variation arises simply 
from the discordance between naturally-variable aspects of the world, on the one hand, 
and the mutable nature of our epistemic activities, on the other.126 
The resistance generated by the interaction of epistemic activities and Being imposes 
limits upon the range of manifest realities that one can generate. Feyerabend 
emphasises that Being is not limitlessly malleable. Since it ‘resists’ our epistemic 
activities, to greater or lesser extents, it cannot be ‘something formless’ but, instead, 
something which ‘by its resistance reveals its properties and laws’ (Feyerabend, 2001, 
238). Being has some structure and properties and is ‘malleable but not entirely 
yielding’ and therefore ‘more pliable than is commonly assumed’ (Feyerabend, 2010, 
234; 2001, 145). However, since Being ‘offers resistance’, it sometimes happens that 
certain approaches ‘simply collapse’, or, perhaps, they meet with only limited 
‘response’, ‘linger for a while … and then disappear’ (Feyerabend, 2001, 145, 215). 
The fact of the variable resistance of Being preserves a commitment to metaphysical 
realism. Being has some objective structure and properties, as evidenced by the fact of 
its resistance to certain epistemic activities. However even though Being is far more 
malleable than is commonly supposed—by scientific monists, for instance—it is not 
able to sustain any and all epistemic activities. Feyerabend stresses that the question of 
the receptivity of Being to epistemic pluralism has not yet been established and that we 
must pursue a vigorous programme of proliferation in order to determine this. 
The interaction of epistemic activities with Being generates manifest realities. Since 
our epistemic activities can be modified, through innovation or changes in the 
conditions underlying them, our manifest realities are similarly mutable. The instability 
and variability of our epistemic activities and manifest realities can be extended to 
encompass our explanatory values, languages, social conditions, and so on. This is why 
Feyerabend emphasised that social and cultural developments could prompt major 
epistemological changes, such as the emergence of Greek philosophy during the 
Archaic period or the ‘scientific revolution’ of early modern Europe. These were both 
episodes in which changing social and intellectual conditions resulted in new 
conceptions of reality and associated values, practices, and institutions. Because social 
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 Pickering (1995) refers to this process as ‘interactive stabilisation’. 
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and cultural factors can prompt major epistemological changes, they can also incite 
fundamental revisions in our conception of reality; for instance, Feyerabend argued that 
the emergence of the philosophical cosmologies of the Presocratics was intended to 
help introduce a new conception of reality to challenge traditional Greek religion. This 
is another example of Feyerabend’s connection of abstract epistemological and 
metaphysical issues with concrete social and political concerns. 
Feyerabend’s later metaphysics can now be reconstructed. Being can sustain a 
plurality of epistemic activities. The successful and stabilised interaction of our 
epistemic activities with Being generates quasi-stable manifest realities. These can be 
modified in response to changing social and intellectual conditions and so our manifest 
realities are directly related to human explanatory interests. The interaction of epistemic 
activities with Being generates ‘resistance’ because of the imperfect fit between the 
commitments which constitute those activities and Being itself. Feyerabend remarked 
that ‘there is no way of finding out the limit to which the world permits relativism 
because Being itself cannot be known’ (quoted in Ben-Israel, 2001: 98) and that the 
nature of its ‘resistance’ cannot be known because the ‘conditions of its acting’ remain 
‘shrouded in darkness’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 213). Some epistemic activities generate 
very little resistance, whilst others generate more, and this variable resistance reflects 
the objective structure and properties of Being.  
Feyerabend emphasises, however, that Being itself cannot be known. The structure 
or nature of Being cannot be directly known to us because our knowledge of it is always 
mediated by the particular epistemic activities we are employing. Our positive 
knowledge of Being is limited to the empirical fact that it can sustain a radical plurality 
of epistemic activities. The ‘abundance’ that Feyerabend praises therefore arises from 
the interaction of diverse human epistemic activities, on the one hand, with the 
‘richness of Being’ on the other. Abundance, so conceived, also makes clear the 
epistemic value of cultural diversity, since the diverse explanatory goals, modes of 
inquiry, and forms of knowledge that exist across both Western and non-Western 
cultures provide multiple ‘approaches’ to Being that maximise our epistemic 
engagement with multiple aspects of the ontological richness of reality whilst also 
fulfilling diverse human explanatory needs. 
The foregoing account is my reconstruction of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics. It 
provides an account of the major components of his metaphysics and their relationships 
to one another. Aside from a few footnoted remarks, I have not raised major criticisms 
of it yet, but in the next section I address some criticisms of the metaphysics and 
identify some problems with it. These mainly concern the charge that it is a form of 
social constructionism and the question of whether it is a form of realism or not.  
 
8.3 Criticisms and problems. 
Feyerabend did not provide a complete account of his metaphysics. The reconstruction 
given in the last section draws upon various remarks and descriptions scattered 
throughout the later writings. Feyerabend himself provided no systematic account and 
often experimented with his metaphysical ideas, playing with different interpretations 
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and ideas. This means that there are ambiguities and gaps in his account which suggest 
many different problems. My focus here is on Preston’s charge (1997; 2009) that 
Feyerabend’s later metaphysics is a form of social constructionism. This criticism 
aligns Feyerabend with various constructionist and relativist camps within the 
philosophy of science. It also reflects various complaints that Feyerabend defends an 
intolerable ontological pluralism, whereby Being includes various exotic entities like 
gods and demons. I outline Preston’s charge and then discuss Farrell’s objections to it. 
Preston has argued that Feyerabend’s metaphysics is a form of social 
constructionism. Social constructionists maintain that the theoretical entities of the 
sciences are ‘constructed’ by the social and material practices of scientific research. 
Preston argues that Feyerabend’s apparent social constructionism is ‘perhaps the 
weakest part’ of Feyerabend’s later philosophy and suggests that ‘more plausible 
view[s]’ are offered by Cartwright (1999) and Dupré (1993) (Preston, 2000: 620). Later 
in this section I suggest that Feyerabend’s metaphysics is in fact very close to that of 
Cartwright and Dupré. Preston notes Feyerabend’s enthusiasm for asserting the 
ontological authority of non-scientific epistemic activities, such as those of global 
indigenous cultures. For instance, Feyerabend writes that when Being is ‘approached … 
in one way, we get elementary particles’ and that ‘proceeding in another, we get a 
nature that is alive and full of gods’. The consequence is that ‘[s]cience is certainly not 
the only source of reliable ontological information’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 145).  
Preston argues that this is a form of social constructionism because Feyerabend 
seems to admit into his ontology any entities and processes which have featured within 
human cultures. This leads to a radical ontological pluralism—indeed, to a pluralism so 
radical as to seem almost absurd. For instance, Feyerabend opens Conquest of 
Abundance with the cheerful remark that reality is ‘abundant beyond our wildest 
imagination’ because it includes ‘trees, dreams, sunrises … thunderstorms, shadows, 
rivers [and] the lives of people, Gods, entire galaxies’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 3). The list of 
entities and processes that Feyerabend seems willing to admit into his ‘abundant’ 
ontology therefore include concrete and abstract entities, natural and supernatural 
objects, and whole domains of reality (such as transcendental realities).  
Preston objects that: 
 
‘Feyerabend never does anything to support his willingness to say that 
things that some people believe in, such as gods, exist (not merely that they 
exist ‘for’ those who believe in them, whatever that means). One gets the 
impression that he thought that merely pointing out that some people believe 
in them, or that enough people believe in them, was enough.’ (Preston, 
2000: 621) 
 
On this account, Feyerabend lapses into social constructionism because the only 
condition that he imposes upon ontological realism is the existence of a culture or 
community who recognised such entities. As Preston neatly puts it, Feyerabend suffers 
from a ‘reluctance to take sides’ between groups with competing ontologies, and so 
reverts to the position that ‘everything believed in by anyone from a ‘successful’ culture 
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exists’ (Preston, 2000, 621). Feyerabend’s radical ontological pluralism arises from his 
deep-seated reluctance to criticise the ontologies of the diverse cultures to whose 
protection he is committed. Instead of asserting some form of ontological realism and 
insisting that certain entities do not exist, Feyerabend lapses into the social 
constructionist view that, ontologically speaking, ‘anything goes’. Feyerabend wants to 
embrace ontological pluralism without any ontological realism, and to allow that ‘our 
world contains particles and [electromagetic] fields side by side with demons and Gods’ 
(Feyerabend, 2001: 134). 
Is Preston’s charge of social constructionism justified? Certainly there are many 
passages throughout the later writings which would seem to support it. Feyerabend 
often embraces radical ontological pluralism, as evidenced by his various paeans to the 
‘richness of Being’. Furthermore, Feyerabend does sometimes seem to suggest that a 
culture needs only to engage in certain practices for them to produce (or construct) 
certain entities. ‘Cultures’, he writes, ‘call forth a certain reality’ by engaging in certain 
practices (Feyerabend, 1993: 272). One could read the later writings and conclude that 
Feyerabend did indeed hold to the social constructionist view that ontology is simply a 
by-product of various human social and material practices.  
Feyerabend can certainly be read as a social constructionist. There are many 
passages which could sustain a social constructionist interpretation of his later 
metaphysics. However I suggest that there are two reasons why, in fact, he is not guilty 
of social constructionism. The first is that many of the social constructionist passages 
are best read as rhetorical or experimental, insofar as Feyerabend was playing with 
certain formulations of his ideas, rather than stating his established views. Such 
passages could also be simply due to ambiguous phrasing, especially since into his late 
period Feyerabend’s writing because much less intellectually rigorous. The second is 
that there is a feature of Feyerabend’s metaphysics which arguably insures him against 
social constructionism. Farrell notes this feature and Preston’s omission of it: 
 
‘The important clauses which Preston does not take into his account are the 
ones which proclaim that reality “offers resistance” and that reality is simply 
“more pliable than is commonly assumed.” If we look at the idea that reality 
“offers resistance” such that “some constructions find no point of attack in it 
and simply collapse,” then we must conclude that … if reality offers 
resistance and unequivocally says ‘no’ to some constructions, then reality 
must, in some manner, be independent of the constructions.’ (Farrell, 2001: 
363) 
 
Farrell proposes that the fact that Being ‘resists’ certain approaches means that it must 
have some objective structure and properties. Reality is not limitlessly malleable, even 
if it is more malleable than most forms of metaphysical realism maintain. There are 
therefore objective metaphysical limitations on the sorts of epistemic activities that one 
can successfully engage in and therefore limits on the type and range of manifest 
realities that we can generate. As Feyerabend himself remarks, ‘the interference 
[generated by our epistemic activities] has its limits. Nature is not something formless 
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that can be turned into any shape; it resists and by its resistance reveals its properties 
and laws’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 238). This remark makes clear the fact that Being has 
some objective structure and properties and that these provide limitations on the sorts of 
successfully epistemic activities human beings can engage in. Being does not afford us 
the metaphysical licence to construct whatever kind of world we desire, and certainly 
Feyerabend affirms that certain approaches ‘simply collapse’, or, perhaps, they meet 
with only limited ‘response’, ‘linger for a while … and then disappear’ (Feyerabend, 
2001: 145, 215). The point being made here is that reality can sustain multiple different 
epistemic activities, more than has generally been supposed by monists, but that it is not 
able to sustain an unlimited number of such activities. 
Farrell concludes that the fact of Being’s resistance protects Feyerabend against the 
charge of social constructionism. Although our socially, materially, and intellectually-
conditioned epistemic activities do play a constitutive role in the sort of manifest reality 
we generate, reality itself makes a decisive contribution. Farrell suggests that 
Feyerabend’s point is that our knowledge of the world is generated by the interaction of 
our contingent and variable epistemic activities, on the one hand, and Being on the 
other. This preserves a role for human activities but preserves a commitment to 
metaphysical realism. Farrell illustrates this with the example of elementary particles. 
Feyerabend writes that physical scientific experiments ‘ show how certain sections of 
the world respond to [our] approaches’ and states that molecules, for instance, ‘do not 
simply exist—period—they appear only under well-defined and rather complex 
conditions’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 142). Farrell suggests that Feyerabend’s remarks here 
reflect his earlier studies in the philosophy of quantum theory, whereby our 
experimental results reflect the particular experimental arrangements we employ. 
Commenting on the example of elementary particles, Farrell argues that: 
 
‘There is here no question as to the reality of elementary particles: given the 
experimental arrangement, as specified in sub-atomic experiments, and 
given the conceptual-semantic system of quantum physics, elementary 
particles can be justifiably posited. The world is manipulated so as to give 
specific responses.’ (Farrell, 2001: 362) 
 
Feyerabend is not a social constructionist. The role of social factors is confined to 
providing the theoretical and practical conditions within which certain epistemic 
activities can be engaged in (for instance, particular experimental arrangements). These 
provide our ‘approaches’ to Being and they can be modified to minimise the 
‘resistance’ they meet with. Farrell suggests that Feyerabend’s later metaphysics was an 
extension of his earlier studies in the philosophy of quantum theory. The guiding idea is 
that our epistemic activities are complex and contingent and that their interaction with 
reality generates resistance. This resistance can be minimised, for instance by 
theoretical refinement and instrumental modification, or even by large-scale social and 
intellectual changes. Reality responds to very many of these epistemic activities but by 
no means all of them. 
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Farrell makes a further point about Feyerabend’s later metaphysics which is 
pertinent. Feyerabend’s later metaphysics is intended to provide foundations for 
epistemic pluralism. This of course includes an appeal to the epistemic activities of non-
scientific cultures. This point fuels the social constructionism charge, because it 
encourages the view that Feyerabend wants to admit all manner of exotic entities—gods 
and demons, say—into his ontology. Farrell suggests that Feyerabend’s remarks about 
culturally diverse ontologies reflect a commitment to proliferation and pluralism. The 
discussions of the Homeric gods, for instance, should be interpreted rhetorically and not 
literally. Feyerabend’s purpose is to provoke us to take seriously both proliferation and 
the idea of a pluralistic reality. The appeals to non-scientific epistemic activities and 
ontologies is, ‘at its strongest, a claim as to the possibility and as yet unfalsified status 
of schemes of reality incompatible with science; dismissed too swiftly by science’ 
(Farrell, 2001: 365). Feyerabend’s rhetorical statements are therefore motivated by a 
desire to promote the principle of proliferation; as Farrell puts it: 
 
‘The questions Feyerabend asks are, what other phenomena and laws can we 
find under other differing circumstances and conditions? And, what is the 
limit to the range of possible unique circumstances and conditions?’ (Farrell, 
2001: 362) 
 
The ‘doctrine of abundance’, as I will dub it, is therefore a methodological principle. 
Feyerabend urges us to adopt a metaphysical picture of the world which is maximally 
amenable to epistemic pluralism, but which avoids lapsing into social constructionism. 
The doctrine of abundance functions as a form of normative realism because it assures 
us that reality does have objective structure and properties, thus encouraging us to 
continue to refine our theories and epistemic practices. It also gives us great scope to 
engage in a wide variety of epistemic activities and to proliferate and pluralise, giving 
us enormous scope to innovate and develop new modes of inquiry and forms of 
knowledge. However the inclusion of the idea of ‘resistance’ provides an essential 
check on the degree of epistemic pluralism that reality can tolerate. Because reality is 
not able to sustain any form of epistemic activity, there is still an onus on us to refine 
and modify our epistemic activities; furthermore, some epistemic activities simply will 
not succeed, despite any desires we may have that they will.  
It is worth remarking that Feyerabend locates his metaphysics within the historical 
narrative of the ‘conquest of abundance’. The key claim of this quasi-historical thesis is 
that there is a longstanding tendency within the histories of Western philosophy and 
science to underestimate the capacity of reality to sustain epistemic pluralism. The 
problems of reality that Feyerabend is concerned with arise when certain philosophical 
or scientific communities begin to deny the ‘abundance’ of reality and militate against 
pluralism. Feyerabend concedes that certain epistemic activities and manifest realities 
are inefficacious, even if he usually stops short of proposing that they should be 
abandoned. However, his complaint is that, too often, judgements about the inefficacy 
of certain epistemic activities are made without proper examination of them (a point 
developed at length in Chapter four). As Feyerabend puts it, ‘[t]he point is that there is 
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not only one successful culture, there are many, and that their success is a matter of 
empirical record, not of philosophical definitions’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 240). No doubt 
Feyerabend thinks that very many of the epistemic activities we engage in—and many 
of the manifest realities they sustain—are inefficacious, in the sense that they fail to 
fulfil the explanatory aims that motivated them, or by their own internal standards, or in 
the sense that alternatives exist which would fulfil their aims superlatively well. The 
political issues that Feyerabend addressed invariably concern the question of how and 
when one culture is justified in criticising and replacing the epistemic activities of 
another culture. Such concerns would seem to be a replay of his dalliance with cultural 
relativism, but in the later philosophy they reflect a new position: the epistemic 
practices of one culture can be judged legitimately by another because there is a 
standard of judgement. An epistemic activity that meets with enormous resistance from 
reality will not fulfil its aims as well as one, perhaps from another community, which 
shares its aims; in that case, one can make a good case for the replacement of the less 
effective epistemic activity. 
I conclude that Feyerabend’s later metaphysics is a form of metaphysical realism. It 
successfully sustains and encourages epistemic pluralism and so also functions as a 
form of normative realism. The later metaphysics is not a form of social construction 
because Feyerabend included the clause that reality resists certain epistemic activities. 
There are objective features of reality that impose limits upon the kind and range of 
manifest realities that reality can sustain. I concur with Farrell that ‘Feyerabend 
emerges as an, albeit idiosyncratic, but nonetheless unmistakable, realist’ (Farrell, 2001: 
363). The later Feyerabend therefore succeeds in providing a thesis of metaphysical 
realism which fulfils his aim of sustaining a radical epistemic pluralism. In the next 
section, I connect this interpretation with Feyerabend’s earlier work on 
incommensurability and proliferation and suggest that one could identify Feyerabend as 
defending a sort of ‘perspectival realism’, of the sort recently defended by Ron Giere. 
As a caveat, my aims in this Chapter are not to defend the later Feyerabend’s 
metaphysics and epistemology, but only to provide the most charitable interpretation of 
them. There are many problems with these aspects of the later Feyerabend, some of 
which have been noted; however, in Chapter nine I suggest that many of these problems 
can be sidestepped if one interprets the ‘metaphysics’ as a methodological device.  
8.4 Incommensurability and perspectivism. 
In earlier sections of this Chapter, I argued that Feyerabend’s later metaphysics was 
intended to support a radical epistemic pluralism.  The key feature of the metaphysics is 
that reality is responsive to a diversity of epistemic activities, far more so than many 
philosophers of science have tended to suppose. Feyerabend concluded that reality is 
therefore metaphysically capable of sustaining epistemic pluralism. Epistemic pluralism 
not only maximises our epistemic engagement with reality but also enables us to fulfil 
diverse human explanatory aims, including the values and concerns of diverse human 
cultures.  In this section, I summarise my account of Feyerabend’s later metaphysics 
and the value of cultural and epistemic diversity by providing an account of what 
Feyerabend means by the ‘abundance’ of reality. 
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Feyerabend’s metaphysical theorising began with an emphasis upon the ‘abundance’ 
of reality.  This theme is first visible in Farewell to Reason, although it is clearly 
continuous with the pluralistic themes of the earlier philosophy.  Oberheim makes the 
strong and plausible claim that all throughout his career Feyerabend’s had ‘no 
allegiance to any philosophical isms other than pluralism’ and that his philosophy 
consisted in ‘a pluralistic philosophical method that calls for pluralism in science and 
philosophy in the pursuit of progress’ (Oberheim, 2006: 277, 287). The idea of 
‘abundance’ is Feyerabend’s attempt to provide an account of how epistemic pluralism 
can be accommodated within a metaphysical picture of the world. This interest in the 
metaphysics of epistemic pluralism reflects another longstanding theme in 
Feyerabend’s philosophy, namely, incommensurability. Feyerabend’s account of 
incommensurability progressed throughout his career as he applied it to different 
problems, for instance, the relation between scientific theories and, later, between 
human cultures. The core issue motivating his various forms of incommensurability was 
the question of how multiple accounts can be legitimately be given of a single 
phenomenon. Feyerabend asked ‘why should it not be possible to say conflicting things 
about the same situation and not yet be right?’ (Feyerabend, 1987: 81). 
Incommensurability arises between conceptual perspectives based upon incompatible 
theoretical principles, the standard example from the history of science being 
Newtonian and relativistic conceptions of space. 
Feyerabend argued that incommensurability primarily arises between ‘universal 
theories’. A universal theory is one which makes fundamental claims about the nature 
of reality. Feyerabend thought that all theories have ontological implications and this of 
course becomes problematic when one employs two alternative theories with competing 
ontological commitments. Such ontological problems may arise sequentially, when one 
theory replaces another (for instance, in a ‘paradigm shift’), or simultaneously, when 
two conceptually incompatible theories are employed at the same time (for instance, 
when a physicist shifts between relativistic and Newtonian physics—they cannot both 
be true, but, then, they do not need to be for most scientific purposes). Feyerabend was 
always intrigued by the fact that ‘when fundamental theories change, meanings change, 
which can result in a new conception of the nature of reality’ (Oberheim, 2006: 123).  
The success of a plurality of scientific theories leads to the puzzling metaphysical 
problem of how one is to account for the vindication of the mutually inconsistent 
ontologies those theories embody. This puzzle eventually came to motivate the later 
metaphysics and resulted in the account of ‘abundance’. Oberheim explains the 
relationship between incommensurability and the metaphysics of epistemic pluralism: 
 
‘Feyerabend used the notion of incommensurability to characterise the 
relation between two successive ‘fundamental’, ‘universal’, or 
‘comprehensive’ scientific theories. By these he meant non-instantial 
theories that talk about everything that there is … By restricting his notion to 
transitions involving such comprehensive theories, Feyerabend intended to 
stipulate those that have ontological implications; i.e., those that have 
implications about the very nature of reality.’ (Oberheim, 2006: 157) 
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Feyerabend argued that incommensurability arises when the success of two or more 
theories commits us to accepting the mutually inconsistent ontologies those theories 
embody. The appeals in the later philosophy to the various mythological and magical 
cosmologies are intended as rhetorical radicalisations of the problem of 
incommensurability. But even if one confines the phenomenon of incommensurability 
to recognisably scientific theories, the problem stands because the plurality of 
successful scientific theories provides a sufficient diversity of mutually incompatible 
ontologies. Incommensurability is therefore a response to the problem of the 
metaphysics of epistemic pluralism: how can a plurality of theories (or epistemic 
activities) all meaningfully refer to a single reality when the ontologies those theories 
embody are mutually incompatible? 
The solution to this is to recognise the interactive nature of human knowledge about 
the world. Feyerabend emphasised that our inquiries into the world are conditioned in a 
wide variety of ways. Conquest of Abundance details the perceptual and cognitive 
capacities of human beings, the contingencies of our language and concepts, the 
particularities of the social and material conditions which constitute our epistemic 
activities, the array of cognitive and practical values informing the direction of research, 
and the wider cultural and historical factors affecting the interpretation of our 
knowledge of the world. This emphasis upon the multiple contingencies affecting 
human epistemic activities corresponds to the wealth of literature in historical, 
philosophical, sociological, and cognitive studies of science. Feyerabend argued that 
such complexity and contingency is partly constitutive of the ‘abundance’ of reality, 
since these multiple conditions create highly textured epistemic practices. However, the 
contingencies accompanying our epistemic activities also condition the knowledge that 
they generate because they introduce complex conceptual and other parameters to the 
inquiries we engage in and the knowledge they produce. This is a lesson that 
Feyerabend imported from his studies in the philosophy of quantum mechanics: the 
particularities of our experimental arrangements affects the knowledge thus produced 
and variations in those arrangements will produce different outputs. To understand 
Feyerabend’s remarks upon the contingencies of human epistemic activities one can 
compare it with Giere’s recent defence of ‘perspectival realism’. I will give a brief 
account of Giere’s perspectival realism and then argue that it provides an excellent 
model for understanding Feyerabend’s own commitment to epistemic pluralism. 
There are three reasons for using Giere’s perspectival realism to understand 
Feyerabend’s metaphysics of epistemic pluralism. The first is that both defend a 
pluralistic realism which both permits and encourages a proliferation of epistemic 
activities. The second is that both are keen to avoid the twin extremes of objectivist 
realism and social constructionism; this is particularly important for the defence of 
Feyerabend against Preston’s charge. The third is that there is an existing literature 
upon Giere and Feyerabend, namely Matthew Brown’s (2009) comparison of the two. I 
give an account of Giere’s perspectivism and then consider whether the later 
Feyerabend can be understood as a form of perspectivist. 
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In recent years Ron Giere (2006a, 2006b) has developed a thesis of ‘perspectival 
realism’. The aim of Giere’s perspectival realism is to develop a pluralistic 
understanding of scientific knowledge that can mediate between objective realism, on 
the one hand, and social constructivism, on the other. Its affinity to the later Feyerabend 
is therefore obvious. Giere’s aim is to affirm both the role of human agency within 
scientific observation and theorising and the possibilities for a realistic interpretation of 
the theories thus generated. The resulting ‘perspectival realism’ is, he argues, ‘as much 
realism as science can provide. Objectivist realism cannot be even an ideal goal’ (Giere, 
2006a: 16).127 The reason is that scientific observation and theorising are perspectival 
insofar as they apply to only certain aspects of the world and only ever imprecisely (for 
the reason, of course, that they apply to some aspects at the expense of others).  
Giere illustrates his perspectivism with the example of colour vision. Contrary to 
common sense, objects and lights are not ‘objectively’ coloured in the way we imagine. 
Grass, for instance, is not actually green ‘in itself’ since its perceived colour is the result 
of a fairly complex interaction between its physical properties and the evolved human 
visual system, and the wider cultural and linguistic factors which inform our 
perceptions. Colour is the result of an interaction between features of the world and our 
perceptual and cognitive systems. Giere argues that his ‘interactionist’ account of 
colour complicates the question of whether colours are objective properties of the 
world. They are if human beings are counted as parts of the objective world, in 
conformity with a commitment to naturalism, but they are not if, as Giere puts it, ‘one 
imagines a world in which humans never appeared with their contingently evolved 
visual system’, for then ‘there is no basis for assigning colours to any object’. Without 
human beings with their evolved visual system there would simply be ‘a hodgepodge of 
physical characteristics’ (Giere, 2006a: 27). 
The example of colour vision illustrates the principles of perspectival pluralism. The 
representations of the world that are generated by our various practices of scientific 
observation and theorising are the results of interactions between the world on the one 
hand and our contingent epistemic activities. Our instruments, as specific and material 
forms of epistemic activity, respond to only certain aspects of the world and then only 
with a limited responsiveness.128 Such instruments do ‘greatly enlarge and enrich’ our 
perspectives upon the world but they are, still, inescapably perspectival. Therefore the 
knowledge they produce is therefore constituted by the particular interactions between 
our epistemic activities and the world itself. Giere puts it nicely when he explains that 
‘claims about what is observed cannot be detached from the means of observation’ and 
that such observations ‘remain internal to the relevant perspective’ (Giere, 2006a: 48, 
49). There is therefore no perspective which is ‘outside’ of any perspective and from 
                                                           
127
 Feyerabend similarly rejects objectivist realism and constructionism as extreme 
positions (Feyerabend, 1993: 271; 2001: 241). 
128
 Feyerabend had earlier suggested that one consequence of the partial character of our 
epistemic activities is that ‘[f]eatures lacking in the description tend to recede into the 
background, outlines emphasised by the description become more distinct (Feyerabend, 
1987: 106, original emphasis). 
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which one could therefore survey and assess all other perspectives: ‘[t]he knowledge we 
get comes from one perspective or another, not from no perspective at all. Multiplying 
perspectives does not eliminate perspectives’ (Giere, 2006a: 92).129 
The plurality of perspectives available to us is a consequence of two points. The first 
is the empirical fact that the world can sustain perspectival pluralism. Both historical 
and contemporary scientific practice makes it clear that there are a variety of 
perspectives at work, often many within even a narrowly defined domain of inquiry. 
And Giere is careful to stress that his perspectival pluralism need entail no strong 
metaphysical commitments about ‘what the world is like’ (see Giere, 2006a: 67f). The 
second is a result of the fact that perspectives are both ‘partial’ and what Giere calls 
‘interest-relative’ (Giere, 2006a: 73), that is, constituted by certain specific human 
values and explanatory interests. All perspectives have their own capacities and 
deficiencies relative to the aims informing them and the parameters introduced by the 
instruments and theories which generate them. Since there is neither certainty nor 
justified expectation that these explanatory aims will be shared across diverse research 
communities there is no good reason why any single perspective could legitimately be 
judged to be superior or more ‘objective’ than any other. The successfulness of each 
perspective is dependent upon its successful representation of the aspects of the world 
in relation to the explanatory interests informing it.  
This preserves both a commitment to realism and an acknowledgement of the 
constitutive role of values in scientific inquiries. Nor is there any reason to suppose that 
a plurality of perspectives should be compatible with one another; one can accept 
differences between scientific theories if one recognises that they reflect different 
explanatory interests. Problems only arise when one insists upon the exclusivity or 
primacy of some one theory, a point discussed in Chapter four. Giere offers a metaphor: 
many cartographical projections are different from one another, even though they are all 
perspectives upon the Earth’s surface, for the reason that they cannot simultaneously 
preserve shapes and areas everywhere. The differences between these projections 
therefore arise from a trade off in these variables—certain shapes are ‘smoothed’, for 
instance, whilst certain areas may be obscured or perhaps absented altogether. ‘This 
feature of the example’, writes Giere, ‘conflicts with what I presume to be the 
widespread methodological presumption among scientists that different perspectives on 
a single universe should, in principle, be compatible’ (Giere, 2006a: 80). This makes 
sense: often in mapmaking, for instance, accuracy is sacrificed in favour of 
interpretability—and so with perspectives more generally, one must balance a range of 
explanatory and pragmatic values against representational and other considerations.   
The partial character of perspectives of course offers an argument in favour of 
pluralism. Since each perspective focuses on only certain aspects of the world and only 
then to a certain degree, the majority of the world’s aspects are left out. And as Giere 
(2006a: 47f) notes, even those aspects which are included are then subjected to 
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 Giere (2006a: 93) concludes that an ‘absolute conception of the world’ in the sense 
made famous by Bernard Williams (1978) is therefore ‘unattainable’, even if one does 
still enjoy ‘a viable notion of scientific realism [which] is perspectival and contingent’. 
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distortion by the computational and other processes that instrumental data must go 
through in order to become cognitively usable. An obvious strategy to address the 
partial character of perspectives is to invoke a principle of proliferation. The ‘gaps’ in 
one perspective can be identified by the occupation of another, alternative perspective; 
to borrow a term from van Fraassen, each perspective ‘occludes’ certain features of the 
world (van Fraassen 2010: 34-39 passim) and so by occupying a plurality of standpoints 
one can attain a more complete image of the object or phenomena under inquiry. I say 
‘more complete’ because one cannot, of course, enjoy a complete perspective upon the 
world for the obvious reason that a perspective is generated by a cluster of instrumental 
and theoretical commitments which necessarily delimit the aspects of the world 
represented and the degree of accuracy to which that represent can attain.130 A ‘view 
from nowhere’ would be no view at all. Perspectival pluralism therefore will not 
provide us with a ‘complete’ view of the world in all its aspects, but it will maximise 
the number of aspects available within the perspectives available to us. 
Giere suggests a further role for perspectival pluralism. Often the contingencies 
inherent in certain perspectives will remain invisible and undetectable without the 
resources offered by alternative perspectives. This is, Giere stresses, only a ‘possibility’ 
since there is no assurance than the mere occupation of one perspective provides us 
with an advantageous critical stance upon another. However, ‘in the major historical 
examples of changes in theoretical perspective, the specific contingencies that sustained 
the earlier perspective became evident only from the vantage point of the later 
perspective. Often it is only from a new perspective that one can see, relative to that 
new perspective, where the earlier perspective was lacking’ (Giere, 2006a: 94). A due 
sense of epistemic humility and a commitment to methodological fallibilism therefore 
requires us to generate new perspectives to fulfil critical as well as the more obvious 
explanatory functions; and, of course, each perspective can in potential fulfil both 
critical and explanatory aims. 
How does Giere’s perspectival realism compare to Feyerabend’s pluralistic realism? 
Brown (2009: 219) compares Giere’s perspectivism with the later Feyerabend and 
summarises their shared picture of perspectivism in three related claims: 
 
1. That observation and theory are both limited and partial perspectives on the 
world. 
2. That inquiry doesn’t disclose a single, coherent description of the world, but a 
plurality of overlapping perspectives, which are compatible in one sense, which 
                                                           
130
 A similar point is made by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of 
Perception, where he writes that: ‘I see the next-door house from a certain angle, but it 
would be seen differently from the right bank of the Seine, or from the inside, or again 
fro an aeroplane: the house itself is none of these appearances … Is not to see always to 
see from somewhere? To say that the house itself is seen from nowhere is surely to say 
that it is invisible!’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1996: 67). I thank Simon James for bringing this 
passage to my attention. 
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are all perspectives on the same world, but don’t add up to an absolute view of 
the world. 
3. These perspectives are inherently bound to our purposes, interests, practices, 
and abilities.131 
 
Following Brown, I agree that Feyerabend can be interpreted as defending a form of 
perspectivism. Our diverse epistemic activities reflect our purposes and interests and 
their interaction with reality generates what Giere calls ‘perspectives’ and what 
Feyerabend calls ‘manifest realities’. These are complex and dynamic and include a 
complex array of values, practices, epistemic activities, material and social 
contingencies, and reality itself. As Feyerabend puts it, ‘the world as described by 
scientists is the result of a complex exchange between Nature [or, Being] … and 
inquisitive research teams including, possibly, the whole subculture that supports them’ 
(Feyerabend, 2001: 239). Since these perspectives or manifest realities are ‘interest-
relative’ they are, to borrow one of Feyerabend’s terms, ‘incommensurable’ with one 
another, even though they all pertain to the same world. Therefore, our diverse 
epistemic activities generate a plurality of perspectives upon reality; this is epistemic 
realism, since the knowledge thus generated does reflect genuine features of the world, 
but is preserves what Brown calls the ‘human contribution’, the fact that our epistemic 
activities necessarily include our biological, cognitive, and social capacities, as well as 
our values and interests. As Brown puts it, ‘the human contribution … must be 
understood as making as much of a contribution to the activity of comparison as the 
things being compared’ (Brown, 2009: 219). 
Giere and Feyerabend also share a common commitment to pluralism. Both affirm 
that our epistemic activities are ‘perspectival’ in the sense that each one can fulfil only 
certain of our values and concerns. For Giere, each perspective locks onto only certain 
aspects of the world and then only with a limited accuracy; similarly for Feyerabend, 
our manifest realities reflect only certain of our purposes and aims and are similarly 
structured by conceptual, methodological, and other commitments. The ‘partial’ 
character of our perspectives (or manifest realities) should therefore encourage us to 
proliferate and embrace pluralism. For both Giere and Feyerabend, proliferation enables 
us to expand the range of perspectives available to us. This will maximise both the 
range of aspects of the world accessible to us and our capacity to generate critical 
comparisons between our perspectives. Indeed, Giere suggests that it is ‘[o]ften only 
from a new perspective that one can see, relative to that new perspective, where the 
earlier perspective was lacking’—and he credits this point to Feyerabend’s remarks on 
proliferation in ‘Explanation, Reductionism, and Empiricism’ (Feyerabend, 1962) 
(Giere, 2006a: 94, n49).  
Perspectivism therefore entails pluralism and proliferation. Since no one perspective 
can fulfil all of our diverse explanatory, representational, and other interests, 
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 Brown in fact adds a fourth claim, that ‘[r]epresentation is a four-way affair between 
theory, world, audience, and guiding purposes’, but this is less relevant for my purposes 
here. 
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proliferation and pluralism is our best strategy. Indeed, both Giere and Feyerabend 
reject monism as a goal of scientific inquiries on the grounds that it reduces our 
epistemic engagement with reality, the number of explanatory interests represented, and 
the potential for critical improvement. The virtue of perspectives (or manifest realities) 
is that they are partial, but this is also their vice; however, this vice is easily corrected 
by proliferation and pluralism. Giere (2006b) emphasises the fact that his perspectivism 
is necessarily pluralistic, and Feyerabend concurs; in a passage from Conquest of 
Abundance which is especially amenable to a perspectivist interpretation, Feyerabend 
argues that: 
 
‘[A]llowing abundance to take over would be the end of life and existence as 
we know it—abundance and chaos are different aspects of one and the same 
world. We need simplifications (e.g., we need bodies with restricted motions 
and brains with restricted modes of perception). But there are many such 
simplifications, not just one, and they can be changed to remove the elitism 
which so far has dominated Western civilization.’ (Feyerabend, 2001: 241) 
 
The language in this passage is looser, but Feyerabend is clearly thinking along the 
same lines as Giere. Our epistemic engagement with reality is mediated by biological, 
perceptual, cognitive, instrumental, and social factors and each of these introduces 
limitations upon the knowledge thus produced. Therefore one should proliferate and 
maximise the number of perspectives so that the partial character of each perspective 
can be best accounted for. Using Giere’s perspectivism, Feyerabend’s position can be 
clarified: there is a single world, Being, but our knowledge of it is always conditioned 
by biological, cognitive, and other commitments. These commitments occlude certain 
features of the world, emphasising some at the expense of others, introducing a partial 
quality to the knowledge thus generated. Therefore, proliferation and pluralism should 
be recognised as our best means of avoiding a situation in which we are 
epistemologically and critically impoverished. 
Can the later Feyerabend be understood as defending a form of perspectival realism? 
I suggest that he can, for three reasons. Firstly, Feyerabend is keen to develop a thesis 
of epistemic realism which incorporates both human agency and metaphysical realism. 
Like Giere, he steers a course between objectivist realism and social constructionism. 
Therefore the later Feyerabend shares the aims of perspectivism. Secondly, Feyerabend 
maintains that the inclusion of contingency of human epistemic agency—
instrumentation, explanatory values, and so on—introduces a ‘partial’ character to the 
perspectives we generate. Our perspectives disclose certain aspects of the world to a 
certain degree of accuracy. Giere calls this the ‘perspectival character’ of our 
knowledge, whereas Feyerabend more negatively refers to the ‘simplifying’ nature of 
the ‘abstractions’ we employ. The point in both cases is that our knowledge of the 
world is partial and perspectival and reflects features of the world as interpreted 
according to the particularities of the epistemic activities we engage in. Thirdly, the 
partial or perspectival character of our knowledge of the world introduces a normative 
argument for proliferation. Giere and Feyerabend both argue that any single perspective 
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is limited in two ways: epistemically, it can only engage with certain features of the 
world and explanatorily, it can only fulfil certain of our explanatory aims. Therefore in 
order to maximise our epistemic engagement with reality and to fulfil multiple 
explanatory aims one must actively proliferate the number and kind of perspectives 
available.  
The perspectival interpretation of the later Feyerabend has other advantages in that it 
is consonant with the arguments for epistemic pluralism offered by Chang and Harding. 
Feyerabend’s perspectivism runs as follows: human epistemic activities are conditioned 
by various material, social, and intellectual contingencies, up to and including large-
scale cultural values and interests. These are necessary to the constitution of the 
particular epistemic activities we engage in, but they also delimit the aspects of the 
world that we have epistemic access to. Therefore one should proliferate and increase 
the number and kind of perspectives available and this includes encouraging critical 
interaction between those perspectives. The resulting plurality of perspectives will still 
be highly conditioned and therefore there is no promise, and perhaps no possibility, that 
they can be unified; however this is not a problem, because any such unity is precluded 
by the basic incompatibilities of (for instance) the explanatory aims informing those 
perspectives. The unity of science must therefore be rejected as a viable aim of 
scientific inquiry. An effective strategy for pluralising the sciences is, following 
Feyerabend and Harding, to incorporate the epistemic resources of non-Western 
cultures and use these to both rehabilitate the disenfranchised epistemic projects of 
those cultures and, following Chang, to revitalise Western scientific projects.  
The foregoing interpretation of the later Feyerabend provides the best interpretation 
of his later metaphysics. It aligns him with contemporary pluralists such as Chang and 
Giere and it connects them, in turn, with postcolonial philosophers of science such as 
Harding. In so doing, it identifies an important connection between cultural and 
epistemic diversity and so fulfils that important aim of Feyerabend’s later philosophy. 
Interpreting the later Feyerabend using perspectivism also helps to make sense of his 
remarks upon ‘abstractions’ and locates these relative to his longstanding concern with 
pluralism and proliferation. Perhaps most importantly, the perspectivist interpretation of 
the later Feyerabend enables us to give a coherent account of the idea of ‘abundance’ 
which is so central to the later philosophy. The abundance that Feyerabend praises 
arises from the interaction of diverse human epistemic activities on the one hand and 
reality on the other. Our inquiries into the world are conditioned by a diversity of 
factors, cognitive, environmental, social, epistemic, and historical. Such diversities 
enable a radical epistemic pluralism, encompassing multiple systems of knowledge, 
modes of inquiry, and forms of knowledge and these collectively maximise the 
‘approaches’ that we make to Being. As our approaches become more numerous and 
diverse they enable us to disclose a greater number of aspects of Being to greater 
degrees of articulation. The plurality of ‘manifest realities’ generated therefore 
maximises our epistemic engagement with reality, it allows us to satisfy multiple 
explanatory goals and it ensures that the values and interests of diverse human cultures 
are represented within out epistemic activities. The ‘doctrine of abundance’ so 
conceived also promises to ‘help us to think more creatively about the possibilities and 
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the value for everyone of living in a world of multiple knowledge systems’ (Harding, 
2006; 51). 
 
8.5 Conclusions. 
This Chapter offered a study of the metaphysics and epistemology developed in 
Feyerabend’s later philosophy. I identified the aims of this metaphysics as being to 
provide foundations for a radical epistemic pluralism. The metaphysics was then 
reconstructed from the various scattered accounts of it throughout the later writings. 
The core idea is that reality is sufficiently metaphysically complex to sustain multiple 
epistemic activities, which identify certain aspects of it to a certain degree of 
complexity. The interaction of our epistemic activities and reality can be stabilised so 
that they successfully fulfil the explanatory aims which inform them. I then suggested 
that Feyerabend’s later metaphysics can be understood as a form of perspectival realism 
which is consonant with his wider emphasis upon the value of cultural and epistemic 
diversity.  
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Chapter Nine 
Ch9 Pluralism and the Ineffability of Reality 
 
9.1 Metaphysics and pluralism. 
9.2 Epistemic pluralism and the ineffability of reality. 
9.3 Can ineffability really secure epistemic pluralism? 
9.4 The doctrine of ineffability as a ‘first-order-norm’. 
9.5 Ineffability and intellectual virtues. 
9.6 Conclusions. 
 
The later Feyerabend defended a thoroughgoing epistemic pluralism. Reality is 
receptive to many different modes of inquiry and forms of knowledge, including, but 
certainly not limited to, those of the Western sciences.  Feyerabend defended this 
pluralism in two ways. First, he provided a series of epistemological arguments, which 
emphasised maximising criticism and empirical content, and affirming the diversity of 
values informing human epistemic activities. I connect this with contemporary debates 
over scientific pluralism, and values in science. Second, and more intriguingly, 
Feyerabend argued that the only way to safeguard epistemological pluralism was to 
assert the ‘ineffability’ of Reality. This ‘doctrine of ineffability’ precludes any one 
‘theory’, ‘worldview’, or, more broadly, one set of epistemic activities, from 
‘Platonising’ themselves, and asserting their ‘hard realist’ credentials. I then outline this 
‘doctrine of ineffability’ and consider whether it can really safeguard epistemic 
pluralism in the way that Feyerabend suggests, using the recent work of Hasok Chang 
along the way. 
 
9.1 Metaphysics and pluralism. 
In his later philosophy, Feyerabend began to provide metaphysics to support his 
epistemic pluralism—or so I argued in Chapter eight. The metaphysics runs into many 
problems, some of which, like the constructionism charge, can be refuted; however, 
there are others which cannot be so easily discharged. I avoided critical discussion of 
these problems because in this Chapter I argue that, in fact, the ‘metaphysics’ that the 
later Feyerabend offers was not intended as a metaphysical system at all. Instead, it is a 
methodological and epistemological device whose aim is to support epistemic 
pluralism. The ‘doctrine of ineffability’ that the later Feyerabend offers is therefore not 
a metaphysical thesis but, rather, a methodological device.  
On my interpretation, the later Feyerabend does not need to provide any substantial 
metaphysics at all to support epistemic pluralism. There has been a marked tendency 
amongst scientific pluralists to embrace a form of ‘metaphysical quietism’. I offer two 
examples. Chang argues that: ‘[my] epistemic pluralism does not rest primarily on any 
specific beliefs about the fundamental ontology of nature. Without denying the 
inevitable linkage between epistemology and metaphysics, I want to show that there are 
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strong arguments for pluralism that do not depend on strong and assured views about 
what the world is really like’ (Chang, 2010, n.p.).132 Similarly, Stephen Kellert, Helen 
Longino, and Ken Waters remark that the pluralism they defend in their paper ‘The 
Pluralist Stance’ is ‘not based on any metaphysical assumptions’, and they remark that 
they ‘have no a priori basis for assessing the monist assumption that the nature of the 
world is such that its parts can be completely described or explained by a 
comprehensive account grounded on a consistent set of fundamental principles’ 
(Kellert, Longino, and Waters, 2006: xiii). In both cases, leading pluralists maintain that 
epistemic pluralism neither relies upon, nor need invoke, any particular metaphysical 
claims. One can rely simply upon historical, epistemological, or empirical arguments, 
without needing to ‘go metaphysical’.133 Indeed, some pluralists maintain that making 
metaphysical claims is not only unnecessary, but may threaten to prematurely foreclose 
certain possibilities for epistemic pluralism, and so should be resisted on those 
grounds.134  
Feyerabend concurs that there are good epistemological arguments for pluralism. 
However, into his later work, he began to argue that pluralists do need something 
further, and so, it seems, began to abandon the metaphysical quietism of later pluralists 
like Chang, Kellert, Longino, and Waters. In Conquest of Abundance, this further thesis 
was what I dubbed the ‘doctrine of ineffability’. That book includes a bold historical 
thesis—which I will not explore here—the guiding point of which is that the history of 
thought indicates that Being is rich, responsive, and ‘abundant’, responsive to a radical 
diversity of epistemic activities. This is the point that Feyerabend was making in his 
remark that ‘[a]bundance occurs in history. It does not occur in the world’ (2001, 139). 
The marvellous epistemic pluralism that Conquest of Abundance appeals to is not an 
ontological feature of reality – although of course it may be, for all we know – but, 
rather, a reflection of the diversity of values and interests informing our epistemic 
activities, of the complex material and social conditions within which they occur, and, 
perhaps most importantly, of the ingenuity, imagination, and tenacity of human beings. 
These reasons alone are sufficient grounds for affirming that Being is more responsive 
and manifold than many philosophers and scientists have supposed: history teaches and 
affirms pluralism. What remains now is to consider this pluralism in relation to the 
doctrine of ineffability, because in the foregoing discussion the arguments given were 
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 I quote from the text of Chang’s written paper, and thank him for allowing me to see 
a copy of the paper. See also Chang (forthcoming: Ch6). 
133
 Dupré’s ‘promiscuous realism’ (1993, Ch1; 2002, 53-55) is a good example of an 
epistemic pluralism that does rest on strong metaphysical claims. 
134
 One might object that no danger to pluralism need arise, as long as one entertains a 
sufficiently ‘rich’ metaphysics. I agree that there are ‘richer’ and ‘poorer’ metaphysical 
systems; however, my worry is that even a very rich metaphysics will still foreclose 
certain epistemic activities—by mere fact of having certain ontological commitments of 
its own—and so constitute a danger, even if only in principle, to the sort of radical 
pluralism I have in mind. My thanks to Alex Carruth for raising this point. 
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historical and epistemological. Is there still a need for a quasi-metaphysical ‘doctrine of 
ineffability’? 
 
9.3 Can ineffability really secure epistemic pluralism? 
Feyerabend claimed that insistence on the ineffability of Being is an essential 
precondition for defending radical epistemic pluralism. Although the various historical, 
epistemological, and empirical arguments are persuasive, there is still a need for some 
further ‘metaphysical’ claim: in this case, that Being is ineffable, meaning that one 
cannot have positive knowledge about it (and this includes both the nature of Being 
itself and the conditions or factors underlying the ‘resistance’ it offers’).135 In 
Feyerabend’s words, Being, ‘if such an entity can be postulated, is ineffable. What we 
do know are the various forms of manifest reality.’ He continues that that ‘[m]any 
scientists identify the particular manifest reality they have developed with Ultimate 
Reality’—that is, Being—but cautions that ‘[t]his is simply a mistake’ (2001, 214). This 
is a bald statement of the doctrine of ineffability, and it immediately invites several 
objections. 
There are a range of possible objections to the doctrine of ineffability, but I will 
consider just three. First, the nihilistic objection: if we cannot know reality, then why 
bother? Many of our inquiries are directed towards the end of describing reality as it is, 
at establishing some sort of ‘correspondence’ between our best theories and reality. A 
doctrine of ineffability would forever preclude such ambitions, and, for that reason, 
could be seen to encourage a sort of epistemological nihilism. To this, I think, 
Feyerabend could make two responses: first, knowledge of Being itself is not anyway 
within our epistemic reach—our cognitive capacities do not allow it, so it is not and 
never was a viable goal. And second, there is no need, in any case, for us to entertain 
such ‘realist’ ambitions. The diversity of explanatory values and interests informing our 
epistemic activities provide us with more than enough to go on, without needing to 
press the ‘objectivist realist’ line (see Giere, 2006). Second, there is the superfluity 
objection: that, interesting as a doctrine of ineffability may be, there is simply no need 
for it. Certainly critics like Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam have objected that such 
doctrines ‘do not get us anywhere’, are ‘quite empty’, and argue that there is ‘nothing in 
the history of science’ which suggests that they are anything to ‘aim at’.136 The 
implication for the pluralist is that the epistemological and other arguments for 
pluralism are enough, and so any further arguments, especially those which violate 
metaphysical quietism, are just superfluous. Indeed, introducing further, exotic claims 
like the doctrine of ineffability may even be dangerous and open pluralism up to a 
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 See the correspondence in Ben-Israel (2001), where Feyerabend candidly discusses 
his developing doctrine of ineffability (although, of course, he does not use that term). 
136
 Rorty and Putnam’s criticisms are documented and discussed in Cooper (2002), 281-
282. Cooper himself defends a ‘doctrine of mystery’—and, incidentally, invokes 
Feyerabend’s ideas in Conquest of Abundance. See further Cooper (2000). 
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whole range of criticisms that it could easily avoid without any loss to its 
persuasiveness.  
Third, and related to this, there is the baroque objection: that the doctrine of 
ineffability is just far too unnecessarily complicated. It opens up a metaphysical can of 
worms which simply complicates the pluralism debate without any obvious advantage 
to the pluralist, such that it is better simply to let it be. On these terms, Chang, Kellert, 
Longino, and Waters were correct to insist on metaphysical quietism—and I agree. 
There are many problems with Feyerabend’s ‘metaphysics of Being’, not all of which 
can be accounted for by pointing to the fact that Conquest of Abundance was left 
uncompleted at the time of Feyerabend’s death; and although he promised, in a letter to 
a correspondent, that though his ideas seemed ‘rather mystical’, he could make sense of 
them and provide hard arguments, the absence of them means, alas, that the superfluity 
and baroque objections do stand—at least, in the face of the plausible claim that the 
epistemological, historical, and empirical arguments are enough, and that metaphysical 
quietism is, if nothing else, the pragmatic or tactical response. 
The superfluity and baroque objections seem to me reasonable enough. However, 
one would like to do justice to Feyerabend, so perhaps it is worth spending a little 
longer considering the possible nature and merits of the doctrine of ineffability. Clearly 
Feyerabend was aware of these objections, and the fact that he pressed on with the 
doctrine of ineffability, affirming it throughout many of his later essays and papers, 
indicates that it must, to his mind at the least, have been doing some important work. 
So, exercising the principle of charity, what functions might the doctrine of ineffability 
be fulfilling, given Feyerabend’s guiding concern to defend a radical epistemic 
pluralism? 
 
9.4 The doctrine of ineffability as a ‘first-order-norm’. 
To answer this question, I propose that the doctrine of ineffability be considered as a 
‘first-order norm’ that can guide human inquiries into reality. A first-order norm is ‘an 
expression of disapproval or approval toward a combination of attitudes’ (Marturano, 
2005: §4a). In this case, the (objectionable) attitudes in question are epistemic, and 
include dogmatism, intolerance, and other symptoms of a ‘monistic’ stance towards 
reality, and to our epistemic engagements with it. It is a pragmatic device that ought to 
be accepted by a given community of inquirers that lends shape and structure to their 
epistemic activities. The term and idea of a ‘first-order norm’ is borrowed from Simon 
Blackburn’s Ruling Passions (1998), where he writes that ‘our first-order ethical 
practice is based on the presupposition that there are objective, independent, binding 
ethical facts, facts that exert pressure on all rational beings, whereas in truth there are 
no such facts’. The idea here is that some form of ‘moral realism’ should be accepted 
by a given moral community to provide essential structure and depth to our moral 
beliefs and practices. Blackburn continues that ‘[t]he view that there is an authoritative 
source for ethics is purely a fiction’, which ‘may be a useful fiction’, but cautions that it 
would ‘be a mistake to take it for the truth’ (1998: 301). 
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Blackburn thus proposes that some form of ostensible moral realism should be 
accepted as a ‘first-order norm’ to provide much-needed security for our moral beliefs 
and practices. For instance, this norm would guard against the ever-present danger that 
one might lapse into some form of corrosive moral anti-realism, or relativism, or other 
such slippery positions, which would cast our moral activities into disorder. On these 
terms, ‘moral realism’ does not function as any sort of metaphysical claim, but, rather, 
as a guiding norm that can provide stability, structure, and foundation for moral beliefs 
and activities which might otherwise lapse into disorder. It is a sort of ‘regulative ideal’, 
assented to by a given moral community, as a pragmatic device to help order and 
structure moral life. As Blackburn reiterates, ‘what seems like a thought that embodies 
a particular second-order metaphysic of morals is seen instead as a kind of thought that 
expresses a first-order attitude or need’. The reason is that obligation—in this case, 
moral obligation—needs to seem ‘peremptory and absolute’ (as George Eliot put it), 
and so in turn ‘often needs to be perceived as something sufficiently external to us to 
act as a constraint or bound on our other sentiments and desires’ (1993: 153). 
I propose that the doctrine of ineffability functions as just such a first-order norm. It 
is, ostensibly, a strong metaphysical claim, but, in fact, is a communally-acceptable 
norm. Like any first-order norm, its function is to ‘promote our goals’, for instance, by 
providing a means for ‘co-ordinating human actions, avoiding conflict, generating 
conventions, promoting the possibility of flourishing existence’ (Blackburn, 1998: 39). 
In Feyerabend’s case, the goals in mind are epistemic, and the ‘flourishing’ which these 
goals contribute to is a sort of epistemic flourishing, which he equates with pluralism. 
After all, our diverse practical and cognitive interests, and the values and interests 
informing them, are best served by recourse to epistemic pluralism (as the 
epistemological arguments for pluralism make clear.) However, to undercut the 
monistic tendencies apparent amongst many philosophers and scientists, there is a need 
to provide deep foundations for this epistemic pluralism, and the doctrine of 
ineffability, as a ‘first-order norm’, is intended to do just that. It affirms that there are 
many ways of ‘approaching’ and engaging with Being, but denies that any one of our 
sets of epistemic activities are privileged, such that their asserting their absolute status 
would be unjustified. 
This interpretation also protects Feyerabend against the three criticisms raised 
earlier: the nihilism, superfluity, and baroque objections. The last two are dealt with 
most easily: there is nothing superfluous or baroque about the doctrine of ineffability, 
because it is not a metaphysical claim. The doctrine of ineffability does not imply that 
we cannot know anything about Being, so it is not guilty of promoting epistemological 
nihilism. On the contrary, the ‘abundance’ that Feyerabend praises arises from the 
interaction of diverse human explanatory interests, values, and practices, on the one 
hand, and ineffable Being on the other. On these terms, the only limits to such 
‘abundance’ are the various monistic imperatives evident amongst certain groups of 
scientists and philosophers. Rather gnomically, the only limits to abundance are those 
epistemic attitudes which maintain that there is a true or final theory—a ‘theory of 
everything’, say—towards which our current epistemic diversity is aiming or 
‘converging’ upon. Feyerabend suggests that the main threats to epistemic pluralism are 
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these monistic attitudes, and proposes, instead, that scientists—and, indeed, all 
inquirers—should be humble, but optimistic. 
The doctrine of ineffability has a strategic role to play. It is intended to secure 
epistemic pluralism against the ambitions of ‘monists’, by forever precluding any one 
community of inquirers from ‘Platonising’ their own particular ‘manifest reality’. 
Feyerabend insists that each set of successful epistemic activities can affirm its own 
practical and cognitive merits; however, no one set can take the further step of 
‘Platonising’ or ‘absolutising’ itself, and identify the manifest reality it generates with 
Being itself. As long as Being is unknown, and the doctrine of ineffability affirmed, we 
must keep our epistemic options open; however, this isn’t a metaphysical claim but a 
‘first-order’ norm to guide and regulate human inquiries. 
How, then, does the doctrine of ineffability function as a ‘first-order norm’? First, it 
prevents any community of inquirers from identifying its own manifest reality with 
Being itself, and so preserves epistemic pluralism. As long as Being remains ineffable, 
it is wise to keep our epistemic options open, and preserve and exercise a vigorous 
pluralism. And this does not lapse into epistemological nihilism—quite the contrary—
because it maximises the number of active epistemic activities and assures that one 
gains the multiple ‘benefits of tolerance’ and ‘benefits of interaction’ that Chang 
describes. Second, and more importantly, the doctrine of ineffability encourages 
inquirers to cultivate a set of ‘intellectual virtues’: humility, tolerance, open-
mindedness, intellectual sympathy, and so on. It ensures that we adopt a proper attitude 
towards our own cognitive capacities, to entertain realistic estimations of our 
explanatory scope, tolerance of other modes of inquiry and forms of knowledge, and 
encourages a sense of wonder and possibility in the face of the ‘richness of Being’. 
 
9.5 Ineffability and intellectual virtues. 
A further claim can be made about the contribution that a doctrine of ineffability can 
make to sustain a vigorous epistemic pluralism. An acceptance of the ineffability of 
reality should promote the cultivation of certain intellectual virtues, especially in 
inquirers who accept it as a first-order norm. The intellectually-virtuous characters that 
result would, I think, be particularly receptive to epistemic pluralism. Indeed, my strong 
claim is that an intellectually-virtuous character is necessarily also a pluralist, although 
my arguments here do not rely upon this stronger claim.   
The connections between history and philosophy of science and virtue epistemology 
are fairly sparse at the moment, doubtless due to the still fairly-new status of virtue 
epistemology as a distinct area of epistemology. Despite this, a vocabulary of virtues is 
common amongst philosophers of science: terms (or, virtues) like ‘humility’, 
‘tolerance’, ‘open-mindedness’ are all used as terms of praise, and scientists themselves 
may be celebrated for their ‘discipline’, ‘perseverance’, and ‘generosity’. One great 
advantage and attraction of virtue epistemology is that it transforms these honorific 
terms into strong virtues, providing us with a new and deeper set of terms of praise—
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and, of course, criticism.137 There is, sadly, neither need nor space here to go into the 
possibilities for a ‘virtue-centric history and philosophy of science’. My aim is simply 
to suggest how Feyerabend’s doctrine of ineffability may sustain pluralism by 
encouraging the cultivation of certain intellectual virtues. 
To do this, it is instructive to note that Feyerabend’s doctrine of ineffability was 
largely inspired by the fifth-century Christian mystic Pseudo-Dionysius (1987), 
commonly known to theologians as Denys. Indeed, Feyerabend reports that, when 
developing his views on the ‘ineffability of Being’, that he ‘started from what Pseudo 
Dionysius Areopagita said about the names of God’.138 Feyerabend here refers to 
Denys’ On the Divine Names.139 For Denys, reality is ultimately identified with God. 
Human beings cannot have direct or complete knowledge of God, because of our 
limited perceptual, cognitive, and linguistic resources. What we can and do have is a 
whole series of ‘divine names’, each expressing an aspect of God—like ‘fire’, ‘light’, 
‘father’, ‘creator’, ‘wisdom’, and so on. Some of these divine names (like ‘fire’ and 
‘light’) are mutually coherent, but others (‘wisdom’ and ‘son’, say) certainly are not. 
Pseudo-Dionysius therefore concluded that our knowledge of God is partial and 
pluralistic, and that, therefore, the true nature of God does and will remain forever 
unknown and ineffable. The proper comportment that human beings should therefore 
assume when contemplating God is, therefore, best expressed by the intellectual and 
theological virtue of humility.140 Although the nature and significance of the virtue of 
humility is much contested, the guiding idea, in the theological context at least, is that 
human beings must acknowledge the proper limits concomitant to their inquiries into, 
and knowledge of, God. 141 
                                                           
137
 For instance, Chang (2010: 9) mentions a ‘reasonable humility’ which should arise 
from an appreciation of epistemic pluralism, ‘concerning human ingenuity, or a 
recognition of the complexity of life, or both’. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison 
(2007: 39-40) similarly note that a virtue-centric historiography has the ‘unexpected 
payoff’ of rendering the ‘oddly moralising tone’ of early modern scientific writing 
intelligible: their ‘admonitions, reproaches, and confessions’ referred not only to 
epistemic errors, like the intrusion of aesthetic judgements, but also reflected tangible 
moral failures—of patience, diligence, and so on. I say more about this in my (2009a). 
138
 See Feyerabend (2001: 195, 214, 233). See Gersh (1978) and Rorem (1993) for 
excellent introductions to Pseudo-Dionysius. For a fuller account of Feyerabend’s use 
of Pseudo-Dionysius, see Kidd (forthcoming c). 
139
 For a useful discussion of the ‘divine names’, see Janowitz (1991) 
140
 David E. Cooper (2002) similarly defends a ‘doctrine of mystery’, and offers a 
sustained argument for support the claim that the virtue of ‘humility’ is an essential 
feature of it. 
141
 There is a growing literature on the virtue of humility. For epistemic humility in 
science, see Kidd (2011b). The classic discussion is arguably the section ‘On Humility’ 
in Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (§161). See also Richards (1992). Often 
humility is interested as reflecting some sense of self-abasement—this is what 
Nietzsche disliked about Christianity. The interpretation of humility as a form of self-
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How do these remarks relate to Feyerabend? If one accepts that ultimate reality—
whether God or ‘Being’—is ineffable, then one must reassess one’s epistemic capacities 
accordingly. Most obviously, any ambitions to achieve a final, complete, or absolute 
knowledge or understanding must be abandoned. Correspondingly, one should accept 
that any such knowledge that one might claim will be partial, and pluralistic: Being 
responds to all of our epistemic activities and, as history indicates, can generate a vast 
diversity of ‘manifest realities’, each reflecting a complex interplay of our values, 
practices, and interests with ineffable and ‘abundant’ Being. These various manifest 
realities have, as it were, ragged edges and, owing to the diverse values and so forth 
which constitute them, cannot be harmonised or unified (nor, indeed, is there any need 
for them to be). Any such claims to unity, actual or inevitable, are, argues Feyerabend, 
‘a pedagogical fake’, or ‘an attempt to show, by a judicious up- and down-grading of 
disciplines, that a synthesis has already been achieved’ (2001: 154). Therefore, once 
one accepts the doctrine of ineffability one should perpetually resistant to attempts to 
seek any ‘final’ theoretical account, thereby rejecting all forms of monistic realism. And 
the cultivation of humility and other intellectual virtues will be central to this, for two 
reasons. 
First, Feyerabend can use a virtue-epistemological critique to counter the monistic 
tendencies that worry him. Any one community of inquirers which ‘Platonised’ their 
manifest reality would be guilty of a lack of humility, since they must make the claim 
that had achieved a privileged cognitive capacity—an Archimedean point—from which 
they could assert the identify of their manifest reality with reality itself. Since our 
knowledge is constituted and confined by our manifest realities, one cannot ‘step 
outside’ them to directly compare them against Being itself. Therefore, we have no 
means by which to assert the ‘absolute’ status of our own, preferred manifest reality.142  
Second, there is a tentative language reflective of virtue epistemology throughout 
Feyerabend’s writings. Throughout his career, during his ‘early’ and ‘later’ periods, one 
finds him repeatedly emphasising the moral and epistemic value of a host of 
recognisably intellectual virtues, including: humility, imagination, curiosity, open-
mindedness, and intellectual sympathy. Correspondingly, Feyerabend also constantly 
                                                                                                                                                                          
abasement seems unnecessary, however, since being humble, at least in my view, 
consists in the appreciation and assessment of one’s own limits and capabilities in 
relation to a wider context. The fact that certain features of the ‘order of being’ exceed 
‘all our competence’ (Havel, 1992: 267) should not inspire pessimistic renderings, such 
as Nancy E. Snow’s suggestion that ‘[c]entral to the role of humility is the 
acknowledgement of error or personal deficiency and its negative impact on others’ 
(1995: 205). Such negative conceptions of humility – as some kind of perverse praise of 
one’s own limitations and faults – seems to owe much to Aquinas’s treatment of 
humility. Judith Andre is, therefore, surely correct in her remark that ‘[i]f humility is a 
virtue it will be a richer object of study than the current philosophical discussion 
suggests’ (Andre, 2002: 279). 
142
 Feyerabend’s worries about ‘Platonisation’ are best stated in the form of Cooper’s 
‘hubris’ charges against ‘scientific absolutism’. See Cooper (2002: Ch8). 
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criticises both individuals and groups who exhibit the related intellectual vices, such as 
dogmatism, closed-mindedness, and unimaginativeness.143 Such virtue-epistemological 
critique is very visible in Feyerabend’s criticisms of Kuhn in ‘Consolations for the 
Specialist’, for instance in his complaint that Kuhn ‘steadfastly emphasises the 
dogmatic, authoritarian, and narrow-minded features of normal science’, with the 
explicit end of achieving a temporary “closing of the mind”’ (Feyerabend, 
1970d/1981b: 139).  
This interpretation of Feyerabend has been presaged by Godfrey-Smith (2001) and 
Meynell (1978). They both emphasise the importance to Feyerabend of what a virtue 
epistemologist would call ‘good intellectual character’ (see Roberts and Wood 2007). 
Godfrey-Smith (2001, 111-112), for instance, notes that Feyerabend’s paper 
‘Consolations for the Specialist’ ‘shows him to be one of the most perceptive critics of 
Kuhn’, for the reason that Kuhn offered ‘an incitement for scientists to become orderly 
and mechanical’ by ‘encouraging the worst trends in twentieth-century science toward 
professionalization, narrow-mindedness, and exclusion of unorthodox ideas’ (Godfrey-
Smith, 2001: 111-112). Often, such complaints are passed off as typical Feyerabendian 
polemics—perhaps reflective of his idiosyncratic temperament—rather than being 
perceived as philosophically-significant criticisms. I suggest that, on the contrary, the 
charge that Kuhn’s model of science encourages the formation of ‘dogmatic’, ‘narrow-
minded’ scientists is at the heart of Feyerabend’s criticisms in ‘Consolations’. Indeed, 
Feyerabend himself argued that ‘the final and most important argument against a 
‘mature’ science as described by Kuhn’ is the ‘humanitarian’ one (Feyerabend, 
1970d/1981b: 144). Hugo Meynell (1978: 252) similarly suggests that, on Feyerabend’s 
view, ‘it is the thorough application of the three mental dispositions of attentiveness, 
intelligence, and reasonableness, which are operative to some extent in all human 
affairs whatever, which is … constitutive of science as such.’ Feyerabend values the 
sciences ‘because, and in so far as, [they] cultivate mental dispositions in a very 
thorough way, far beyond the immediate requirements of survival’. However Meynell 
identifies these ‘mental dispositions’ as consequences of the application of scientific 
method and so thinks that Feyerabend’s ‘anarchism’ militates against them. This is 
false, for the reason that there is, as Feyerabend argued, no singular ‘scientific method’; 
indeed, ‘epistemological anarchism’ allows for a plurality of intellectual virtues to be 
manifested across the diverse range of epistemically excellent activities that one can 
justly describe as ‘science’. Godfrey-Smith and Meynell between them lay the 
                                                           
143
 I will shy off from giving a long list, but for some examples, see Feyerabend 
(1981a), 21, 34, 82n4, 85-86, 139, 150-151. This point might also shed light on the ad 
hominem nature of many of Feyerabend’s criticisms: one cannot help but criticise a 
person for having and exhibiting intellectual vices, since it is persons which are the 
‘bearers’ of virtues. However, see further Fricker’s (2010) proposal that institutions, 
juries and other collectives may also possess virtues; an engaging future project would 
be to see how virtues operate within scientific communities—a project which my case 
study of Feyerabend and Kuhn is intended to foreshadow. 
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foundations for future studies of the connections that Feyerabend may have seen 
between intellectual virtues and scientific methodology. 
Finally, a focus on intellectual virtues also helps to make sense of Feyerabend’s 
polemics against ‘intellectuals’, who, he alleges, invariably exhibit ‘conceit’ and 
‘intolerance’ (Feyerabend, 1993: 266-267; 1994).144 (Whether such criticisms are fair or 
not is, of course, another matter).  
I propose that the doctrine of ineffability functions as a ‘first-order norm’ by 
providing a foundation for the cultivation of intellectual virtues which are constitutional 
to being a good epistemic pluralist. These virtues include humility, tolerance, and open-
mindedness, and these are pre-conditional to epistemic pluralism because they militated 
against the monistic or dogmatic tendency to restrict the range of theories and traditions 
that one entertains, consults, and considers. The role of the doctrine of ineffability here 
is to emphasise that the ‘richness of Being’ cannot be exhausted by any one theory, or 
set of theories; that one needs many different and often-divergent ‘approaches’; that 
each ‘approach’ can claim explanatory successes and cognitive and practical efficacy of 
its own; and, finally, that the only real limit to the ‘abundance’ of reality is our own 
intellectual-viciousness. Of course, there may well be metaphysical limits to our 
investigations into reality, but, even if these exist, we will encounter the limits imposed 
by our own intellectual viciousness long before any limit that reality itself may impose. 
The doctrine of ineffability ‘points beyond itself to other types of knowledge and, 
together with them, to an unknown and forever unknowable [Being]’ (Feyerabend, 
2001: 196).145 
 
9.6 Conclusions. 
I have argued that the later Feyerabend sought to defend a radical epistemic pluralism 
by introducing the ‘doctrine of ineffability’ as a first-order norm. The doctrine of 
ineffability was intended to preserve pluralism by precluding any one community of 
inquirers from affirming the ‘hard realist’ credentials of their own ‘manifest reality’. 
However, ineffability of this sort is not a metaphysical position, even if the ambiguities 
in Feyerabend’s presentation suggest that it may be. It is, rather, a ‘first-order norm’ 
whose function is to preserve a space for epistemic pluralism, in two ways. First, it 
perpetually prevents any one manifest reality from identifying itself with reality itself, 
which therefore remains ‘forever unknown’ and open to further, pluralistic 
investigation. Second, ineffability, properly conceived, should encourage the cultivation 
of certain intellectual virtues, like humility, which pluralism is receptive to but which 
are incompatible with monism. I conclude that the doctrine of ineffability, so 
                                                           
144
 See, especially, his remarks on Husserl (Feyerabend, 1987: 274). See further 
Feyerabend (1998). 
145
 In Conquest of Abundance, writes Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend (2001: xii), 
Feyerabend ‘just points at the abundance of Being’ and at ‘the human openness and 
tolerance’ which appreciate of it requires. Note, too, that ‘openness’ and ‘tolerance’ are 
ethical and intellectual virtues. 
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conceived, successfully functions to provide firm foundations for epistemic pluralism, 
and that Feyerabend contributes a useful component to contemporary defences of 
pluralism. 
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Ch10 Conclusions 
 
10.1 A recap. 
10.2 The claims of this thesis. 
10.3 Feyerabend into the future. 
10.4 Conclusions.  
 
This thesis offered a study of the later philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. I argued that his 
later works can be understood as a defence of cultural and epistemic pluralism. ‘On the 
Critique of Scientific Reason’ includes the important remark that ‘[t]he excellence of 
science is assumed, it is not argued for’ (Feyerabend, 1976b: 112) and this brief 
sentence really sits at the heart of the complex array of political and philosophical 
concerns that animated Feyerabend’s later philosophy. In section one, I provide a recap 
of my thesis and section two then outlines my major claims. In section three I end with 
some remarks upon possibilities for future studies of Feyerabend. 
10.1 A recap. 
Chapter One outlined some of the usual criticisms of Feyerabend’s later work, 
including the charges that it consists mainly of ‘anti-science’ polemics, cultural 
relativism, or else that it lacks sufficient coherence to be considered as anything more 
than essays on incidental topics. I rebutted these objections and asserted the unity and 
value of the later Feyerabend. Chapter Two developed the defence of the later 
Feyerabend by providing a re-reading of the period from 1975 to 1978, between the 
publication of Against Method and Science in a Free Society, which is often seen to 
mark the ‘turn’ between the early and later Feyerabend. I suggested that during this 
period Feyerabend first began to explore the philosophical and political implications of 
the pluralistic view of the sciences be had been developing. However, owing to the 
harsh criticisms of Against Method, his first attempt to lay out these ideas was Science 
in a Free Society, whose exaggerated rhetoric obscured the legitimate points it had to 
make. At this point, Feyerabend’s status within the philosophy of science began to 
wane, even if his core project—a ‘critique’ of the nature and limits of science—was a 
legitimate one.  
Chapters Three and Four presented Feyerabend’s epistemological arguments for 
epistemic pluralism and, in Chapters Five and Six, these were connected with 
Feyerabend’s commitment to the value of cultural diversity. I suggested that, following 
John Stuart Mill, Feyerabend recognised that cultural and epistemic diversity are 
mutually enriching. Therefore, a plurality of ‘modes of living’ and ‘modes of thought’ 
is advantageous both for the growth of knowledge and human wellbeing. This helps to 
make sense of Feyerabend’s political concerns about the ‘hegemony’ of the sciences, 
which reflect the moral and political concern, inherited from Mill, about threats to 
diversity. Chapter Seven developed this with an examination of Feyerabend’s political 
philosophy of science, which, on my interpretation, is an attempt to encourage 
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philosophers to take seriously the question ‘what’s so great about science’. This 
question resonates throughout the later work and is not a statement of ‘anti-science’ 
prejudice, but is simply a call for us to be able to provide a clear account of how and 
why the sciences enjoy the cognitive and cultural prestige that they do. 
Feyerabend clearly wanted to defend cultural and epistemic pluralism on both 
philosophical and political grounds. Such pluralism maximises the conditions in which 
human beings can flourish; the sciences can play an important part in this, but not to the 
exclusion of other disciplines and subjects, such as philosophy and the arts. Chapters 
eight and nine explore one of Feyerabend’s final arguments for pluralism, the 
‘metaphysics’ that he began to develop during the last five years of his life. Chapter 
eight provided a reconstruction of the later Feyerabend’s metaphysics and 
epistemology, which I suggested could be interpreted as a form of ‘perspectivism’. The 
idea of ‘abundance’ outlined in Conquest of Abundance arises from the interaction of 
diverse human cognitive and creative faculties, on the one hand, with reality, on the 
other. There are problems with the later metaphysics, of course. Some of these, such as 
the charge of social constructionism, can be rebutted, but other remain more persistent; 
however, I suspended discussion of these and argued, in Chapter nine, that the ‘doctrine 
of ineffability’ that the later Feyerabend offers is in fact a methodological and 
epistemological strategy, not a metaphysical thesis. The ‘ineffability of reality’ 
functions as a ‘first order norm’, in Blackburn’s sense, and its aim is to preclude any 
one community of inquirers from asserting the exclusivity and priority of their own 
epistemic activities and conceptions of reality. Feyerabend’s talk of the ‘abundance’ 
and ‘ineffability’ of Being should be understood as efforts to secure a commitment to 
epistemic pluralism. 
The theme of pluralism therefore resonates throughout the later Feyerabend and it 
brings a new unity to essays and books that might otherwise seem admirably but 
hopelessly eclectic. In his explorations of pluralism, Feyerabend appeals to the history 
and philosophy of science, anthropology, Christian mysticism, and anything and anyone 
else that might offer him useful arguments or ideas. This is wholly consonant with his 
pluralistic methodology. Understanding the later Feyerabend as defending cultural and 
epistemic pluralism also shows his views are far less absurd or untenable than is often 
supposed. At the end of the day, Feyerabend does not claim that ‘Western science’ is 
useless, or that it is on a par with witchcraft and voodoo, nor does he claim that 
‘anything goes’ across cultures and sciences. Sometimes his rhetoric and ambiguities 
obscure his points, but there is, I suggest, a very persuasive position underlying his 
accounts of pluralism: Feyerabend’s position is that one should be able to account for 
the value of the sciences and that this requires us to have a proper understanding of the 
nature and limits of scientific inquiry.  
The sciences have much to offer, but their cognitive and cultural value is contingent 
upon our enjoying a proper critical perspective upon them. Feyerabend worried that 
‘myths’ about the sciences (such as the ‘myth of method’ and the presumption of the 
omnicompetence of science) were obscuring our capacity to critically assess their value 
and efficacy. Feyerabend is not in any sense ‘anti-science’, but is, rather, ‘anti-
scientistic’ in the sense outlined by Midgley (2001) and Dupré (1993): their hostility is 
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not to the sciences but only to inflated and misleading accounts of the structure, value, 
and efficacy of the sciences. His later philosophy was a sustained invitation to us to 
develop this critical perspective on science; the result of this perspective may well be a 
reassessment of the distribution of epistemic excellence, but it would not result in 
anything like the abandonment of science. Of course, Feyerabend felt that there were 
good empirical reasons to take seriously certain practices and systems currently judged 
to be ‘non-scientific’, and he was sensitive to the social, environmental and political 
destruction that have resulted from the presumption that cognitive and practical efficacy 
is confined to Western scientific and technological practices alone. However, such 
reassessments are made, not in an ‘anti-science’ or ‘anti-Western’ stance, but in a 
humanitarian spirit which sought to identify the practical and cognitive resources 
available to humankind. Far from being the ‘worst enemy of science’, the later 
Feyerabend proposes that the sciences may well deserve their privileged authority 
within our culture, but only on the condition that such authority was the result of 
sustained critical reflection, rather than prejudice or presumption.  
Feyerabend considered the question of the value of the sciences to be unanswered. 
Smolin (2007: 292) once remarked that Feyerabend’s ‘anti-science’ reputation had 
‘undoubtedly arisen because he considered the question of why science worked as 
unanswered’. This can be understood in two ways. First, Feyerabend thought that many 
familiar reasons given for the value and efficacy of the sciences were false or untenable. 
The two main reasons that he often referred to were the ‘argument from method’ and 
the ‘argument from results’, the claims that the sciences are uniquely efficacious 
because they enjoy a distinct ‘method’ which ensures their special cognitive status. 
Feyerabend’s argument against methodological monism and his epistemic and 
empirical defences of ‘non-scientific’ practices and knowledge were both intended to 
undercut these two arguments. Second, Feyerabend thought that judgements about the 
value of science were too often badly performed, presumptive, or just not taken 
seriously. Many of his later appeals to what I described as the efficacy of indigenous 
cultures reflected a concern to challenge the ‘presumption of the omnicompetence of 
science’. Feyerabend did consider that many ‘non-scientific’ environmental, medical, 
and classificatory practices were in fact successful and there is ample empirical and 
philosophical material in support of this; however, his primary aim was, I think, to 
prompt us to take seriously the question ‘what’s so great about science’.  
The later philosophy is therefore a sustained attempt to enable us to properly frame 
and address the question of the value and efficacy of the Western sciences in relation to 
the diversity of epistemic practices evidenced by global cultural diversity. Many of 
these attempts are, of course, polemical; but they are motivated by an earnest desire to 
provoke critical discussion and a sincere concern to preserve cultural and epistemic 
pluralism.146 Feyerabend thought that both philosophy and polemic were necessary to 
make us realise the presence and power of the myth of the omnicompetence of science; 
this is why he challenges us to imagine a ‘post-scientific society’ within which 
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 As one reviewer of Conquest of Abundance remarks, ‘Feyerabend’s views become 
more challenging with the quality of the questions put to him’ (‘A.N.’, 2001: 198). 
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scientific knowledge and practices play no part, and why he calls for the separation of 
science and the state, or when he curtly states that the philosophy of science should be 
abandoned and ‘left to die’.147 The purpose of such provocations is to help us to realise 
the presence of the entrenched prejudices which Feyerabend thinks preserve the 
privileged authority of the Western sciences. As Feyerabend once put it: 
 
‘It is very difficult nowadays to approach such questions in the right spirit. 
What is worthwhile and what is not are to such a large extent determined by 
the existing institutions and forms of life that we hardly ever arrive at a 
proper evaluation of these institutions themselves. The sciences especially 
are surrounded by an aura of excellence which checks any inquiry into their 
beneficial effect.’ (Feyerabend, 1981b: 142) 
 
This passage makes the aims of the later Feyerabend clear. A ‘proper evaluation of the 
sciences’ which proceeds in the ‘right spirit’, free from prejudice and presumption, will 
allow us to assess the ‘aura of excellence’ which surrounds the sciences. This will 
almost certainly result in a reconceptualisation of the structure and efficacy of the 
sciences, but this is a good thing, since it provides us with a clear and truthful 
understanding of them. It should also encourage pluralism, as we realise that 
possibilities exist for diversity in science which is currently checked by our false ideas 
about what science is, and isn’t. As Dan Hutto recognises, in a review of Conquest of 
Abundance, our capacity for conceptual innovation and epistemic growth ‘rests on the 
existence of unnoticed or, as yet, unemphasised aspects of reality’ which account for 
‘the possibilities in our ways of understanding that have been under-explored, 
unexamined and/or simply unseen’ (Hutto, 2002: 366). ‘What is important to stress’, 
adds Hutto, is that ‘such ambiguities and possibilities for change are always present in 
our language and practices, since they draw on the abundance that ultimate reality, or 
Being, avails us’ (Hutto, 2002: 367). The fact of the abundance of reality ensures the 
possibility of epistemic plurality and cultural diversity and therefore preserves an 
optimistic and attractive vision of a world of irreducible and inexhaustible richness, 
beauty, and complexity. The abandonment of false images of the science, and the 
reassessment of epistemic excellence, should begin to disclose something of the 
‘richness of Being’ that Feyerabend clearly delighted in.  
Feyerabend does not think that his later philosophy actually captures the abundance 
of reality. To do so would mean that he was as guilty as the ‘monists’ he criticises of 
trying to ‘cut down’ or dissolve the ‘richness of Being’ that he so praises. Feyerabend 
suggests simply that the world is richer than we may be liable to suppose. The policy is 
not ‘anything goes’ but rather ‘many things go’148—and the task of philosophers of 
                                                           
147
 In Science in a Free Society, Feyerabend suggested ‘that fields such as the 
philosophy of science, or elementary particle physics, or ordinary language philosophy, 
or Kantianism should not be reformed, but should be allowed to die a natural death’ 
(Feyerabend, 1978a: 122).  
148
 I borrow this neat quip from Chang (2010). 
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science is to help to identify just which things ‘go’ and which do not, and to expose 
those prejudices which interfere with this project. As Hacking puts it: 
 
‘What Feyerabend disliked was any form of intellectual or ideological 
hegemony … Single-mindedness in the pursuit of any goal, including truth 
and understanding, yields great rewards; but single vision is folly if it makes 
you think that you see (or even glimpse) the truth, the one and only truth.’ 
(Hacking, 2000: 28) 
 
What Feyerabend is trying to challenge is our susceptibility to ‘single vision’, to the 
reductionist and monistic tendencies which, he alleged, exist in certain areas of our 
intellectual culture, and which have come to enjoy considerable cognitive and cultural 
authority and, with that, striking political power.  
 
10.2 The claims of this thesis. 
There is much to say about the later Feyerabend. In this thesis I have focused upon one 
theme, the value of cultural and epistemic pluralism. Much more could be said about 
the later Feyerabend, but it will be worthwhile to state, briefly, my major claims and 
their significance for Feyerabend scholarship and the philosophy of science: 
 
(1) The later philosophy of Paul Feyerabend is unified and worthy of philosophical 
attention. The rebuttal of the ‘four charges’ against his later work should open the 
way for future studies, and hopefully this thesis will have offered some avenues for 
profitable enquiry. 
(2) The significance of Feyerabend’s work is not exhausted by his contributions to the 
philosophy of quantum theory, rationality and theory change, and methodology. 
These are all important, but the later work broaches new issues and questions 
which deserve to be taken seriously; for instance, questions about the value of the 
sciences. Indeed, many of the topics he raises have gone on to become important 
debates in the philosophy of science. 
(3) Feyerabend should assume a more central place within contemporary debates about 
pluralism in the sciences. Only a very few contemporary pluralists, namely Chang 
and Dupré, cite Feyerabend as a precursor. A notable area in which Feyerabend can 
contribute to contemporary pluralism is his emphasis upon the contributions that 
other cultures’ scientific traditions can make. 
(4) Feyerabend anticipated many of the themes of subsequent postcolonial and political 
philosophers of science, such as Harding and Kitcher. However, these subjects 
have not recognised this fact and would, arguably, benefit from doing so—
especially since Feyerabend indicates how political and postcolonial themes are 
continuous with more familiar issues in ‘mainstream’ philosophy of science. 
(5) The influence of John Stuart Mill upon Feyerabend has been clarified. What 
Feyerabend took from Mill was not simply arguments for theoretical pluralism, but 
a commitment to the ‘ethical’ value of cultural diversity. Mill’s claim that a 
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diversity of ‘modes of living’ is a precondition to human flourishing became a 
central feature of Feyerabend’s work. 
(6) Feyerabend had a deep and abiding concern with human wellbeing. I called this the 
‘primacy of ethics’. This is both an ethical and a political concern and it arguably 
animated his other concerns with, for instance, pluralism in the sciences. I would 
go as far as to say that all of Feyerabend’s pluralism was, following point three, 
motivated by a concern to provide conditions maximally suited for human 
flourishing. As Oberheim beautifully puts it, Conquest of Abundance is ‘an 
invitation to participate in the richness of being and a more tolerant and 
compassionate view of how the sciences, arts, and religions could jointly contribute 
to improving the human condition’ (Oberheim, 2001: 598). 
(7) The later Feyerabend was not a cultural relativist. Instead, he maintained that 
cultural diversity provides the range of ‘forms of life’ within which human beings 
can live and flourish. One can engage in intercultural moral criticism, provided one 
has sustained contacts with the populations in question. Feyerabend certainly was a 
cultural relativist for a period, but that pejorative label does not apply to his later 
work. 
(8) Feyerabend’s political philosophy of science is more coherent than is often 
supposed. The remarks on the separation of science and the state and the proposals 
for the public control of science are not, in themselves, the purpose of 
Feyerabend’s political remarks. Instead, they are intended to identify some of the 
issues which he thinks have been neglected by philosophers of science—even if 
recent work, for instance by Philip Kitcher, has been engaging with them. The core 
of Feyerabend’s political philosophy is the insistence that human beings must be 
properly informed about the institutions that affect them. The sciences were, he 
worried, too often exempted from this. 
(9) Feyerabend’s later work connects with range of disciplines and subjects that 
extends far beyond the history and philosophy of science. Obvious points of 
contact include medical and cultural anthropology, ethics, environmental and 
development studies, indigenous rights movements, feminist and postcolonial 
studies, and the history of philosophy. These wider connections indicate how 
Feyerabend can perhaps contribute to debates in these disciplines, and, 
reciprocally, how they might strengthen his later work. Even ostensibly eccentric 
inclusions, like Pseudo-Dionysius and the Dadaists, are in fact important to 
understanding the later Feyerabend—and they also indicate something of his 
scholarly ingenuity. 
(10) Throughout his later philosophy Feyerabend developed a history of Western 
intellectual culture, from the ancient to the modern period. This included a 
sustained study of Ancient Greek philosophy. This history deserves sustained 
study, since it forms part of the wider ‘conquest of abundance’ narrative. 
(11) The later Feyerabend is best understood as an attempt to provoke us to critically 
reflect on a series of interrelated questions about science, culture, and reality. 
Feyerabend is trying to provoke us to critically reflect; not to make (too many) 
positive claims. The later philosophy, is intended above all to serve a heuristic 
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function; to offer us a new perspective upon global cultural and epistemic diversity. 
As Grazia Borrini-Feyerabend puts it, the later Feyerabend is ‘not arguing nor 
striving to explain’, but instead offers ‘some questions and some stories [and] 
points at the abundance of Being’ (Borrini-Feyerabend, 2000: xii). 
 
Each of these claims could sustain further studies. Hopefully this thesis has succeeded 
in demonstrating that there is ample material and motivation for future studies of the 
later Feyerabend. 
10.3 Feyerabend into the future. 
It is worth briefly surveying the prospects for future studies of the later Feyerabend. 
Gratifyingly, the signs are encouraging. Interest in his work has been fairly constant 
since his death, although much of it suffers from the influence of the four charges 
rebutted in chapter one. Feyerabend remains a presence within the philosophy of 
science and his work is also still cited by anthropologists, development studies scholars, 
and others—including computer scientists. The last decade has also seen growing 
interest in Feyerabend amongst Italian, Spanish, and Eastern European philosophers; 
indeed, much of the recent literature on Feyerabend comes from philosophers based in 
those nations.149 
The next five years will see the publication of a host of new ‘Feyerabendiana’. These 
include volume four of his philosophical papers, entitled Physics and Philosophy 
(Feyerabend forthcoming a), currently being edited by Stefano Gattei and Joseph 
Agassi, collecting together Feyerabend’s early work in history and philosophy of 
quantum theory. The early 1990s lecture series Conflict and Harmony (Feyerabend 
2011) was published in English, having been unfortunately re-titled The Tyranny of 
Science (see Kidd forthcoming a). The Introduction to the Philosophy of Nature 
(Feyerabend 2009) has appeared in German to positive reviews in both the academic 
and popular press and is currently awaiting an English translation. Finally, 
Feyerabend’s correspondence with Kuhn, Popper, and John Watkins is currently being 
edited and prepared and should provide new personal and philosophical insights into his 
life and work—and theirs. There is also scholarly potential for a sustained study of 
Conquest of Abundance and the later philosophy at large, including developed accounts 
of Feyerabend’s discussions of epistemic pluralism, cultural diversity, the history of 
Western intellectual culture, ancient Greek thought and culture, the relationship 
between the arts and sciences, and the influence upon his work of Pseudo-Dionysius, 
David Bohm (1957), and the Dadaists, amongst others. These topics have been almost 
entirely neglected by the scholarship, much to the detriment of our understanding of the 
breadth and depth of Feyerabend’s thought. This thesis has hopefully helped to provide 
the basis for future studies of these various topics and in encouraging interest in them.  
There are also good philosophical reasons for an engagement with the later 
Feyerabend. Many of the topics and themes of his later work resonate with 
                                                           
149
 See, for instance, Adam (2001), Casamonti (2002), Civit (2008), Dauksa (2008), 
Dos Santos Terra (2008) and Tambolo (2007). 
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contemporary debates within the history and philosophy of science. Feyerabend was, I 
argued, a vigorous epistemic pluralist and this would locate him within the ‘pluralistic 
turn’ within the philosophy of science, as represented by figures such as Chang, Dupré, 
and Giere.  
Feyerabend engaged with issues in political and postcolonial philosophies of science, 
such as the work of Kitcher and Harding respectively, and he should enjoy a special 
significance because he is arguably the philosopher of science who has take the 
question of the value of science in the modern world seriously more than any other. 
(Indeed, Kitcher’s next book is called Science in a Democratic Society, the title of 
which is a nod to Feyerabend’s Science in a Free Society). Feyerabend’s ‘relativism’ is 
still of relevance to contemporary relativists, such as Boghossian, and it will be 
discussed by philosophers of science who retain an interest in relativism, such as Martin 
Kusch (who is currently writing a history of relativism in nineteenth- and twentieth-
century German thought within which Feyerabend will, Kusch tells me, feature).  
There is also scope for a revised account of Feyerabend’s place within the history of 
philosophy of science, both to correct the neglect of his later philosophy and to locate 
him within these wider antecedent developments. Finally, there are good opportunities 
for developing the connections that Feyerabend drew between history and philosophy 
of science, on the one hand, and anthropology, environmental and development studies, 
and other disciplines, on the other. This includes potential for the application of his later 
work to contemporary indigenous rights activist groups, postcolonial development 
theorists, and others involved in more overtly political activities. The prospects for 
future studies of Feyerabend are therefore very bright indeed. 
10.4 Conclusions. 
This thesis presented a study of the later philosophy of Paul Feyerabend. I argued that it 
consisted of a defence of cultural and epistemic pluralism which is continuous with his 
earlier work in scientific methodology. Despite rhetorical excess and occasional 
ambiguity, the later philosophy offers a coherent case for the claim that the continuing 
value of science depends upon our understanding of it. Previous failures to attain such 
understanding have resulted in political as well as philosophical problems and so there 
are urgent practical and moral as well as scholarly imperatives for us to pursue a 
‘critique of scientific reason’. A key outcome of such a ‘critique’ will be an 
appreciation of cultural and epistemic pluralism and their capacity to facilitate both the 
growth of knowledge and human wellbeing. The later Feyerabend therefore succeeded 
in presenting an optimistic and humane vision of cultural and epistemic pluralism, one 
which celebrates both the cross-cultural diversity of human interests and values and the 
‘richness of Being’ it discloses. 
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Appendix I Recollections of Paul Feyerabend 
 
These recollections are drawn from personal correspondence with former students and 
colleagues of Feyerabend and from various philosophical texts and autobiographies. All 
sources are cited and I offer my thanks to Alison and Donald for sharing their 
recollections. 
  
Alison Assiter ‘I am a former student of Paul Feyerabend. Following the B. Phil in 
Oxford I moved to Sussex to do my D. Phil there and he was around. He was a supreme 
actor. He would sit at the front of very large lecture theatres performing, for example, 
flat earth theory ... He would ‘jump’ (given his physical state that was difficult) from 
his desk and say, “look the earth can't be moving because I would not have landed 
vertically below the place I jumped from if it were”. He was also frustrating in seminars 
because he would say something and you would make a point against it (as you were 
supposed to!) and he would say: “oh well, I said that a few minutes ago, I no longer 
think it”.’ (per comm 8th March 2010) 
 
Donald Gillies ‘I met Paul Feyerabend not long after I had started (in the autumn of 
1966)  as a PhD student, and was working with Imre Lakatos as my supervisor in the 
LSE department of philosophy, of which Sir Karl Popper was then the head.  At the 
time Paul Feyerabend was very famous and fashionable.  He had at least 3 different 
academic posts, including one at University College London.  When in London, he 
would come frequently to LSE since he was very friendly towards Imre Lakatos with 
whom he enjoyed discussing philosophy.  In fact he gave his principal London lectures 
in LSE rather than UCL.  These were perhaps the most brilliant lectures which I ever 
attended.  Feyerabend had originally wanted a career as a performer either in the theatre 
or in Opera, and he gave his lectures with all the skill of a consummate actor.  The 
theme of the lectures was that during the period of the Copernican revolution 
(Copernicus to Newton), witchcraft was much more rational than science.  Feyerabend 
quoted the theory of witchcraft from a 17th [sic: 15th] century book on the subject:  
Malleus Maleficarum, which then was only available in Latin though it has 
subsequently I believe been translated into English.  He would translate a passage from 
this book, and then compare it with a passage from e.g. Galileo.  He would try to 
show that the authors of Malleus Maleficarum argue in a much more rational fashion 
with more attention to the empirical evidence than does Galileo.  Imre Lakatos would 
sit at the back of these lectures, but, every so often, he could no longer control himself.  
He would then exclaim:  “Oh Paul!  How can you say such a thing!” and then proceed 
to criticize Feyerabend's thesis forcefully.  Feyerabend was very skilled at argument, 
however, and could usually get the better of Imre Lakatos, or at least hold his own. At a 
personal level, Feyerabend always struck me as a very kind man.  He was always 
helpful to students and was an accessible person who would be prepared to make 
himself available to students for discussion and answering questions, even though he 
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was a world star at the time.  His behaviour in this respect was very different from that 
of other academic stars I have known subsequently.  I remember that on one occasion I 
gave a student party in a (not very salubrious) flat I was sharing with several other 
students.  I invited Imre Lakatos who was my supervisor, and he and Paul Feyerabend 
both came.  I remember sitting on the sofa with Paul Feyerabend who was very 
interested in Marshall McLuhan at the time and told me what he thought were the 
philosophical implications of McLuhan's work.’ (per comm 26th June 2008) 
 
Geoff Jordan ‘Feyerabend was enormously charismatic and persuasive … I was at 
LSE when Feyerabend gave a series of lectures ostensibly for “freshers”—first year 
undergraduates like myself—as an introduction to scientific method. People travelled 
from far and wide to attend these lectures and there were often scuffles to get into the 
Old Theatre, which was packed an hour before the lectures were scheduled to begin. 
Feyerabend began his first lecture by using the enormously long blackboard in the Old 
Theatre to wonderful theatrical effect. He took a piece of chalk and starting at the left-
hand side of the blackboard, dragged the chalk along the blackboard making a line. (He 
had quite a bad limp which made it even more dramatic.) When he got half way across, 
he stopped and lifted the chalk. Half a centimetre later, he continued the line until he 
got to the end of the blackboard. Then he strode back to the tiny gap in the line, 
thumped it and bellowed “THAT is Popper’s contribution to the philosophy of 
science!” He was equally enthralling when he sat in LSE’s Three Tuns Bar, good-
naturedly and passionately arguing about science and politics with anyone else who 
could get a seat at the crowded table.’ (Jordan, 2004: 49n13) 
 
John Krige ‘Sussex University: the start of Autumn Term, 1974. There was not a seat 
to be had in the biggest Arts lecture theatre on campus. Taut with anticipation, we 
waited expectantly and impatiently for the advertised event to begin. He was not on 
time—as usual. In fact rumour had it that he would not be appearing at all, that illness 
(or was it just ennui? or perhaps a mistress?) had confined him to bed. But just as we 
began sadly to reconcile ourselves to the idea that there would be no performance that 
day, Paul Feyerabend burst through the door at the front of the packed hall. Rather pale, 
and supporting himself on a small metal crutch, he walked with a limp across to the 
blackboard. Removing his sweater he picked up the chalk and wrote down three 
questions one beneath the other. What’s so great about knowledge? What’s so great 
about science? what’s so great about truth? We were not going to be disappointed after 
all! … [He] brought the house down by writing “Aristotle” in three-foot high letters on 
the blackboard and then writing “Popper” in tiny, virtually illegible letters beneath it!’ 
(Krige: 1980: 106-107)) 
 
Karin Knorr-Cetina ‘I went to his lectures [at Berkeley]. He was supportive. But 
Feyerabend at that time was a curious fellow. I had already met him in Vienna before. It 
was very difficult to have an intellectual discussion with him. He didn’t seem 
interested. He put his own philosophy into practice and he seemed interested only in 
pleasure. He was no longer interested in intellectual discussions with newcomers or 
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with anybody, it seemed (Lakatos had already died). Still Feyerabend was a very 
interesting experience for me because he was very committed to his historical materials 
and he gave fascinating lectures on it. But you could not get into a discussion with him; 
he refused to do that.’ (quoted in Bechtel and Callebaut, 1993:109) 
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Appendix II Further Reading on Indigenous Cultures 
Feyerabend often discussed indigenous cultures. Farewell to Reason and the third 
edition of Against Method are the best sources for his remarks on indigenous cultures 
and international development. Feyerabend’s discussions generally fall into two kinds. 
Firstly, there is documentation of the efficacy of indigenous medical, environmental, 
agricultural and classificatory systems. These are pertinent to the discussion in Chapter 
four about the presumption of the omnicompetence of science. That Chapter dealt with 
the philosophical arguments against that presumption, but it is worth adding some 
literature which provides empirical support for Feyerabend’s claims about the efficacy 
of indigenous cultures. Secondly, Feyerabend often discusses the ‘disenfranchisement’ 
of indigenous practices, systems, and cultures. This relates to his ethical and political 
concerns about the dissolution of global cultural diversity.  
The following is a condensed bibliography of further sources, which readers 
interested in the empirical support for such claims might turn. For convenience, I divide 
them into ‘Efficacy’ and ‘Disenfranchisement’. For both of these themes, the work of 
Sandra Harding (1998; 2006; 2008; forthcoming) is indispensable as a source both of 
further reading and philosophical discussion. 
 
II.1 Efficacy 
Anthropologists and other scholars have provided enormous documentation on the 
beliefs, practices, and systems of knowledge generated by world cultures. The general 
scholarly issues are discussed by Brouwer (1998). 
The relationships between ‘traditional’ and ‘Western’ medicine is disussed by  
Bodeker (2007), Cant and Sharma (1999), Lock and Nichter (2002) and Strathern and 
Stewart (1999). The historical context is provided by Bynum et al (2006), Digby 
(2006). Much of the best literature is being provided by historians of colonial medicine, 
such as Crozier (2007), De Barros (2007), Harrison (1999), Lyons (2007), MacLeod 
(1988), Palit and Dutta (2005) and Sutphen and Andrews (2003). The philosophical 
issues concerning medical pluralism are discussed by Kidd (forthcoming f) and 
Parusnikova (2002), and there is useful material in Singh and Ernst (2008). 
Feyerabend’s credentials as an environmental philosopher are defended by the later 
Arne Naess (1991)—himself an eminent environmental philosopher—and Devall 
(1999). The efficacy of traditional environmental knowledge is discussed and defended 
by Brunbacher and McGregor (1998), Dudgeon and Berkes (2003), Ellen and Harris 
(2004), the Gwich’in Elders (1997), Johnson (1992), McGregor (2004), Milton (1998), 
Roberts (1996), Sanga and Ortalli (2004), Selin (2003), Stevenson (1999). The 
historical perspective is detailed by Schibeinger and Swan (2007). 
 
II.2 Disenfranchisement 
There is an enormous literature on the historical, moral, political, and legal aspects of 
the often-detrimental relationships between ‘Western’ and ‘non-Western’ cultures.  
These range from specific anthropological case studies of particular tribes, to more 
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expansive historical narratives, with much else besides. An invaluable resource is 
Blaser, Feit, and McRae (2004). Fricker’s (2007) idea of ‘epistemic injustice’ could be 
usefully applied to the disenfranchisement of indigenous knowledge and cultures. See 
also Giuilio (2004). The history is treated in the essays in Delbourgo and Dew (2008), 
Jacob (2008) and Pratt (2008). The political and legal issues regarding indigenous 
peoples are discussed in Gray (2002), Keal (2003), and Shiva (1989). Shiva (1993) also 
discusses the general philosophical and practical issues regarding cultural and epistemic 
pluralism, and Spivak (1999) offers an engaging ‘postcolonial critique’. 
 
These suggestions for further reading do not reflect the enormous diversity of literature 
on this topic. The items included are, notably, primarily academic works, and do not 
include the testimonial literature provided by indigenous peoples themselves. This is 
something that Feyerabend would certainly disapprove of, but hopefully this omission 
may be addressed in future studies. 
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